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Despite Economics increasing interest in the effects of conflict, our empirical knowledge has 
lagged behind. Recent studies have highlighted important and varied long run costs to 
conflict. Due to a lack of research on how households adapt to conflict and insecurity, 
however, we have little understanding of how these costs emerge and little evidence with 
which to design policies. This dissertation contributes by examining the responses of 
households to insecurity, particularly during conflicts. 
 
While other authors point to the importance of insecurity, insecurity has never been measured. 
The dissertation introduces a methodology to create spatially disaggregated measures of 
conflict risk and uses these to present the first estimates of the relative contributions of 
insecurity and exposure to violence to the aggregate household costs of conflict. While the 
dissertation leverages several unique datasets, I show that more widely available data can be 
used to similar effect. Having established that insecurity accounts for at least half of the costs 
in rural Northern Uganda, I examine household livelihood responses along both intensive and 
extensive margins. Lastly, using a ten period panel with the first direct household subjective 
perceptions of insecurity, I investigate the impact of these perceptions on income and find that 
these effects differ throughout the year, likely reflecting the heterogeneity of income 
generating opportunities throughout the year. Moreover, I study the effect of prior perceptions 
 in determining current beliefs and find that prior beliefs have little economic significance. 
Rather, agro-meteorological conditions, particularly pasture quality (NDVI), drive changes in 
subjective perceptions of insecurity. 
 
The primary contribution of the dissertation is to underline the importance of responses to 
insecurity in determining the costs to conflict. Despite the focus on exposure to violence, the 
majority of the aggregate costs of conflict arises from responses to insecurity and may occur 
irrespective of the presence of violence. More broadly, by focusing on areas and households 
which experience conflict, current studies conflate the effects of the risk and realization of 
violence. The results here suggest that the large and varied lasting costs of conflict likely can 
be traced back to household responses to insecurity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT: MEASUREMENT AND PATHWAYS 
 
The empirical literature on the costs of conflict has evolved from initial cross country aggregate 
measures of foregone economic growth to the more recent examination of the non-monetary 
micro-costs, such as education and health, associated with conflict. Currently, the literature is 
further evolving towards a third stage which aims to understand the pathways from conflict to 
the observed costs. While the former two stages have quantified large and varied costs from 
conflict, the emerging third stage is essential for designing policy, both with respect to targeting 
and mechanisms. This dissertation aims to contribute to this third stage by quantifying the effects 
of insecurity (i.e., the risk of violence during conflict) separate from its manifestation (i.e., 
attacks and exposure to violence).  
Whereas existing studies have not empirically modeled and measured insecurity distinctly, I both 
propose a methodology for creating spatially disaggregated measures of conflict-risk as well as 
provide the first empirical study with actual household subjective expectations of insecurity. 
Additionally, I use perhaps the largest household data set ever used to study conflict to provide a 
comprehensive view of household responses to insecurity. Lastly, while time has been used to 
identify the effects of conflict, this has typically relied comparisons across years. Using unique 
quarterly data, the dissertation examines the effects of the seasonal timing of perceptions of 
insecurity by estimating quarter-specific impacts of subjective expectations. 
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The early macro-based research examined used cross country panel data to examine the effects 
of the incidence of conflict on GDP (per capita) finding estimated impacts ranging from 1.25 to 
2.2 percent lower GDP per capita per year of civil conflict (Collier 1999; Imai and Weinstein 
2000; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003). Taking into account all the factors associated with 
conflict, including spatial spillovers (Murdoch and Sandler 2002; 2005), Collier and Hoeffler 
(2007) estimate that the cost of a “typical” civil war is roughly 250 percent of the initial GDP. 
These estimates, however, only focus on the aggregate economic effects, as measured by GDP. 
In addition to the difficulties in accurately measuring national account in the midst of conflict, 
GDP is only one portion of the costs of conflict. Conflict may have long run impacts through 
educational or health outcomes. Additionally, these estimates do not explain how these costs are 
distributed both within the country as well as across the population. 
While a related literature on peace dividends using asset prices has emerged (for housing prices: 
Besley and Mueller 2012; Collins and Margo 2007; for stock prices: Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007; Zussman and Zussman 2008; Zussman, Zussman, and 
Nielsen 2008) has emerged, the current empirical literature primarily focuses on individual and 
household outcomes. This micro-conflict literature finds substantial conflict-induced costs along 
a number of different dimensions including education (Akresh and de Walque 2011; Blattman 
and Annan 2010; Shemyakina 2011), nutrition/health (Akresh et al. 2011, forthcoming; Minoiu 
and Shemyakina forthcoming) and shifts in behavioral parameters such as risk aversion or time 
preferences (Voors et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2012; Cassar et al. 2012). With the possible 
exception of the literature on the behavioral consequences of conflict, the causes for the observed 
lower outcomes are unclear. In particular, it is not clear whether these outcomes arise 
predominately from direct exposure to violence or rather from the effects of risk, presumably via 
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deliberate household risk mitigation. This distinction has important consequences for the design 
of policy interventions. 
While insecurity has been believed to have an important effect in spreading the costs of conflict 
(Dercon 2008; Justino 2009), this has only been recently supported empirically. Recent research 
have found household behavior that is consistent with ex ante risk mitigation strategies in labor 
markets (Fernández et al. 2011; Menon and Rodgers 2011) and the choice of crops and livestock 
(Finnström 2003; Bundervoet 2007; Vlassenroot 2008). While these behaviors are often 
interpreted as responses to insecurity, the actual risk or perceptions of risk have not yet been 
measured; rather, the research has relied on qualitative priors on insecurity and potential 
responses. Consequently, the responses could also reflect a variety of other unmeasured factors. 
Moreover, since these studies focus on specific responses, such as in the labor market, we lack 
both an understanding of the overall effects of insecurity as well as the importance of the relative 
pathways. 
This dissertation makes several contributions to understanding how insecurity contributes to the 
observed costs during conflict. In economics, data on subjective expectations are rarely collected 
(Manksi 2004), especially for expectations of violence. To help to address the absence of 
relevant data, the second chapter proposes a methodology for creating spatially disaggregated 
measures of statistical and perceived risk based on spatio-temporal community-level behavior 
and placement of attacks. This methodology is then used to create the first estimates of the 
separate effects of the risk and realization of conflict. The findings suggest that while the effects 
of exposure are more important than those of risk in households which are attacked, the 
aggregate effects of insecurity are more important. This reversal in relative importance results 
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from the relatively small fraction of the population who are directly exposed violence whereas 
insecurity is more widely experienced. More broadly, this suggests that a focus on the direct 
victims of conflict may overlook the majority of the costs. 
While the second chapter finds substantial individual and aggregate costs from conflict, it does 
not examine their origins. The third chapter examines the correlation between the above 
measures of risk and household behavior using data from close to 700,000 households. I find that 
most of the consequences of insecurity in Northern Uganda are along the intensive margins. In 
particular, households respond to insecurity by changing the value (-65% at the mean level of 
insecurity) and composition of livestock holdings. Looking at the returns associated with 
different types of livestock, households shift from more profitable but risky larger livestock to 
smaller livestock. There is also evidence of men shifting from unpaid family labor to becoming 
employees whereas female labor force participation and allocation is unaffected. In contrast to 
asset portfolios, risk seems to have only limited effects on sources of income. Similarly, there is 
no real effect on the returns to assets. Moreover, once the asset portfolio allocation is included in 
the model, the economic effect of insecurity from chapter 2 disappears. This suggests that the 
effect of the risk of violence may operate primarily through changes in assets composition and in 
the activities in which these are employed and not through changing returns to these activities 
While chapter 2 provides the first quantitative evidence of the costs of insecurity, it uses 
constructed measures of risk which may differ from actual perceptions. Using a 10 period panel 
of household perceptions of insecurity, Chapter 4 uses the first direct subjective expectations of 
insecurity to study their effect on income. I find that their significant effects on income 
components are masked in the aggregate income measure. Moreover, there are substantial and 
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varied impacts of insecurity inter-seasonally that cannot emerge in the current cross-sectional 
literature. Lastly, the evolution of perceptions across time is studied. I find that prior beliefs 
regarding insecurity have little impact on current beliefs whereas agro-meteorological 
conditions, particularly pasture quality, are important determinants. As is discussed in Chapter 6, 
this suggests that agro-meteorological conditions can be used to create models forecasting 
perceptions and therefore enable pre-emptive policy interventions. 
Taken together, the chapters in the dissertation provide the first comprehensive examination of 
the relative effects of insecurity (i.e., the risk of violence) versus actual violence. In particular, 
contrary to general beliefs, direct exposure to violence does not appear to be the driving the 
majority of conflict related costs, as measured by income or consumption. Additionally, the costs 
from insecurity appear to arise from costly household responses as opposed to general 
equilibrium effects, such as prices. Chapter 6 concludes by examining the implications of the 
previous chapters for the policy and considers research questions which arise from the 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COST OF FEAR:  
THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE RISK OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
 
I. Introduction 
The 2011 World Development Report notes that one in four individuals live in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries, or in countries with very high levels of violence. Moreover, not a 
single Millennium Development Goal (MDG) has been achieved by a low income fragile or 
conflict-affected country (World Bank 2011). Despite this clear influence on both country and 
individual-level outcomes, economists have a very limited empirical understanding of the effects 
of conflict, especially at the household level. The existing literature primarily examines 
aggregate national measures of the economy or focuses on micro post-conflict outcomes; the 
behavior of households during conflict remains almost unstudied. In particular, since the 
majority of people in conflict and violence-prone countries do not experience violence directly, 
the near-exclusive focus of the literature on the experience of violence1 ignores potentially 
significant losses due to the persistent insecurity and uncertainty. 
Although both insecurity and exposure to violence surely contribute to the costs of conflict, the 
distinction between the two has important consequences. If the costs from conflict primarily arise 
from direct exposure, this implies that the costs of conflict are disproportionately borne by a 
narrow set of individuals and only materialize during attacks and in ex post household responses. 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper, the experience of violence refers to first-hand exposure to attacks. Being present at an attack 
without being directly attacked is not considered as “experiencing violence” in this paper. 
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In this case, policy interventions are necessarily reactive as they can only occur after attacks. In 
contrast, if the costs are primarily due to insecurity, then the costs of conflict are spread out over 
the broader population and are likely the result of ex ante risk mitigation strategies. That is, the 
costs from conflict are primarily “self-inflicted” by households as they seek to minimize 
exposure to violence and its expected impact. Consequently, policy interventions should focus on 
broader swathes of the populations and can be pro-active rather than waiting for the outbreak 
violence.  
Several recent papers examining the effect of conflict on labor markets have found responses 
consistent with responses to insecurity (Dell 2011; Fernández et al. 2011; Menon and Rodgers 
2011). Similarly, numerous authors have linked the increases of low-risk low-return crops during 
conflicts to insecurity (Finnström 2003; Bundervoet 2007; McKay and Loveridge 2005; 
Vlassenroot 2008). In the absence of empirical measures of insecurity, these claims cannot be 
directly examined nor can the potential (and relative) effects of insecurity be quantified. 
This paper provides the first empirical estimates of the effects of the risk of violence during 
conflict by creating spatially disaggregated measures of risk. Similar to Mueller and Besley 
(2012), I rely on the spatio-temporal variation in the realization of violence. Whereas Mueller 
and Besley measure sectarian violence in Northern Uganda at the regional level, using 
representative community and household data from Northern Uganda, I am able to look at the 
variation at a much more disaggregated level and thereby to create community level measures of 
conflict risk. Although individual risk can differ from community risk levels, qualitative and 
quantitative evidence strongly suggests that exposure to violence within Northern Ugandan 
communities is largely homogenous and independent of household attributes, In contrast to the 
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existing conflict literature which conflates the effects of the risk and realization of violence, by 
using these measures of risk, this paper provides the first separate estimates of their respective 
effects. 
The unique data allow for the creation of disaggregated measures of both statistical (objective) 
and perceived (subjective) risk. While subjective perceptions of risk are conceptually superior, 
these are rarely collected, particularly in conflict data (Manski 2004). In contrast, as is shown in 
this paper, statistical measures of risk can be created using the relatively more available data on 
the placement of attacks. Comparisons of the two measures of conflict show that the effects of 
the two are qualitatively similar thereby suggesting a methodology for creating disaggregated 
risk measures in other contexts. 
At the individual level, there are higher costs (in terms of per capita household expenditure) from 
the experience of violence than from conflict risk (10 percent vs 2-8 percent). However, since 
considerably more individuals suffer from conflict risk than are exposed to violence, risk 
accounts for at least half of the aggregate household losses from conflict. Additionally, I present 
the first empirical evidence of within-country spillovers of conflict-related losses onto 
households that are not directly exposed to violence. Lastly, this research adds to the literature on 
food aid by providing rough estimates on the effectiveness of food aid in mitigating conflict-
related economic losses among households in Northern Uganda.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly considers how conflict-
related risk can affect household behavior. Section III discusses the heterogeneity in the risk of 
experiencing violence and reviews the relevant economics literature. Section IV briefly 
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highlights the history of conflict in Northern Uganda before section V presents the empirical 
strategy. Sections VI and VII discuss the underlying data and the estimation results, respectively. 
Section VIII concludes and discusses policy implications. 
II. Risk, Shocks, and Conflict 
The literature on choice under uncertainty provides a framework for understanding the role of 
risk in household decisions. This literature views households as living in uncertain environments 
where choices regarding asset and activity portfolios are made before the uncertainty regarding 
future shocks is resolved. Households make decisions at two discrete points in time. First, 
households make choices before knowing which, if any, shocks will occur. Ex ante strategies, 
such as diversifying crops or delaying planting, are used to manage the risk2, that is, to reduce 
the probability of the shock or the magnitude of its effects. A second choice takes place after any 
shocks have occurred, whether positive or negative. At this time, households use ex post risk 
coping strategies (e.g., selling assets) to smooth incomes (Deaton 1992, Dercon 2002, or 
Townsend 1994).  
In addition to the risk of death or injury, conflicts can also affect both ex ante and ex post 
decisions. For instance, assets that support peacetime livelihoods may become liabilities during 
conflicts (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2007). Certain assets, such as livestock, are not only more 
likely to be looted, but they may also increase the risk of being attacked, especially if they are 
difficult to conceal. The composition of crops is also likely to change as crops whose harvest 
may be delayed at low cost, such as cassava, may be particularly advantageous in conflict zones. 
                                                          
2 Risk refers to the possibility that a particular shock may occur. 
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In contrast, perishable crops, such as fruits or vegetables, often need to be harvested within a 
short period of time. If households are forced to choose between venturing to exposed fields to 
harvest and remaining in the relative safety of their village, they may choose to not cultivate such 
crops in the face of the risk of violence. More broadly, conflict-related risk should lead 
households to avoid otherwise profitable activities with sunk costs, or assets that cannot be easily 
hidden, transported or liquidated (Dercon 2008). This suggests that as perceived risk increases, 
income and consumption should decrease below their risk-free optimal levels. In certain cases, 
households might consume more in order to prevent looting although this strategy is unlikely in 
the poorest households, who save little. 
Conflict also reduces the effectiveness of ex post risk coping strategies thereby increasing the 
importance of ex ante risk mitigation. Markets for asset sales3 or for labor may no longer 
function well, while migration may become restricted. Similarly, both community and informal 
insurance networks may weaken due to the death or migration of members, or the increase in 
shocks experienced by network members due to the conflict (Verpoorten and Berlage 2007). 
Additionally, the risk associated with travel, even over short distances, may also weaken ties 
between members. 
III. The Empirical Conflict Literature 
Although the effects of conflict have been examined at both the micro and macro levels, conflict 
risk has never been explicitly considered been measured. For aggregate studies, the effects of 
conflict are typically measured using changes in GDP and therefore reflect the risk and 
                                                          
3 Verpooten (2009) reports that cattle prices in Rwanda decreased by 50 percent during the genocide. This may be 
caused by the widespread sale of cattle as well as by the difficulty in protecting livestock during times of conflict. 
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experience of violence as well as conflict-induced changes in trade, exchange rates and foreign 
direct investment. Consequently, it is difficult to understand how estimates of 1.25 to 2.2% lower 
per capita GDP each year of conflict translate to the micro-level (Collier 1999; Imai and 
Weinstein 2000; Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003). In particular, these studies are unable to 
study the distributional effects of conflict on welfare.  
At the household level, the absence of measures of conflict risk leads studies to overestimates of 
the direct effect of violence. Since households that experience violence also suffer from its risk, 
the effect of ex ante risk management is included in the estimates of the effects of exposure to 
violence. At the same time, despite overestimating the effect of the experience of violence, the 
overall impact of violence is underestimated. Since losses are only measured in households or 
regions that experience violence, these studies leave out the effects of risk of violence in those 
households that do not experience violence. Lastly, these studies typically focus on post-conflict 
outcomes and find important consequences from conflict. However, they are unable to separate 
the mechanisms. What are the relative contributions of the violence, the ex ante risk mitigation 
or the ex post coping mechanisms? 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers that formally test for the effects of conflict risk 
separate from the direct experience of violence; however, many results are consistent with 
households sacrificing returns in response to this risk. Examining rural agriculture during the 
conflict in Burundi, Bundervoet (2007) finds a shift from maize towards cassava production that 
he interprets as household increasing the share of low-risk low-return crops in their portfolio. 
McKay and Loveridge (2005) find similar results looking at changes in the composition of 
production in Rwanda pre- and post- genocide (1990 and 2000). Although they do not control for 
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violence, they also find that households shifted away from “risky” cash crops such as coffee and 
beer bananas towards “safer” crops such as cassava and Irish potatoes. Similarly, examining 
labor markets, Fernández et al. (2011) find that a shift in male labor shifted from on-farm work 
towards off-farm non-agricultural work. This is partially driven by the focus of Colombian 
violence on land and livestock, thereby making agricultural labor riskier. Examining female 
labor market choices in Nepal, Menon and Rodgers (2011) find increased supply in response to 
conflict. While they provide several reasons for this shift, one is that many men left their families 
(and the women) behind as they sought work and security. Similarly, examining the effect of 
municipal level drug trade-related violence in Mexico, Dell (2011) finds that it lowers female 
labor force participation and female informal sector wages. 
A related literature examines peace dividends by looking at the effect of violence on housing 
prices (Besley and Mueller 2012; Collins and Margo 2007), and stock prices (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007; Zussman and Zussman 2008; Zussman, 
Zussman, and Nielsen). These studies find strong effects of peace on prices, especially as it 
becomes credible, or surrounding key events such as assassinations. While these studies do not 
explicitly model the effects of the risk of violence, as a group, they suggest strong financial 
responses to conflict risk. 
IV. Conflict in Northern Uganda 
Although conflict in Northern Uganda pre-dates the emergence of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in 1986, the rise of the LRA from the remnants of Alice Lakwena’s short lived rebellion 
began a near-continuous cycle of violence in Northern Uganda. Initially, the LRA sought to 
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capitalize on the tensions between the North and the newly installed government in the center of 
the country, and claimed to represent the interests of the Acholi, one of the main Northern ethnic 
groups. The inability of the LRA to obtain support from the local population quickly led to the 
LRA targeting the local population for supplies and recruits. Throughout this period, attacks are 
fairly widespread. Representative data finds that 16, 25 and 25 percent of Northern communities 
suffered attacks by the LRA in 1992, 1999 and 2004 respectively (Ssewanyana et al. 2007).  
Unlike many other insurgencies, the LRA typically did not seek to engage government forces, 
preferring instead to target the local population especially for forced recruitment through 
abductions. Youths were typically permanently abducted and forced into the LRA, while older 
individuals were often used as temporary porters or as guides. The length of the conflict and the 
absence of reliable data complicate estimates of the level of abductions, however, they are 
believed to range from 20,000 to 80,000 (Lomo and Hovil 2004, Pham et al. 2007, and Blattman 
and Annan 2010).  
The prolonged violence resulted in several types of migration. Wealthier household were able to 
flee towards urban areas. Poorer groups tended to move to internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camps located within Northern Uganda (Fiala 2009). Additionally, since the LRA often attacked 
at night, a large number of children commuted nightly to the relative safety of urban areas or to 
the centers of IDP camps. At its peak, there were an estimated 30,000 “night commuters” 
(Amnesty International 2005). 
Beginning in 2002, the government displaced large numbers of individuals, primarily from 
conflict prone areas, to IDP camps. Between voluntary and involuntary movements, certain 
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districts virtually emptied. For instance, by 2004, approximately 90 percent of the original 
populations of Gulu and Kitgum districts were no longer in their original districts (Pham et al., 
2005). Although the reasons for the government’s choices of particular districts are not known, it 
is reasonable to assume that these areas were among the areas with the highest risk of future 
attacks. Consequently, ex ante losses from the risk of conflict may be underestimated as the 
individuals in the high risk communities were moved to lower risk communities.  
V. Empirical Strategy 
Building on the earlier discussion, the effects of conflict on household welfare can be thought of 
as being composed of two parts: the responses to risk (Risk: ex ante risk mitigation), and the 
effects of the shock including household responses (Experience: losses from both the exposure to 
violence and the subsequent ex post risk coping).  
Formally, this can be estimated using the following equation: 
(1) 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏3𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
where the subscripts refer to community i and household j. X reflects the other observed factors 
that influence welfare. While the questionnaire contains questions regarding the exposure of 
communities and households to violence, there is only limited information regarding risk. 
Consequently, conflict-risk levels need to be estimated. 
Measuring Conflict Risk 
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Since violence is typically not random, regions or households face different risks of exposure. 
Conceptually, violence can be thought of as occurring on two separate but related levels: 
geographic and within area. The former “placement effect” encompasses the reasons that 
determine which areas experience violence (see Jacoby 2000 for discussion of placement 
effects). In the context of conflict, the characteristics of an area, such as the physical geography 
or its ethnic homogeneity, may influence both its likelihood of being attacked as well as the 
observed outcomes. The second effect is the within community heterogeneity as even within a 
community that is attacked, households may face very different risks of experiencing violence. 
For instance, in ethnic or religious conflicts, such as genocide in Rwanda or inter-communal 
violence in India, this risk may vary greatly among households within a community and will 
therefore result in different household responses.  
In this paper, the estimation of risk on the assumption that, in the context of Northern Uganda, 
while the risk of violence is heterogeneous at the community level, it is largely homogenous 
within communities. This assumption is supported by a variety of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence.  
Although the LRA operated throughout Northern Uganda, the “placement” of its attacks was not 
random as it primarily operated in the Acholi districts. While the tactics and motivations of the 
LRA are unclear, there are several plausible explanations for this targeting such the substantial 
linguistic differences throughout Northern Uganda. Since the original LRA members primarily 
came from the Acholi districts, it was easier for the LRA to operate in these areas and to 
communicate with abducted individuals from these districts. Moreover, although the main bases 
for the LRA were in Southern Sudan, they had a number of smaller bases in the area including in 
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Pader district (Fiala 2009). Over time, especially after 2002, LRA attacks became more frequent 
in other parts of the country (Ssewanyana et al. 2007). This is partially the result of the forced 
displacement of districts by the government, thereby depriving the LRA of potential targets for 
supplies and abductees and forcing them to follow the migration. 
In contrast to the “placement” of attacks, within community risk was largely homogenous as the 
evidence suggests that attacks and abductions were random within the same village, or at least 
uncorrelated with individual observed and unobserved characteristics. This is largely the result of 
the ideology of the LRA to “purify” Northern Uganda of corruption and witchcraft through 
violence (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Branch 2010; Titeca 2010; and Finnström 2003). 
Consequently, all non-LRA individuals were at potential risk of violence, abduction or death. 
Interviews of former LRA officers indicate that the LRA would attack any households 
encountered and abduct all able-bodied civilians (Blattman and Annan 2010). In particular, the 
former officers note that the targeted homesteads were generally unplanned and random. 
Crucially, this suggests that concerns of reverse causality between consumption and conflict, 
such as villagers reducing wealth to lower the likelihood of attacks, are unfounded. 
Once a village or homestead was attacked, the LRA’s “strategy was to abduct first and sort out 
later” (Blattman and Annan, 2010: p. 8-9). This is supported by Blattman and Annan’s (2010) 
quantitative analysis of youth abductions using a pre-abduction representative data set for one of 
the most affected districts in Northern Uganda.4 They find no statistically significant differences 
                                                          
4 The Blattman and Annan study is particular unique since in most data, including the one used for this research, it is 
not possible to empirically verify the exogeneity of attacks. Any post-attack variables are potentially endogeneous to 
the violence. Additionally, since certain households or individuals may disappear from the data, the post-attack 
population is not representative of the pre-attack population. Consequently, any analysis requires both a pre-attack 
representative sample and pre-attack characteristics. 
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in the mean of pre-war characteristics that predict abductions in other conflicts, such as pre-war 
wealth or parental characteristics. The only exceptions were the year of birth and the size of the 
household. The former reflects the preference of the LRA for youths between the ages of 10 and 
24 as forcible recruits; younger children were less useful while older youth were perceived as 
being difficult to indoctrinate. The significance of the size of household is driven by the sub-
sample of household with 25 or more members. This is not only a rare occurrence in their data 
but also overall in Northern Uganda. The 2002 Uganda National Census shows that less 1 
percent of households in Northern Uganda, rural or urban, have 15 or more members; in rural 
areas, this represents roughly 0.5% of the sample. Blattman and Annan’s (2010) findings suggest 
that variation of individual and household characteristics within village did not affect the 
likelihood of being abducted. 
Relationship between Objective and Subjective Risk 
Two different types of risk can be estimated with the data available in this study: statistical 
(objective) and perceived (subjective). The former refers to the observed likelihood of a 
particular shock occurring while the latter to the a priori belief that a specific shock will occur. In 
general, the two types of risk may differ for a variety of reasons including incomplete 
information or behavioral biases such as the proximity or vividness of events. Moreover, within 
economics, Lowenstein et al. (2001) highlights how “emotional reactions to risk situations often 
diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks…[and that] when such divergence occurs, 
emotional reactions often drive behavior”. (p. 267).  
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In particular, numerous studies argue that subjective risk assessments are formed through 
interactions between analytical and experiential systems (see Slovic et al. 2002 for a review of 
the literatures). That is, subjective risk assessments are can be broadly considered as a 
combination of objective risk and of individual feelings, memories and associations. Based on 
this relationship, statistical risk can be viewed as a measurement of perceived risk that contains 
measurement error (the subjective part of the expectations). Therefore, as with classical 
measurement error, the effects of statistical risk in the subsequent results should be lower than 
those the perceived risk (due to the attenuation bias towards zero). 
Estimating Risk 
Both objective and subjective risk are measured through questions in the community 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was administered through group interviews of community 
leaders.5 Specifically, the objective risk measure is based on a binary question asking about 
“incidents of LRA Rebel attacks currently (2004).” Since this is relative to a specific event, as 
opposed to a belief, it is unlikely that there systematic differences between community leaders 
and individual household respondents. Moreover, due to its potential consequences, this is an 
important event that is likely well known within the village.  
The second relevant question asked in which years did “any section of the community find it 
hard to cultivate their land in the past years because of insecurity?” The responses are limited to 
those who answer the current year (2004). While this question does not directly measure subject 
                                                          
5 Enumerators were instructed to make certain that the respondents contained at least two men and two women and 
which did not exceed 10 individuals. Moreover, the group was supposed to contain at least several individuals who 
have lived in the community for several years and who are knowledgeable about historical events. In general, this 
group was supposed to be organized with the help of the local community leader (chairperson of the LC1). 
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perceptions regarding risk, it does measure a direct response to perceived insecurity. Since 
agriculture is the self-reported primary income source for the majority of respondents (~70 
percent) in these rural communities, this question is a particularly good measure of household 
responses to insecurity.  
The previous discussion regarding LRA attacks makes clear that once villages are attacked, all 
households are equally at risk. While this directly implies that objective risk measures are 
homogeneous within villages, subjective risk measures might not be as homogeneous. This is 
relatively little empirical evidence on heterogeneity in subjective expectations, particularly 
within developing countries. The only study of which I am aware suggests that across-
community variation in beliefs is substantially higher than within-community variation (Doss et 
al. 2008). Moreover, the widespread attacks and abductions in the area – close to 40 percent of 
males and 20 percent of females aged between 14 and 30 were abducted in the most affected 
areas – implies that the indiscriminate strategies of the LRA were widely known (Beber and 
Blattman 2010). 
While a variety of factors might lead to systematic difference in perceived risk levels, the data 
allow for controls for many of the most important. In particular, controls are included for the 
demographic structure of the household as those with younger members might be at greater risk 
of suffering a prolonged abduction, or members working in multiple locations or attending 
school thereby increasing the risk of abduction. Additionally, since household perceptions might 
be systematically related by personal histories with violence, variables for household histories of 
prior attacks and of prior abductions over the previous 10 years are included.  
 23 
 
 
Similarly, the gender of the head of the household might influence perceptions of risk as the 
experience of abductees often varied based on their gender. Males often were indoctrinated and 
turned into fighters. Others primarily carried loads or performed domestic duties in the camps. 
Although some females also became fighters, they frequently were used as sex slaves or as cooks 
within the camps. Moreover, since these camps were located in Southern Sudan, it was typically 
more difficult for females to escape due to the added distance from their homes and the fewer 
opportunities to slip away in camps. Consequently, a control for the female headed households is 
also included. Although it is not possible to fully control for everything which might lead to 
heterogeneity of subjective beliefs within villages, based on the particular context and the 
included controls, the residual heterogeneity is likely small and random.  
Empirically, risk is estimated at the community level using the following logistic regression: 
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴 + 𝐵𝑍𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖) 
where the dependent variable, Indicator, is measured at the community level. As noted, for 
objective risk, Indicator is a binary variable for whether or not community i was attacked in 
2004. In this case, the predicted value (or fitted value) from equation (2) is the estimated 
probability of the community experiencing an attack in 2004. For subjective risk, the dependent 
variable is a binary variable for whether any section of the community found it hard to cultivate 
their land in 2004 because of insecurity. The predicted value represents the probability that the 
community would report being insecure in 2004 and therefore represents subjective risk. The risk 
levels are predicted using the distance of community i from LRA attacks in previous year as the 
vector of explanatory variables, Z. 
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As noted earlier, based on the context and the included controls, the fitted values for both 
objective and subjective risk are arguably also largely homogenous within communities. 
Consequently, despite being measured at the community level, the fitted values from equation 
(2) are treated as measures of individual risk for the remainder of the paper.  
Welfare Effects 
In the second stage of the estimation, the predicted risk values from equation (2) are inserted into 
equation (1) resulting in equation (3): 
(3) 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑅𝚤𝑠𝑘�𝑖 +  𝑏2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏3𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗  
Welfare is measured as the log of per capita household expenditure for household j in community 
i. While household welfare can be measured using different measures, per capita consumption is 
arguably highly correlated with many of the alternative choices and directly linked to poverty 
measures. Risk�i is a vector containing the fitted risk value and its square from the first stage 
(equation (2)). This choice reflects the intuition that there is a natural limit to the amount that 
households can decrease their expenditure. Initially, households are able to adopt a variety of 
strategies to reduce ex ante risk but that also reduce income (and expenditures). As risk 
increases, their ability to further adapt is limited both by the availability of strategies and by the 
expenditure required to survive. Due to the high correlation between measures of objective and 
subjective risk, equation (3) is estimated separately for each type of risk.   
The vector also includes an interaction term between female head of household and the fitted 
value of risk. This reflects both the specific context in the Northern Uganda as well the literature. 
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As previously noted, the very different consequences of abduction faced by women suggest that 
they might be more affected by the risk of violence. There are, however, also reasons to believe 
that women might be relatively less affected by this risk. In contrast to men, women in Northern 
Uganda often remained within their villages or homesteads. Men traveled more extensively 
potentially giving them access to more information about neighboring attacks.6 The broader risk 
literature has also examined gender difference in response to risk although no consensus has 
emerged (Doss et al. 2008). 
The Experience vector measures the experience of violence in community i and household j. 
These variables are separated based on the level of aggregation (community or household). 
Community and household experiences of violence may differ for a variety of reasons including 
migration, the spatial distribution of household or even the nature of the specific attacks. 
Additionally, the effects of the two experiences are likely to be different. Whereas community 
level attacks may affect the broader economy and public goods, household attacks may lead to 
the destruction or theft of personal assets, the abduction or death of household members or 
psychological trauma.  
The experiences are also divided based on the time elapsed since the shock. In particular, binary 
variables are included for whether community i and household j have experienced an attack from 
rebels since 1992. A binary variable for whether community i was attacked by rebels in 2004 is 
included. The survey did not contain a similar question for households. There are questions 
                                                          
6 This difference was apparent in qualitative work by the author after the end of conflict. Whereas men had 
knowledge of abductions in the surrounding area, women often only knew the history of the village. In the extreme 
case, a woman did not know of the abductions in a village located less than 10 minutes away by foot. 
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regarding abductions in 2004 as well as abductions since 1992 which are included in the control 
vector, Xij. 
Equation (3) therefore separates the effect of ex ante risk exposure (𝑏1) from the experience of 
being attacked (𝑏2). When objective risk is used, equation (3) contains both the dependent 
variable and the fitted value for equation (2). Mechanically, the predicted value of risk used in 
equation (3) represents the part of the experience that is correlated with the proxies used in 
equation (2). Therefore, although the experience variable and the fitted values are highly 
correlated, they have distinct interpretations. The former reflects the effect of risk on expenditure 
while controlling for the experience of households and communities. Similarly, the latter reflects 
the effect of the experience of violence after controlling for risk. 
The control vector, Xij, contains a variety of household and community-level controls. The 
controls for the demographic structure of the household reflect both the differences in 
productivity and required consumption levels of different age groups but also their varying risk 
for abduction. As noted earlier, the LRA systematically targeted youth between the ages of 10 
and 24. Consequently, households with members in this age group might experience greater 
(perceived) risk. Depending on specification, it also includes measures of productive household 
assets. 
The data allow me to largely control for migration within rural communities or IDP camps in 
Northern Uganda. In particular, the migration of individual members is controlled for using a 
variable for the number of absent working age household members (14-60). I also control for the 
motivation for any migration by including binary variables for migration due to insecurity by the 
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head of the household in 2004 or ever. While there is no data on forced migration, this is likely 
included in the category for migration due to insecurity.  
It is not possible to link migrants with their former communities. Consequently, the variables 
regarding their community’s experience with violence relate to their current community. 
Therefore, certain households may have experienced an attack in 2004 but currently reside in a 
community that has not currently experienced an attack. This is part of the variation that allows 
for the separate estimation of household and community experiences of violence.  
Households that either migrated to urban areas in Northern Uganda or which left Northern 
Uganda are not included in the sample. The sample is therefore only representative of non-urban 
rural households (including IDP households) in 2004. Since the conflict has been ongoing since 
1986, it is likely that most households that could leave Northern Uganda (or even move to cities) 
would have left before 2004 
VI. Data 
The household and community data are drawn from the Northern Uganda Survey (NUS) that was 
administered by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics in 2004. The NUS data are one of the largest, if 
not the largest, representative datasets of any country during a conflict. Large surveys 
administered during conflicts typically omit the most dangerous areas.7 As a result, arguably the 
most relevant households for studies on the effects of conflict are not included. In contrast, the 
                                                          
7 For instance, despite being a nationally representative survey, the 1999/2000 Uganda National Household Survey 
used by Deininger (2001) omitted several conflict areas. This is based on personal correspondence with the Ugandan 
Bureau of Statistics. 
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NUS contains representative data for 386 geo-referenced rural communities and 3,867 
households.  
Since the empirical strategy relies on the community geographical coordinates, the data are 
restricted to the communities (and associated households) for which these data are available and 
correct8. Additionally, households without any consumption of food or which had abnormally 
high holdings of land (>200 acres as compared to mean holdings of 3.7 acres with a standard 
deviation of 5.4) are not included. The remaining analysis is based on 353 communities and 
3,509 households for which data were available.9 
The NUS data are supplemented with data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
(ACLED) for Uganda (Raleigh and Hegre 2005). The NUS data only include data on community 
level attacks in 1992, 1999 and 2004. By providing additional geo-referenced data for the 
location of LRA attacks from 1997 until 2003, ACLED allow both for a larger set of instruments 
and a more accurate “map” of violence. Additionally, insofar as the behavior of households 
changes based on their distance from violence, ACLED should result in more precise estimates 
of the effects of the risk of violence. The ACLED data are drawn from a variety of sources 
including press accounts, books, and humanitarian worker accounts. The data are disaggregated 
by event type, year, participants, and geographical coordinates. This paper only uses the events 
that are violent, include the LRA, and occurred in 2003 or earlier. Additionally, since the 
                                                          
8 For 33 communities, the recorded coordinates fall outside of the boundaries of Uganda and therefore these 
communities have been dropped. Since this is based solely on the recorded coordinates, there is no reason to believe 
that any systematic differences exist in these observations. 
9 The variables for the distance to the nearest attack are an exception. These were created using all the data – rural or 
urban – for which correct geographical coordinates were available. 
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precision of the geographical coordinates varies, I only include those that are precise to the 
village or sub-region location and exclude those which are only recorded at the regional level. 
Table 1 reports the weighted descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of 
equation (2). LRA attack in 2004 is a binary variable for whether or not community i was 
attacked by rebels in 2004. Insecurity is a binary variable for whether “any section of the 
community found it difficult to cultivate their land in 2004 because of insecurity.” This measures 
the perceived risk of violence within the community. 
The instruments used in equation (2) are drawn from the NUS and the ACLED datasets. These 
measure the distance (in arc degrees) from community i to the nearest attacked community 
(excluding community i). For the NUS data, these are created for the rebel attacks in 2004, 1999 
and 1992. The ACLED data represent the distance (in arc degrees) from community i to the 
nearest LRA attack in each year from 1997 to 2003. Objective and subjective risk are the fitted 
values for the estimation of equation (2) using the binary variables for whether community 
experience of violence and perceived insecurity, respectively, as dependent variables.  
As can be seen in table 1, close to one third of the survey communities were attacked in 2004. A 
similar number of communities reported being insecure. On average, communities were 
relatively close to attacks by the LRA as the average distance varied between 0.20 and 0.90 
decimal degrees (approximately 22 and 100 kilometers, respectively). For the closest 
communities, this was as low as approximately 3.6 kilometers. 
Table 2 reports the weighted descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of 
equation (3). Expenditures are measured as the natural log of per capita annual total household 
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expenditure, defined as the sum of food expenditures (purchased, home production, and free), 
non-durable goods and frequently purchased services (including rent ), semi-durable and durable 
goods and services, and non-consumption expenditures (such as remittances and taxes). 
Although food aid is not directly measured, free food is used as proxy. The recall periods vary 
across the components of expenditure from the past week for food to the past year for semi-
durables and durable goods and services as well as for non-consumption expenditures. The 
aggregate expenditure annualizes components and assumes that behavior over the recall period is 
representative for the entire year. Livestock holding are aggregated into Tropical Livestock 
Units10 (TLU). Household members are defined as all household members who have lived in the 
house 6 months or more during the past 12 months. This also includes those who have come to 
stay in the household permanently even if they have lived in the household less than 12 months.  
Households11 are relatively small, with only 5 members. 
Household members are defined as all household members who have lived in the house 6 months 
or more during the past 12 months. This also includes those who have come to stay in the 
household permanently even if they have lived in the household less than 12 months. Regular 
members are defined by NUS as “close relatives and would have been usual members of the 
household but have been away more than six months during the last 12 months”. Regular 
members are not included in the household for the purposes of calculating per capita 
expenditure. On average, households were relatively small with only 5 members on average as 
compared to a national birthrate of 6.65 children per woman. 
                                                          
10 Tropical livestock units are aggregated as follows: head of cattle=0.70, sheep and goats=0.10, pigs=0.20, 
poultry=0.01. 
11 Regular members are defined by NUS as “close relatives and would have been usual members of the household 
but have been away more than six months during the last 12 months”. Regular members are not included in the 
household for the purposes of calculating per capita expenditure. 
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VII. Results 
As discussed above, the estimates of the objective and subjective risks of attack from equation 
(2) are used as regressors in equation (3). By their very nature, predicted regressors are estimated 
with error and therefore the standard errors need to be adjusted (Pagan 1984). This is addressed 
using a bootstrap with 2000 replications. Typically, since the same sample is used in both stages, 
sampling with replacement alters the composition of the sample in both stages. This paper differs 
in that different levels of data are used in each stage; the first stage uses community level data 
while second stage uses household data. Consequently, only only the first stage is bootstrapped 
and the resulting 2000 estimates of risk are used in the second stage (which uses a constant 
sample throughout). 
The estimates of the objective and subjective risks of attack are created using the coefficients 
from the estimation of equation (2) (table 3). In each case the independent variables measure the 
distance of the community from violent attacks by the LRA in various years. The errors in the 
logit regression are clustered at the community level. In the first column, the dependent variable 
is a binary variable for whether or not a community was attacked by the LRA in 2004. 
Consequently, as previously discussed, the predicted values represent the probability of the 
community being attacked in 2004, that is the objective risk. Similarly, the second column uses a 
binary variable for the perceived insecurity within the community. As previously noted, the fitted 
values from column (2) are estimates of the likelihood that the community feels insecure and 
therefore of the subjective risk.  
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Overall, while the variables are strongly jointly statistically significant, only several of the 
variables are individually significant, likely reflecting the multicollinearity among the 
instruments used. The fit of the model can be assessed by looking at what percent of attacks in 
2004 are correctly classified12 in each specification. For objective risk, this is a direct measure of 
accuracy since the fitted values represent the probability of being attacked in 2004. For 
subjective risk, it is suggestive as subjective risk is likely to be strongly and positively correlated 
with actual attacks. The predicted values for objective risk match very closely with the actual 
distribution of attacks (90.1%). The predicted subjective risk also does well albeit to a lesser 
degree (79.9%). These strongly imply that attacks at the community are clustered and, hence, 
non-random. In addition to the overall levels, the spatial distribution of objective and subjective 
risk at the community level are similar to those of actual attacks (Table 4). The higher subjective 
risk in Karamoja likely reflects the insecurity in the region associated with cattle raiders.  
Table 5 presents the key results from the estimation of equation (3). The results are divided into 
those using objective (columns 1-3) and subjective risk (columns 4-6). All of the regressions 
contain the same basic set of controls13 and the errors are clustered at the community level. The 
first column for each (columns 1 and 4) contains only plausibly exogenous factors that influence 
expenditure. The second columns introduce binary variables for each of a range of productive 
                                                          
12 To calculate correct classification, the fitted values are compared with the actual values (here the binary variable 
for a community bring attacked in 2004). Since actual attacks are binary while the estimates of the risk are 
continuous and bounded by 0 and 1, values of less than 0.5 for the estimated risk are counted as 0 and values greater 
than 0.5 as 1 for the purpose of checking the accuracy. 
13 The controls are for prior abductions, the demographic composition of the household, the gender of the head of 
household, whether the household had migrated due to insecurity (in 2004 or since 1992), the highest education in 
the household, residence in an IDP camp, the presence of a major source of employment within 10 kilometers of the 
community and district fixed effects. 
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assets14, a variable for the total amount of land owned, and a variable for total livestock holdings 
in tropical livestock units (TLU). As noted, both theory and prior empirical research suggests 
that asset holdings may be endogenous. Columns 3 and 6 further add interaction variables 
between attacks and risk. These allow the effects of risk to differ between attacked and non-
attacked households and communities. 
As noted earlier, the measures of risk are highly correlated with the measures of exposure to 
violence at the community level. This underscores the consistent significance of the risk 
measures across specifications and measures of risk. The coefficients for the linear and squared 
terms for risk are generally significant. Moreover, as expected, due to classical measurement 
error, both the significance and magnitude of the subjective risk estimates are relatively larger. 
The results, however, are qualitatively similar. 
Moving to the last columns in each set of specifications, the risk-attack interaction variables are 
never significant, individually or jointly15. This suggests that the losses from risk between 
affected and non-affected households and communities are not significantly different. This may, 
however, also result from the high correlation between the interactions variables and the 
measures of risk and attack. This possibility is supported by observation that the inclusion of the 
interaction terms only increases the standard errors of the risk variables without affecting their 
coefficient estimates. Consequently, the remainder of the paper will focus on the specifications 
in columns (2) and (5). 
                                                          
14 There are separate binary variables for the ownership of at least one unit of the following: a plough, a hoe, a boat, 
a motor vehicle, a motorbike, a bicycle, and a generator. 
15 These are only significant at 71 and 80 percent levels, respectively. 
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At the sample means for objective and subjective risk, risk decreased expenditure on average by 
3 and 8 percent, respectively, as compared to 10 percent for prior attacks on the household. 
When taking into account the gender of the head of the household, the average effects decrease 
to approximately 2 and 6 percent for objective and subjective risk, respectively. Even within 
households that experience violence, risk remains an important factor as it accounts for between 
17 and 38 percent of the conflict related losses. Overall, on average, conflict substantially lowers 
per capita expenditure (12 and 16 percent). These rates are similar in magnitude to economic 
effects of terrorism in the Basque country, approximately 10 percent decrease in GDP per capita, 
reported by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). 
In contrast to attacks on households, attacks on communities are never significant regardless of 
the specification. The lack of significance is not caused by the correlation between the measures 
of the risk and experience of violence as the coefficients for the community-level attacks remain 
insignificant even when the former measures are omitted. Although several possible explanations 
exist for the lack of significance, it is not possible to distinguish between them. For instance, this 
may reflect mechanisms that allow for consumption smoothing within communities. Alternately, 
this may be unrelated to conflict, reflecting instead the nature of traditional livelihoods in 
Northern Uganda. The vast majority of individuals work on their farms or family enterprises. 
Only 10% of sample individuals employed rural Northern Ugandans aged 14-60 work elsewhere. 
The self-sufficiency of rural households and the general lack of labor markets may naturally limit 
community economies and, therefore, the impact of attacks on communities.  
Lastly, the insignificance of community attacks may be the result of offsetting effects. On the 
one hand, attacks on communities may be destructive and have negative lasting consequences for 
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household income and consumption. On the other hand, prior attacks may lead to higher 
consumption as NGOs may focus their activities in previously exposed areas. The considerable 
effects of food aid are highlighted in the next section. 
Three potential sources of concern remain. First, households are interviewed at different times of 
the year so households interviewed earlier in the year are less likely to have been attacked in the 
calendar year than those interviewed subsequently. Table 6 demonstrates the robustness of the 
results to this concern. Columns (1) and (3) report the results from Table 5. Control variables for 
the month of the survey are added in columns (2) and (4). The magnitude of the effect of risk 
decreases slightly although, qualitatively, the effects remain similar. Additionally, the 
significance of the measures of subjective decrease but they remain highly significant.  
Another concern is that the bulk of expenditure may have occurred prior to attacks, particularly if 
attacks occur late in the year. This is examined in Table 7. Columns (1) and (3) recreate the 
findings from Table 5.16 Columns (2) and (4) limit expenditure to food expenditure, the only 
portion of consumption for which the recall period is the past week. Since the probability of 
experiencing violence in the past week is close to zero, columns (2) and (4) capture only 
expenditure after attacks. The results for subjective risk remain largely consistent and actually 
increase. In contrast, objective risk is no longer significant and household experience of violence 
is no longer significant. Prior community experience becomes significant and is positive in 
column 2.  Although this only occurs in one specification, this result is puzzling and may simply 
reflect the location of food aid. 
                                                          
16 The sample size decreases as two households report no expenditure on food. 
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Lastly, the first stage imposes a particular structure by using a logitistic regression. The results, 
however, remain robust with the use of a probit or linear probability model. The results from the 
2nd stage are essentially unchanged between the logit and probit specifications. With the linear 
probability model, the objective measure of risk is no longer significant although it retains the 
same magnitude as in the logit estimation. 
The Impact of Food Aid 
As previously noted, food aid is often directed to areas which experience violence. 
Consequently, the previous estimates are the “net” costs of conflict as the effect of conflict has 
been mitigated by the considerable food aid and the work of NGOs and government. As can be 
seen in table 8, these efforts were primarily located in Acholi (the most affected region) and 
Karamoja (the poorest region). Therefore, the estimates from table 5 reflect the effects of risk 
after the provision of food aid. That is, these “net” measured effects represent the effect of risk 
and of food aid jointly. These effects are partially visible in figure 1, where the effect of 
subjective risk becomes after 0.89 due to the positive coefficient on the squared term. 17 
Rough estimates of the “absolute” impact of risk, that is the impact of risk in the absence of food 
aid, can be derived in one of two ways. First, while there is only a limited research on the effect 
of food aid on household behavior, Abdulai et al. (2005) find that food aid does not create food 
production disincentive effects among recipients. Consequently, expenditures net of food aid 
might be a good approximation of expenditure in the absence of food aid. If food aid affects 
either food production or the overall levels of expenditure, then a better estimate might be 
                                                          
17 This also reflects the lower density of data in this area leading to less precise estimate as well as the decreasing 
ability for households to limit decrease expenditure as the expenditure approaches a lower bound required for 
survival. 
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obtained using the non-IDP population. The bulk of food aid is provided in IDP camps as the 
median non-IDP camp household did not receive any food aid.  
Table 9 provides the estimates of the absolute effects of risk. For ease of comparison, the first 
column for objective and subjective risk contains the full sample and replicates prior results. The 
second pair of columns maintains the full sample but uses expenditures net of food aid. The last 
pair of columns in each sample limits the sample to non-IDP camp households. The dependent 
variable is actual expenditures, including any food aid. The top section reports the coefficients 
for the risk and attack variables in each regression. The second section reports the average effect 
of risk on expenditures (including the effect of the gender of the head of the household where 
statistically significant).  
Several broad results emerge. First, the objective risk variables are no longer significant in the 
non-IDP camp sub-samples. Although this could reflect the smaller sample size, the magnitude 
of the coefficients also decreases suggesting that this is not solely due to increased standard 
errors. In contrast, the magnitude of the measures of subjective risk increases and remains highly 
significant. This result reinforces the relative importance of subjective as opposed to objective 
risk. Households make their decisions based upon their perceptions, which may diverge from 
realizations to date which are used to generate the objective risk measures. 
Second, the absolute impact of subjective risk is significantly higher in the alternate 
specifications. While neither measure is perfect, our overall confidence in the estimate is 
reinforced by the almost identical estimates of the absolute effects of subjective risk obtained 
using different exclusion rules. The average estimated absolute effect of risk increases to roughly 
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75% of the estimated effect of direct exposure. The increase in the average effect of risk suggests 
that the provision of food aid appears to erase 17-30% of the overall impact of risk. 
Lastly, the effect of gender of the household on the effect of risk completely disappears in the 
specification that excludes households in IDP camps. This is likely explained by differences in 
the behavior of males and females in IDP camps that were obscured by the high correlation 
between risk and IDP camps status. The increase in both magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient in the 2nd specification implies that this is not due to food aid being targeted towards 
women or female-headed households. Rather, this means that female-headed households have 
relatively higher expenditure in IDP camps. Lehrer (2010) suggests that this is driven by 
productivity differences as a gendered work culture tended to develop in IDP camps. Women 
frequently worked while men were less likely to work and spent their days drinking, playing 
cards and talking. 
Aggregate Effects and Spillovers 
Although the estimated effect of the risk of violence is smaller than that of its experience, only a 
modest fraction of the overall population experience violence. In contrast, the risk of exposure 
affects virtually the entire population. Consequently, the aggregate effects of risk are 
considerably higher than implied by cursory comparisons of their estimated coefficients. Table 
10 provides a rough estimate of the contributions of the risk of violence and its realization to the 
aggregate costs of conflict. These are calculated using the coefficients estimated in Table 9 for 
risk (linear, squared and female headed household when statistically significant), the mean 
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household levels of risk, and the aggregate income by exposure status and gender of the head of 
household.  
The first two columns examine the actual effect of risk. Even in the lower estimate using 
objective risk, on aggregate, risk accounts for more than 40% of the overall estimated costs of 
violence. Moreover, there are strong spillovers of risk from those households that have 
experienced violence to those that have never experienced it; close to a quarter of the overall 
losses and more than 60 percent of the losses from risk occur in non-directly affected 
households. When subjective risk is used, the losses from risk are 64% higher than losses due to 
the experience of violence and losses in houses that have never been attacked exceed those from 
“direct” losses from attacks. These effects only increase when the “absolute” effects of risk are 
used. Over 40% of the overall losses occur through spillovers and risk accounts for close to 70% 
of the overall losses.  
The aggregate household losses attributable to conflict are substantial with estimates ranging 
from 0.4 to 0.9 percent of GDP for 2004. Consequently, risk lowered aggregate expenditures by 
15 to 66 million US dollars and spillovers accounted for 9 to 51 million dollars. To put these 
totals into perspective, in 2004, disbursed ODA aid from DAC countries to Uganda amounted to 
roughly 684 million US dollars. Although it is not possible to solely isolate aid directed to 
Northern Uganda or resulting from conflict, the stated purpose of individual grants allow for an 
upper bound of 126 million US dollars to be calculated. The bulk of the disbursed aid, 102 
million US dollars, is categorized as emergency food aid or as food security programmes/food 
aid and is likely partially used in areas outside of Northern Uganda.   
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These losses have accumulated and compounded throughout the conflict. Roughly half of the 0.5 
to 0.9 GDP losses in 2004 are due to the risk of violence. Over the length of the conflict, this 
translates into 4.6 to 8.2 percent lower GDP due to the risk of violence. At the household level, 
the effects are substantially larger since the most of Uganda was not affected by this conflict. 
Using the estimate for the subjective risk specification (6.2 percent lower per capita 
expenditure), the risk of violence lowered expenditure levels by 70 percent over the course of the 
conflict. This likely represents a lower bound estimate as the ability of household to reduce 
expenditure likely reduces as household expenditure decreases. Consequently, as households 
became poorer, their ability to mitigate risk decreased leading to weaker expenditure responses 
to risk. Since the losses compound over time, even small changes in risk-related losses may lead 
to substantially higher levels of welfare of time. For instance, reducing average losses from 6.2 
to 3.1 percent per year reduces the lost per capita expenditure from 70.4 to 45 percent over the 
course of the conflict. 
VIII. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper has examined the effect of the risk of violence on welfare, as proxied by per capita 
expenditure, in Northern Uganda. Depending on the specification, I find that risk reduces per 
capita expenditure by 2 to 6 percent and accounts for roughly half of the overall costs of conflict. 
Within households that experience violence, risk still accounts for between 17 and 38 percent of 
percent of welfare losses. The effects of risk are not limited to households that have experienced 
violence as risk-related losses in household that have never been attacked account for roughly 40 
percent of the overall costs of conflict and 60 percent of the losses due to risk. In aggregate, 
household risk-related losses account are roughly equal to 0.5% of GDP. This suggests that prior 
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studies that focus solely on exposure to violence both substantially underestimate its costs as 
well as ignore one of the more important pathways from conflict to the outcomes observed 
during and post-conflict.  
Compounding these losses over the length of the conflict suggests substantial losses at the 
national level, 4.6 to 8.2% lower GDP, and individual levels, -70% per capita expenditure, due to 
the risk of violence irrespective of the experience of violence. Despite their size, these losses 
likely represent a lower bound of losses due to conflict risk. Over time, the ability of household 
to respond to risk has decreased as household have become poorer (currently the poverty rate is 
over 70%). Since losses compound over time, even measures which lead to limited decreases in 
risk-related losses can lead to substantial welfare improvements over time. 
The evidence also suggests that food aid appears to be partially effective as it reduce the overall 
losses attributable to risk by 18 to 30 percent. This suggests an important role for food aid in a 
period where food aid totals have substantially decreased despite the prevalence of low levels 
conflicts throughout the development world. Moreover, the strong spillovers of losses into 
households and areas that do not directly experience violence suggests that aid should not be 
limited to IDP camp populations although this needs to be balanced with obvious safety concerns 
for humanitarian workers. 
These results suggest that perceptions of risk may be just as important. Careful monitoring of 
these may allow for proactive responses as opposed to waiting for losses to accumulate. The 
importance of risk and the limited ability of households and communities to address this risk 
suggest an important role for government policy. For instance, the loss of customers due to the 
 42 
 
 
crisis and violence surrounding the 2007 Kenyan election and the inability of informal insurance 
networks to compensate led to an increase in unprotected sex by sex workers both during and 
immediately after the crisis (Dupas and Robinson 2011). 
While these results underline the importance of responses to risk, these data are rarely available 
even in non-conflict data. In contrast, there has been a strong increase in the availability of 
spatially and temporally disaggregated data on acts of violence. This paper has introduced a 
simple methodology to obtain disaggregated measures of objective risk using this newly 
available data. While the measures of objective risk are not as strong as those of subjective risk, 
their results are qualitatively similar suggesting that this methodology can be used examine 
responses to conflict risk in other settings.  
While the LRA is no longer active in Northern Uganda, the population is only slowly beginning 
to recover from nearly two decades of violence, fear, and uncertainty. Importantly, as subjective 
risk levels decrease, the process that led to lower welfare during the conflict will reverse itself. 
Although this process will not be without difficulties, the resilience of Northern Uganda after 
two decades of conflict suggests that they are up to the task. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Equation 2 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Source 
LRA attack in 2004 (1=yes) 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Hard to cultivate land due to insecurity in 2004 (1=yes) 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Fitted value using LRA attack in 2004 0.30 0.06 0.37 0.00 0.98 - 
Fitted value using hard to cultivate land 0.28 0.16 0.29 0.00 0.98 - 
Distance to nearest attack 2004 (decimal degrees), NUS  0.34 0.26 0.28 0.00 1.09 NUS 
Distance to nearest attack 1999 (decimal degrees), NUS 0.28 0.20 0.25 0.00 1.25 NUS 
Distance to nearest attack 1992 (decimal degrees). NUS 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.00 1.37 NUS 
Distance to nearest attack 1997 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.83 0.79 0.51 0.02 2.43 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 1998 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.44 0.33 0.34 0.00 1.36 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 1999 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.86 0.90 0.49 0.01 2.22 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 2000 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.92 0.78 0.58 0.00 2.49 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 2001 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.69 0.68 0.47 0.01 2.11 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 2002 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.00 1.60 ACLED 
Distance to nearest attack 2003 (decimal degrees), ACLED 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.95 ACLED 
Author’s calculations using the 2004 Northern Uganda Survey. Weighted using community level weights. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Equation 3 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Source 
Expenditure, ln(per capita annual HH exp)  12.10 12.07 0.66 8.66 15.61 NUS 
Objective Risk 0.29 0.06 0.37 0.00 0.98 - 
Subjective risk 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.00 0.98 - 
Community, LRA attack in 2004  (1=yes) 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Community, LRA attack since 1992 (1=yes) 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 NUS 
HH attacked since 1992 0.43 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Any abduction in 2004  (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Any abduction since 1992  (1=yes) 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Number of disabled in HH 0.31 0.00 0.57 0.00 6.00 NUS 
Female head of HH 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Total number in HH younger than 14 2.61 3.00 1.95 0.00 12.00 NUS 
Total number in HH between 14-60 2.28 2.00 1.33 0.00 9.00 NUS 
Total number in HH older than 60 0.20 0.00 0.47 0.00 3.00 NUS 
Total number in HH older than 60 0.06 0.00 0.28 0.00 3.00 NUS 
Number of non-HH members residing in 
HH 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.00 4.00 NUS 
Some schooling but did not finish primary 
(1=yes)  0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Finished primary (1=yes) 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Some secondary schooling  (1=yes) 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Finished secondary (1=yes) 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Specialized degree or diploma (1=yes) 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Finished tertiary (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 NUS 
No answer for schooling (1=yes)  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Head of HH migrated due to insecurity, 
2004 (1=yes) 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Head of HH migrate due to insecurity, ever 
(1=yes) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Currently reside in an IDP camp (1=yes) 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Community <10 km of major employment 
source (1=yes) 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Converted livestock units into TLU 1.33 0.20 4.80 0.00 141.15 NUS 
Own at least one plough (1=yes) 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one hoe (1=yes) 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one boat (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one vehicle (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one motorbike (1=yes) 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one bicycle (1=yes) 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Own at least one generator (1=yes) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 NUS 
Sum of acres of land in 3 largest plots 3.70 2.00 5.37 0.00 88.00 NUS 
Weighted using household weights 
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Table 3: Logit Estimating Objective and Subjective Risk of Community Attacks 
  Obj Subj   
Distance to nearest attack 1992. NUS 3.14 -0.20   
  [3.14] [1.91]   
Distance to nearest attack 1999, NUS -5.19 1.33   
  [5.13] [2.28]   
Distance to nearest attack 1997, ACLED 2.78 8.31***   
  [2.11] [1.88]   
Distance to nearest attack 1998, ACLED -2.94* -2.54*   
  [1.79] [1.48]   
Distance to nearest attack 1999, ACLED -0.50 -8.30   
  [2.20] [2.27]   
Distance to nearest attack 2000, ACLED -1.08 0.94   
  [1.59] [1.58]   
Distance to nearest attack 2001, ACLED -2.45 0.87   
  [2.51] [1.97]   
Distance to nearest attack 2002, ACLED -0.27 -5.25**   
  [3.08] [1.91]   
Distance to nearest attack 2003, ACLED -16.2*** -1.48   
  [5.08] [1.97]   
Constant 3.18*** 0.36   
  [1.16] [0.49]   
Observations 353 353   
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.58 0.35   
Percent of LRA attacks in 2004 correctly classified 90.1% 79.9%   
Standard errors in brackets are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications. 
Community weights used   
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively   
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Table 4:  Attacks and Predicted Risk in Rural Northern Uganda 
  Community 
Attacked in 2004 
Predicted Risk     
  Objective Subjective     
West Nile 0.02 0.07 0.08     
Acholi 0.87 0.82 0.61     
Lango 0.53 0.49 0.34     
Teso 0.17 0.16 0.23     
Karamoja 0.20 0.22 0.40     
Total 0.30 0.30 0.28     
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Table 5: The Effects of the Risk and Realization of Violence on the Log of Household per Capita Expenditure 
  Objective Subjective 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk of community being attacked, 2004 -0.52** -0.43* -0.45** -0.70*** -0.76*** -0.71*** 
  [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.26] [0.26] [0.26] 
Square of risk of community being attack, 2004 0.50** 0.43** 0.35 0.80*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 
  [0.22] [0.22] [0.23] [0.28] [0.28] [0.27] 
Risk*Female 0.15** 0.13* 0.13* 0.17* 0.16** 0.16** 
  [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] 
Community attack in 2004 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
  [0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.07] 
Community attacked since 1992 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] 
HH attacked since 1992 -0.09** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.05 
  [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] 
Productive Assets   X X   X X 
Interaction terms between attacks and risk     X     X 
Observations 3509 3509 3509 3509 3509 3509 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.38 
The full regressions are reported in Appendix 1 
The regressions included control for household composition, migration, highest education, IDP camp residence 
The regressions also control for the presence of a major source of employment within 5 km 
Standard errors in brackets are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications. Household weights used. Models include district fixed 
effects, and clusters errors by district. 
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively 
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Table 6: Robustness check for time of interview 
  Objective Risk Subjective Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk of community being attacked, 2004 -0.43* -0.42* -0.76*** -0.65*** 
  [0.23] [0.22] [0.26] [0.26] 
Square of risk of community being attack, 2004 0.43** 0.42** 0.87*** 0.76*** 
  [0.22] [0.21] [0.28] [0.28] 
Risk*Female 0.13* 0.13* 0.16** 0.16** 
  [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] 
Community attack in 2004 -0.01 -0.002 -0.03 -0.02 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Community attacked since 1992 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] 
HH attacked since 1992 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
  [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
Control for month of interview   X   X 
Average effect of risk on expenditure -2.0% -1.7% -6.2% -5.0% 
Observations 3509 3509 3509 3509 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
The regressions included control for household composition, migration, highest education, IDP residence 
The regressions also control for the presence of a major source of employment within 5 km 
Standard errors in brackets are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications. Household weights used and models 
include district fixed effects, and clusters errors by district. 
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively   
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Table 7: Robustness check using only expenditure from past 7 days   
  Objective Risk Subjective Risk   
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Risk of community being attacked, 2004 -0.43* -0.50* -0.75*** -0.81***   
  [0.23] [0.29] [0.26] [0.29]   
Square of risk of community being attack, 2004 0.43** 0.41 0.86*** 0.99***   
  [0.22] [0.27] [0.28] [0.3]   
Risk*Female 0.13* 0.16 0.16** 0.17*   
  [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.1]   
Community attack in 2004 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07   
  [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05]   
Community attacked since 1992 0.05 0.08* 0.04 0.06   
  [0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04]   
HH attacked since 1992 -0.10*** -0.04 -0.10*** -0.04   
  [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04]   
Limit to only expenditure in past week   X   X   
Average effect of risk on expenditure -2.0% -12.8% -6.2% -7.2%   
Observations 3507 3507 3507 3507   
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.38 0.24 0.38 0.24   
The regressions included controls for household composition, migration, highest education, IDP camp 
residence 
The regressions also control for the presence of a major source of employment within 5 km 
Standard errors in brackets are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications. Household weights used. Models 
include district fixed effects, and clusters errors by district. 
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively 
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Table 8: Relief Efforts in Northern Uganda 
  
Free food as 
percent of total 
expenditures* 
Food distribution 
by within 5km of 
village center** 
Mean Objective 
Risk** 
Mean Subjective 
Risk** 
  
West Nile 4.1% 6.6% 7.4% 8.4% 
Acholi 11.3% 35.3% 82.4% 61.0% 
Lango 2.7% 0.8% 49.4% 34.1% 
Teso 3.8% 7.2% 16.3% 22.6% 
Karamoja 7.6% 35.5% 21.8% 40.3% 
Rural 5.0% 11.5% 30.4% 28.1% 
*   Weighted at household level     
** Weighted at community level     
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Table 9: Estimating the Actual and Absolute Effects of the Risk of Violence 
  Objective   Subjective 
  All Net Exp No IDP   All Net Exp No IDP 
Risk -0.43* -0.48** -0.31   -0.76*** -0.83*** -1.06*** 
Risk squared 0.43** -0.48** 0.27   0.87*** 0.91*** 1.44*** 
Female headed household * risk 0.13* 0.16** 0.05   0.16** 0.19** 0.04 
Household attacked since 1992 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.12***   -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 
Average effect of risk on expenditure -2.0% -2.6% -0.2%   -6.2% -7.4% -7.9% 
Sample Size 3509 3509 2869   3509 3509 2869 
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively 
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Table 10: Aggregate Costs of Conflict in Northern Uganda for 2004 
    Actual Effect Absolute Effect (Subj) 
    Obj Subj No Aid No IDP 
HH never attacked (% of total cost) 25.2% 40.5% 43.2% 69.9% 
  From Attack -2.6% 1.8% 0.3% 5.2% 
  From Risk 27.9% 38.7% 42.9% 64.6% 
HH attacked 74.8% 59.5% 56.8% 30.1% 
  From Attack 58.6% 36.0% 31.6% 11.2% 
  From Risk 16.2% 23.5% 25.2% 19.0% 
Total         
  From Attack 55.9% 37.9% 31.8% 16.4% 
  From Risk 44.1% 62.1% 68.2% 83.6% 
Total cost (Million Sh) 60,250 128,481 135,199 137,356 
% of GDP   0.4% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIVING WITHIN CONFLICTS: RISK OF VIOLENCE, LIVELIHOODS, PORTFOLIO 
CHOICE AND RETURNS 
 
I. Introduction 
The theoretically strong and potentially costly responses of households to insecurity have been 
recently confirmed empirically and are believed to represent at least half of the aggregate 
household costs of conflict (Rockmore (2011). Moreover, since only a fraction of households 
directly experience violence during conflict, these responses to risk likely also underlie many of 
the adverse conflict and post-conflict outcomes in the literature (consumption: Ibáñez and Moya, 
2010; Rockmore 2011; education: Akresh and de Walque 2011; Shemyakina 2011; and 
nutrition/health: Akresh et al. 2011, forthcoming; Minoiu and Shemyakina forthcoming). Since 
households frequently engage in a range of activities, responses to insecurity likely occur along 
both the intensive and extensive margins. Consequently, a comprehensive examination of 
adjustments to the overall livelihood portfolios is needed to understand household responses to 
insecurity (i.e., the risk of violence) and to design appropriate policy responses. Unfortunately, 
no such comprehensive empirical study exists; the current literature only focuses on specific 
responses, such as labor market outcomes, and therefore provides only a limited view of the 
overall behavioral responses (and potential tradeoffs) by households. 
This paper helps to bridge this gap by providing the first empirical examination of household 
portfolios during conflict by focusing on the behavior of rural households in Northern Uganda. 
In doing so, it extends the current literature in three important ways. First, in contrast to the 
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current fragmented view of household responses to insecurity, I investigate how the risk of 
violence affects the overall choice of activities (sources of incomes and labor market 
participation), and the composition of portfolios (i.e., the choice of crops and livestock) within 
the dominant activity, agriculture. Additionally, the impact of conflict risk on returns to assets is 
estimated and used to separate the effects of household responses to insecurity from those of 
broader general equilibrium effects. 
Second, while the literature discussed changes in household behavior changes during conflict, 
these analyses have not included measures of insecurity. Consequently, the resulting estimates 
necessarily combine effects of both of the risk and realization of violence. Following Rockmore 
(2011), the spatial-temporal placement of violence is used to estimate spatially disaggregated 
measures of conflict-risk and to separate the effects of insecurity from that of the experience of 
violence. 
Lastly, since most of the variation in the “placement” of violence is across geographical regions, 
the risk of violence is necessarily correlated with a variety of other factors that influence the 
relevant outcomes. While this can be overcome with geographic fixed effects, the remaining 
variation in the risk of violence makes it difficult to accurately identify the impacts of (the risk 
of) violence in conventional samples. Unlike existing studies on the micro-consequences of 
conflict which rely on either qualitative evidence or small samples, many of the results in this 
paper are derived from a unique data set of over 690,000 rural households, accounting for 75 
percent of all rural households in Northern Uganda.  
Looking at overall livelihood portfolios, I find that conflict has only a limited effect on the 
principal sources of income of households. Rather, much of the effects of conflict occur with 
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these livelihoods. Labor market responses seem to be concentrated among men. Many of the 
strongest changes from insecurity occur within the livestock and crop portfolios. For instance, 
both the composition and size of livestock are substantially affected. In particular, livestock 
portfolios shift from large to small livestock, matching expectations as smaller livestock are less 
risky since they are less exposed than larger grazing livestock. On average, the value of livestock 
herds drop by two thirds. Moreover, the higher expected returns to larger livestock suggest that 
household forego income as a result of this shift in the livestock portfolio. While there are 
similarly strong responses in cropping patters, the pattern does not seem to match the shift the 
shift towards lower risk crops suggested by the literature. One possible explanation for the 
observed outcomes is that conflict and insecurity constrain the available labor and oxen available 
and therefore induces shifts to less labor/draught intensive crops.  
Returning to Rockmore’s (2011) estimation of the cost of insecurity, I find that the impact of the 
risk of violence on consumption levels disappears once I control for the allocation of asset 
portfolios. Along with the other evidence, this suggests that the primary pathway from conflict-
risk to lower consumption is in portfolio choice as opposed to either returns to capital or general 
equilibrium effects. More broadly, there is little evidence of conflict-risk affected assets returns 
outside of human capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes how livelihoods may 
respond to violence, which underlies the conceptual framework in Section III. The background 
and data are described in Sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI presents the methodology 
and the results and Section VII concludes. 
II. Household Responses to Conflict 
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Although responses to conflict and its risk have been discussed (Dercon 2008; Justino 2009), 
these effects have only been recently quantified. Rockmore (2011) uses the spatial-temporal 
variation in the placement of violence in Northern Uganda to estimate community-level risk 
levels. In doing so, he separates the effects of violence into two components: the cost associated 
with risk and the combined effects of the shock and ex post responses. At the aggregate level, 
risk accounts for roughly half of the overall losses. The analysis does not consider, however, 
which factors underlie these outcomes. Ibáñez and Moya’s (2010) examination of populations 
displaced by violence in Columbia suggests that costly risk coping strategies may be an 
important factor. The authors disaggregate the effects of the displacement and conflict shock into 
permanent and transitory components. They find that the transitory component is particularly 
important in explaining the lower consumption and interpret this as reflecting the disruption of 
risk sharing mechanisms and costly coping mechanisms. In support of this, they find increased 
participation of children in labor markets and a higher likelihood that household members are 
distributed geographically. 
Several recent papers have continued to focus on (costly) adjustments through labor markets. 
Fernández et al. (2011) find the labor markets adjust as men shifted from on-farm work towards 
off-farm non-agricultural work. This is partially driven by the focus of Colombian focus on land 
and livestock, thereby making agricultural labor riskier. In contrast, women are unable to find 
jobs in the formal sector. Since labor markets are unable to fully absorb the labor, this response 
is not completely effective in addressing consumption losses. Menon and Rodgers (2011) 
similarly examine female labor market choice in Nepal and find increased supply in response to 
conflict. While they provide several reasons for this shift, one is that many men left their families 
(and the women) behind as they sought work and security.  
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Both sets of authors suggest that responses, at least partially, depend on perception of riskiness – 
in Colombia, the agricultural sector was viewed as riskier so people moved to non-agricultural 
sector; in Nepal, men were viewed as being at greater risk so they migrated leading women to 
participate more. These responses to risk, however, are not necessarily only reflected in labor 
markets and are also likely to be also present in agricultural portfolios. Moreover, since off-farm 
non-agricultural opportunities may be limited in many areas with conflict, labor market shifts 
may be less feasible. 
The economics literature on non-labor (rural) household responses to the risk of violence can be 
divided into two strands.18 The first strand attempts to isolate the effects of conflict, typically on 
investment decisions. These studies do not differentiate between the effects of the risk of 
violence from its realization nor do they address potential heterogeneity in the selection into 
violence (e.g Deininger 2003; Singh 2011). Grun’s (2008) study of household investment and 
asset composition is notable for recognizing the potential non-random assignment of violence at 
the municipal level. While she attempts to control for the geographical placement of violence, 
she makes the strong assumption that exposure at the individual level is exogenous to individual 
asset holdings and composition.  
A second strand of the literature documents and describes the effects of conflict (combining both 
the risk and realization of conflict risk) on crop, livestock and asset portfolios. This evidence 
suggests several consequences. Not only are there changes to overall production levels, but there 
is strong evidence to suggest shifts in the composition. In particular, a number of studies find 
                                                          
18 I do not address the literature on migration as I focus on responses conditional on the risk of violence. Having 
migrated, households fit into two categories. Either they still experience the risk of violence and then may respond 
as discussed here. Alternately, they no longer experience any such risk and therefore are not the focus of this paper. 
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evidence consistent with households increasing the share of low-risk, low-return activities 
(Finnström 2003; Bundervoet 2007; McKay and Loveridge 2005; Vlassenroot 2008).  
In particular, rural households may value crops whose harvest can be delayed during periods of 
insecurity (e.g., root crops), which require little attention (e.g., calabashes) or which are difficult 
to loot (e.g., rice) (Finnström 2003). In contrast, more lucrative crops, such as fruits or 
vegetables, need to be harvested with a short period of time (and are easily looted) and may force 
households to choose between venturing to exposed fields to harvest and remaining in the 
relative safety of their village.  
Similar responses have been found in other conflict-affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), between 1996 and 2004, general food production 
decreased by 12% but vegetable and cereal production dropped by 42% and 33%, respectively 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008). Additionally, there are shifts from intensive cultivation 
and perennial crops to low-risk and seasonal crops such as green peas and bananas (Vlassenroot 
2008). Vlassenroot notes that “agricultural production had become driven more by the push to 
minimize [conflict-related] risk than to maximize profit” (p. 210). Similarly, studies in Burundi 
(Bundervoet 2007) and Rwanda (McKay and Loveridge 2005) find crop production shifting 
away from “risky” crops and cash crops, such as maize, coffee and beer bananas, towards “safer” 
crops such as cassava and potatoes. Despite these responses, in areas where food markets still 
exist, household may not completely retreat to subsistence farming (OCHA 2005).19 
The size and composition of livestock holdings may also respond to conflict risk. Large 
livestock, such as cattle, need to graze and may further expose household members. In contrast, 
                                                          
19 OCHA’s study of the Beni and Lubero areas in the DRC finds that while close to 54 percent of food production is 
auto-consumed and another 11 percent is used as seeds, a large portion, 27 percent, is sold. 
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smaller livestock, such as goats or swine, can be kept within villages or individual compounds 
and are also more easily hidden. Within the DRC, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2008) find that 
livestock activity shifted from cattle-raising to small livestock activity with cattle decreasing by 
more than half with other studies reporting similar shift towards small livestock (Raeymakers 
2008). The risk associated with important peacetime assets, such as cattle, is illustrated by the 
experience of Northern Uganda. Between 1985 and 1997, the cattle of population of the two of 
the most affected districts decreased by 98.2 percent (from 285,000 to 5,000), primarily due to 
raiding by rebels or neighboring cattle raiding communities (Gersony 1997). More broadly, 
during the genocide, cattle prices in Rwanda decreased by 50 percent (Verpooten 2009). This 
reflects both distress sales of cattle and the difficulty in protecting (large) livestock during 
conflicts. 
Within Northern Uganda, Stites et al. (2006) report a shift towards pigs in Acholi districts for a 
variety of reasons: (1) pigs can be kept inside villages thereby avoiding the need to send boys to 
herd them outside of villages; (2) rarely targeted during raids since the nearby cattle raiders did 
not raid pigs while the insurgent group were banned from eating it; (3) changes in the availability 
of fodder; (4) reducing the concentration of wealth in a single asset (cattle). 
Beyond changing the composition of crops and livestock, conflict can also reduce the returns 
associated with particular activities or portfolio allocations. For instance, returns to labor may 
decline as more remunerative permanent employment opportunities may give way to casual 
labor. Within agriculture, yields may decrease for a variety of reasons such as premature 
harvesting to reduce the risk of pillage, decreased fertilizer use resulting lower soil quality, and 
the inability to fallow fields (Vlassenroot 2008). In Northern Uganda, Stites et al. (2006) note 
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that as (perceived) insecurity increased, villages might be temporarily abandoned as some/all 
villagers spent the night in the bush or, if possible, in nearby hills. Other villages were only 
inhabited during planting and harvesting times although this was risky as attacks increased 
during this period due to the availability of supplies to loot and individuals to abduct. These 
responses also suggest decreased production efficiency due to perceived risk. 
III. Framework for Identifying Behavioral Responses to Conflict Risk 
The observed behavior suggests a framework for identifying responses which aims to 
disaggregate responses as changes at the extensive and intensive margins (e.g., levels and 
composition of assets versus the returns to these assets) or by broader general equilibrium 
effects. Conceptually, the changes in consumption levels induced by can be thought of as 
resulting from (1) ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠: changes in the levels or composition of assets due to risk, which 
includes changes in savings rates; (2) ∆𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦: changes in the choice or intensity of activities 
due to risk; (3) ∆𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠: changes in the returns due to risk; and (4) 
∆𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘: this includes other non-measured pathways from risk to consumption 
including general equilibrium effects such as changes in overall demand and supply of goods.20 
The remainder of the paper uses this framework to examine the impact of risk on household 
behavior and, ultimately, on household consumption. Insofar as possible, each aspect is 
examined separately before estimating a model similar to (1) to understand the effects of the risk 
of violence in rural Northern Uganda.  
IV. Conflict in Northern Uganda 
                                                          
20 The general equilibrium effects (GE) in the other pathways exclude those GE effects captured in the changing 
returns.  
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While Uganda has experienced a variety of internal conflicts since independence, the conflict in 
Northern Uganda lasted from 1986 until 2008 with only briefs respites. The Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) was formed by Joseph Kony from the remnants of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit 
Movement which had sought to replace the national government in Kampala along with elements 
of other insurgent groups. While the LRA initially sought support from the Acholi, one of the 
main ethnic groups in Northern Uganda, the local population did not support them. As a result, 
the LRA raided local communities for supplies and forced recruits. These raids were widespread 
during the conflict as representative data suggests that 19, 25 and 25 percent of Northern Uganda 
communities were attacked in 1992, 1999, and 2004 respectively (Ssewanyana et al. 2007). 
The prolonged conflict resulted in a variety of responses by Northern Ugandans. While the 
conflict led to voluntary migration, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) increased 
substantially beginning in 1996 when the government forced the populations of the most affected 
regions into IDP camps (Fiala 2009). At their peak, approximately 1.8 million persons lived in 
IDP camps and many districts were virtually emptied (IDMC 2010).  
The evidence suggests that while the risk of violence is heterogeneous at the community level, it 
is largely homogenous within communities. As a result, an identifying assumption in the paper is 
that this risk need only be estimated at the geographic level although I also control for factors 
which might lead to within-village heterogeneity. Consequently, insofar as the (perceived) risk of 
violence is not largely homogenous within communities, the measure of risk estimates village-
level average effects of risk. 
The indiscriminate nature of the violence emerges in interviews with rebel commanders who 
note that their strategy was to attack and capture as many people and then to sort them out later 
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(Blattman and Annan 2010). This reflects the ideology of the LRA to “purify” Northern Uganda 
of corruption and witchcraft through violence (Allen and Schomerus 2006; Branch 2010; Titeca 
2010; and Finnström 2003). An analysis of representative21 data from two of the most affected 
districts finds quantitative support for this view. Using recall data on household and community 
characteristics, Blattman and Annan find no significant differences in the means of abducted and 
non-abducted youths with the exceptions of the age of the individual and the size of the 
household. The former reflect the preference of the LRA for children old enough to be militarily 
useful but also sufficiently young to be controlled. The importance of the size of the household is 
due to households with 25 or members, a rare occurrence in Northern Uganda. For instance, in 
the 2002 Census, only 0.1% of rural households in Northern Uganda reported having 25 of more 
members. This suggests, that conditional of being with a village during an attack, abductions 
(and presumably exposure to violence) by the LRA were largely exogenous of individual and 
household characteristics.  
In contrast, the “geographic placement” of attacks by the LRA was not random. Although the 
LRA operated throughout Northern Uganda, it primarily operated in the Acholi districts. While 
the tactics and motivations of the LRA are unclear, there are several plausible explanations for 
this targeting, such as the substantial linguistic differences throughout Northern Uganda. Since 
the original LRA members primarily came from the Acholi districts, it was easier for the LRA to 
operate in these areas and to communicate with abducted individuals from these districts. 
Moreover, although the main bases for the LRA were in Southern Sudan, they had a number of 
smaller bases in the area including in Pader district (Fiala 2009). Over time, especially after 
                                                          
21 Blattman and Annan (2010) use World Food Programme (WFP) food distribution lists from 2002 and a 
retrospective household roster to create household rosters for 1996, a time which predated 85 percent of local 
abductions. The roster was used to create a representative sample of young men from eight sub-counties within 
Kitgum and Pader districts. 
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2002, LRA attacks became more frequent in other parts of the country (Ssewanyana et al. 2007). 
This is partially due to the forced displacement within the Acholi districts by the government 
which deprived the LRA of potential targets for supplies and abductees, thereby forcing them to 
follow the migration. 
V. Data 
Several datasets are used in the analysis presented here. The Northern Uganda Survey (NUS) 
2004 are geo-referenced community and household data representative for Northern Uganda. 
These contain detailed information on a variety of topics including individual and community 
exposure to violence and household consumption. After omitting communities and associated 
households with recorded coordinates outside of Uganda and household without food 
consumption or abnormally high holdings of land22, the final NUS sample contains 230 
communities and 2,300 associated households. 
While the NUS contains information on livestock holdings, there is no information on cropping 
decisions. The 2002 Census for Uganda contains an agricultural module on livestock holdings at 
the time of question and on crops grown during the January-June, 2002, period (the last growing 
season prior to the Census). In addition to being the most recent census, it was also collected 
during the conflict and provides a variety of information on the 24.2 million individuals in 
Uganda. Consequently, rather than relying on representative data (such as the NUS), it is 
possible to directly observe crop and livestock portfolios for the full population. 
                                                          
22 Households who report more than 200 acres of land are omitted. The overall sample for all of rural Northern 
Uganda has mean holdings of 3.7 acres with a standard deviation of 5.4 acres.  
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The Census contains data on 920,958 households in rural areas of Northern Uganda.  The final 
sample used in the analysis contains only 690,836 households (75.0% of the overall rural 
population). This difference arises for three reasons. First, the empirical strategy relies on linking 
the census data with a geo-referenced map. The only parish level map of Northern Uganda is 
from 2006 but a variety of new parishes were established between 2002 and 2006. One of these 
new parishes could not be matched, resulting in the loss of its 41,002 households (5.2 percent). 
Second, while the agricultural module was administered to each household, 139,299 households 
(15.1 percent) could not be matched with the agricultural module. The pattern associated with the 
matching does not suggest that this is systematically related to exposure to conflict or to 
cropping or livestock patterns. Rather, this primarily occurs due to incorrect coding of identifiers 
such as parishes with districts. Although households that cannot be matched have a slightly 
higher incidence of exposure to conflict at the parish level (45.6 versus 41.0 percent), their mean 
conflict risk is slightly lower (38.0 versus 38.8 percent). Third, a further 49,891 households are 
omitted due to missing information from the community survey (5.4 percent). 
These data are supplemented by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) for 
Uganda (Raleigh and Hegre 2005). The ACLED data are drawn from a variety of sources 
including press accounts, books, and humanitarian worker accounts. The data are disaggregated 
by event type, year, participants, and geographical coordinates. This paper only uses the events 
that are violent, include the LRA, and occurred in 2004 or earlier. Additionally, since the 
precision of the geographical coordinates varies, I only include those that are precise to the 
village or sub-region location and exclude those which are only recorded at the regional level. 
The ACLED data are used to supplement the data on the geo-spatial variation of LRA attacks 
from 1997 until 2003. 
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The geo-spatial environmental data has been generously shared by Lang et al. (2010). Further 
information can be found in that paper. These include parish level measures of the percent of the 
parish land in different land types and agro-ecological zones. Tables 1 and 2 presents descriptive 
statistics for the data used. 
VI. Methodology and Results 
A. Estimating Risk 
Since risk is not directly measured, measures of risk need to be estimated. Two different 
measures of risk are estimated: statistical (objective) and perceived (subjective) risk. Objective 
risk refers to the estimated probability of a community being attacked based on the observed 
geo-spatial variation of attacks across time. Subjective risk refers to the population’s perceived 
risk of being attack. While related to objective risk, subjective risk may differ for a variety of 
reasons such as emotions, the information available, local conditions that cannot be observed in 
the data, or as the placement of violence evolves from its historical patterns (Lowenstein et al. 
2001). For instance, the LRA might target particular areas or communities as revenge for 
perceived cooperation with the government or due to the defection of abductees from these 
regions. Slovic et al. (2002) suggest that subjective risk assessments are formed through 
interactions between analytical and experiential systems. Consequently, subjective risk is 
combination of objective risk and of individual feelings, memories and associations. 
Since individuals make decisions based on their subjective risk assessments, these are 
conceptually superior to statistical measures of risk, Subjective risk measures, however, are 
rarely available. While it is possible to construct these with NUS data, this is not possible with 
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the Census data. Rockmore (2011) demonstrates that while subjective risk measures are better, 
objective risk measures can lead to qualitatively similar results. 
While it would be preferred to estimate risk at the individual or household level, there is not 
sufficient data to do so. Consequently, similar to the Rockmore (2011), risk is estimated at a 
more aggregate level. As noted previously, the ideology of the LRA to “purify” Northern 
Uganda resulted in an in-group (LRA members) and out-group (everyone) mentality which 
resulted in largely homogeneous risk within villages. For the NUS data, risk is estimated at the 
community level. Due to the limited availability of geographical coordinates in the Census data, 
risk in these data is only estimated at the parish level. Parishes are the next level of aggregation 
above communities and group several communities together.   
Equation (1) creates measures of risk using the spatial and temporal variation of LRA attacks: 
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑓(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖) 
Where f(·) is the logistic cumulative density function. For objective risk, the dependent variable, 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖, is a binary measure of exposure to risk. For the NUS data, this variable is based on a 
question in the community questionnaire on whether community i was attacked by the LRA in 
2004. This questionnaire was administered to a group of community leaders representing 
different segments of the community, including women. Insofar as LRA attacks were important 
events, it is unlikely that the leaders would be unaware of prior attacks. Additionally, since the 
questionnaire was administered by a statistical agency unconnected with relief work, there is 
little incentive to falsely report attacks. 
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For the Census data, the dependent variable is also drawn from the community questionnaire and 
refers to a question on where there were any incidents of rebel activity the community. As 
previously noted, due to the impossibility to identify the coordinates of the individual 
communities, these answers are aggregated to the parish level. Consequently, the dependent 
variable measures whether or not there were any incidents of rebel activity within any of the 
enumeration areas within parish i. The community questionnaire was administered to a group of 
local leaders including the local chairperson, the Secretary for Youth and the Secretary for 
Women Affairs. As with the NUS data, there is little reason to believe that the data are 
systematically incorrect.  
While the “incidents of rebel activity” is potentially less precise than attacks by the LRA (as 
recorded in the NUS), this is the only information within the Census questionnaire. However, 
since the entire country is surveyed, the Census data on attacks provides a more precise view of 
the movement and placement of LRA than do the NUS data. The predicted value from equation 
(2) therefore represent the probability that the community (parish) is attacked (has rebel activity).  
As noted earlier, subjective risk measures can be constructed from the NUS data. As with the 
statistical risk measure, the binary dependent variable is drawn from the community 
questionnaire. It refers to a question as to whether or not any section of the community found it 
hard to cultivate land due to insecurity in 2004. Therefore, the predicted value is the likelihood 
that any section of the community found it hard to cultivate land during the year. Since this refers 
to a subjective belief, it is possible that the community leaders may have been unaware of the 
activities of others within communities. However, since most respondents are directly involved 
with agriculture, it is likely that difficulties related to farming are shared and communicated 
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within communities. Moreover, while there are certainly differences in beliefs within 
communities, I arguably control for many of the most important factors which might determine 
the heterogeneity – previous exposure to violence, demographic structure of the household, 
female head of household – so that any remaining heterogeneity is likely small and random. 
Importantly, this is not a direct measure of the perception of subjective risk. Rather, finding it 
hard to cultivate the land is a result of this perception and thus represents an indirect measure of 
subjective conflict risk. 
The spatial and temporal variation in LRA attacks in the NUS and ACLED data are used to 
create the independent variables, 𝑍𝑖, for the NUS estimation. Specifically, I use the distance of 
community i from LRA attacks (excluding attack on community i) in each of the previous years 
for which there are data. Consequently, to estimate risk for 2004, the independent variables 
include the distance to the nearest LRA attack in 2003, the distance to the nearest attack in 2002, 
and so forth. The vector 𝛽 represents the partial correlation between the dependent variable and 
the distances from historical attacks. 𝛼 represents the level of risk for community i if its distance 
to attacks in previous years is uniformly 0. 𝜀𝑖 is an error term that is assumed to have mean 0. 
The resultant estimation is presented in table 3. Since only the predicted value of risk is used, the 
best indicator of the fit is the percent of observations correctly predicted. For both the measure of 
objective and subjective risk, over 80% of the data is correctly predicted.  
Some of the analysis relies on the change of (objective) risk levels between 1999 and 2004. 
Since available information on the prior placement of violence differs for the two periods, I re-
estimate the risk levels for 2004 using the same number of lags on the distance to violence in 
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previous years. The results are presented in table 4. Again, the relative fit of the risk measures is 
close to 80%. 
For the Census data, instead of using lagged values, I use distance from current rebel activity in 
the past 12 months. In contrast to the NUS and ACLED data, the Census allows for a full map of 
rebel activity for the region. However, since the Census occurs over a period of time, when the 
current activity is used, the timing of attacks is unclear. Specifically, the specific question in the 
Census asks whether there was any rebel activity within the past 12 months. Since the Census 
occurred over a period of time, rebel activity in certain areas may have occurred after data was 
collected in other regions. Consequently, the spatially disaggregated risk parameters creating 
from the Census data cannot be interpreted in the same casual manner as those from the NUS 
data. 
𝛼 denotes the level of conflict risk within a parish if the distance to attacks in each year is 0, that 
is the amount of risk in a community which is attacked in each year. 𝛽 is the correlation between 
this distance and rebel activity within the community. 𝜀𝑖 is an error term that is assumed to have 
mean 0. The results are presented in table 5. Despite the low number of explanatory variables, 
there is a relatively strong fit as 69% of the data is predicted correctly. 
The change in the placement of violence and in the estimated level of risk in 1999 and 2004 can 
be seen in table 6. Even at the regional level, there is substantial variation in the incidence of 
violence. Overall, there are increases in the incidence in 4 of 5 regions. This reflects the response 
of the LRA to Ugandan government’s Operation “Iron Fist”, which attacked the LRA’s bases in 
South Sudan. The LRA responded by increasing both the intensity of attacks as well as the 
regional scope of their attacks. In the data, this is reflected by the increase of violence in the 
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Acholi districts and the shift of attacks east and south (and away from the West Nile region in the 
North West). The estimated risk levels evolve in similar fashion with the exception of the Teso 
region which shows declining risk between the two points in time due to the initial high 
estimated risk in 1999. 
Since the Census data is comprehensive for Northern Uganda, it is possible to examine the 
distribution of the statistical risk of attacks. In particular, a decomposition of the estimated 
statistical risk shows that roughly 75 percent of the variation is across the 198 sub-counties as 
opposed to within them. This strongly supports the assertion that LRA attacks are not random at 
the geographical level. 
B. Estimating Livelihood Responses 
As noted earlier, the observed changes to consumption in response to changing levels of risk can 
either come from behavioral responses from households or from broader general equilibrium 
effects. I first examine behavioral responses, starting with changes to the extensive margins, 
specifically the correlation between change in risk levels and the reported principle sources of 
income across time. 
Extensive Margin: Sources of Income and Labor Force Status 
One potentially important response to conflict risk is a shift in household income sources. That is 
a change in livelihoods. This shift may be voluntary as households seek to minimize exposure or 
forced as assets or infrastructure which underpin certain income sources become unavailable or 
less effective. The effect of conflict risk on the principle reported sources of income is identified 
by comparing changes in the main sources of income between household in the communities 
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which experience the greatest changes in estimated objective risk levels between 1999 and 2004. 
By comparing changes in income sources across time with locations, it is possible to eliminate 
the effects of any time invariant location-specific effects. Moreover, since the households are in 
communities which have essentially identical levels of estimated risk in 199923, their livelihoods 
should have responded in a similar fashion the conflict risk at the baseline. By comparing 
changes in levels of an outcome (the percent of households reporting a particular principle source 
of income24) across periods in similar communities, this approach resembles a difference-in-
difference methodology. 
Specifically, comparisons are made between the households with the greatest increase and 
decrease in risk. These households are grouped according to the distribution in the change of 
estimated risk between 1999 and 2004. Table 7 presents the results for the 1st and 5th quintile 
where the households in 1st quintile have the greatest decrease in risk between 1999 and 2004.25 
Since the choice of groups is arbitrary, the results for the 1st and 4th quartile are presented in 
Appendix 1. These results are qualitatively similar.  
This analysis relies only on the non-IDP NUS sample due to the substantial difference in income 
sources in IDP camps and the great increase of IDP camps during this period. Moreover, the 
strong expenditure effects in the second chapter persist (and even increase) in the non-IDP 
population. The number of internally displaced individuals greatly increased during this period, 
particularly in late 2002 after Operation “Iron Fist” with reported increases of 100,000 internally 
                                                          
23 As shown in table 7, the risk levels of the groups differ at the 25% level and the levels of risk are within 0.014 
points of each other.  
24 The data does not record the amount of income from each source. Rather, it notes the principle self-reported 
source of income so it is not possible to examine change in the relative contributions of differences sources. 
25 As the groups grow smaller, there are tradeoffs as the absolute difference in risk levels between the first and last 
group grows but sample sizes decrease. Due to these reasons, significant results in the quintiles are perhaps more 
indicative than in the quartiles. 
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displaced individuals in 7 months in 2002 (NRC 2004). Within IDP camps, since there was 
limited access to land and income generating opportunities, the population became increasingly 
dependent on food aid (Allen and Schomerus 2006). The percent of households that report that 
“other transfer (food aid, other aid)” was the main sources of income increased from 4.3 to 
19.8% for households who were in IDP camps in 2004 as compared to a constant 0.3% in non-
IDP households. Consequently, when the IDP camp population is included, there appears to be a 
strong change in income sources due to risk.  
As can be seen at the top of table 7, despite almost identical levels of estimated risk in 1999, the 
groups (1st and 5th quintiles) have significantly different levels of risk by 2004. In 1999, there are 
some differences in terms of principle sources of income. Wage employment is higher in the 5th 
quintile, primarily driven by higher permanent employment levels. There is also evidence of 
lower self-employment within these same groups. 
Comparing changes in the shares of employment between 1999 and 2004, only permanent 
employment is consistently (weakly) significant. With the quartiles (in appendix 1), there is also 
some evidence that the share of temporary employment increases faster in the groups whose risk 
increases the most. While these results are not causal, they suggest that the principle sources of 
income are only weakly linked with significant changes in estimated risk levels. Moreover, 
unlike Fernández et al. (2011), there is a little evidence of a shift from the agricultural to the non-
agricultural sectors. The inability to measure the relative contributions of sections may mask this 
shift, however. Additionally, differences in the violence associated with the different conflicts 
might explain the lack of shift in Northern Uganda. Since abductions were highly prevalent, 
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working in the non-agricultural sector would not lessen the likelihood. In fact, it may have the 
opposite effect as areas with large groups of people of people may be more attractive targets.     
These changes in employment are examined in table 8 which shows the employment status of 
non-disabled adults (aged 14-64).26 The results for both the full and non-IDP camp population 
are displayed in table 8 while those for quartiles are included in appendix 2. Increases in risk are 
correlated with increased work as employees and a slightly larger decrease in unpaid family 
labor. The inclusion of the IDP population does not qualitatively change the results apart from 
the statistical significance of unemployed individuals. Similarly, limiting the sample to 
individuals aged 21-64 (not shown) lowers the portion of individuals in school and slightly 
increases the magnitude of the differences.  
The discussions in the literature on the effects of conflict suggest the possibility of strong gender 
differences. This is examined in table 9, which restricts the sample to those aged 18-64 to limit 
the potential effects of schooling. The labor force participation of women does not appear 
strongly respond to the risk of violence. The magnitude of significant differences is quite small. 
When the quartile groups are used, there is a significant decrease in family workers. In the non-
IDP quartile sample, there is a significant increase in the women who work in the high risk 
sample which almost matches the significant decrease in female students. In contrast, the effects 
of risk are pronounced for men. These results largely match the pattern in table 8 (the combined 
sample) with larger observed effects.   
Interestingly, the share of employers in table 8 and 9 is extremely low and apparently does not 
noticeably shift with increases in risk. Since the share of employees increased, particularly for 
                                                          
26 Since risk is estimated at the community level and since the number of households per community varies, the 
groups (quartiles and quintiles) are slightly imbalanced.  
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men, this implies that either the size of businesses increases with conflict or that other 
businesses, such as NGOs, are more prevalent in high-risk areas and that these absorb/hire away 
labor. In general, the shift away from unpaid family labor to becoming employees might be 
expected to result in higher income and therefore higher consumption levels. This contrasts with 
the observed lower consumption per capita in the second chapter as conflict risk rises. One 
possibility is that the increased number of non-family labor decreased wages. Additionally, the 
departure of unpaid family labor should decrease the productivity of assets, particularly land 
since is an integral part of the Northern Ugandan economy. 
Extensive Margin: Livestock and Crop Holdings 
In both 1999 and 2004, agriculture was the primary source of income for at least 75% of the 
sample. Consequently, it is the main sectors in which responses to conflict-risk might occur. 
While households face certain geographical and agro-meteorological constraints, these changes 
are likely to occur within their livestock and crop portfolios. As noted earlier, the limited 
available literature is consistent with shifts in the portfolio composition. The detailed agricultural 
module in the Census contains information on both livestock holdings and crop choices. 
First, the number of each major livestock type is estimated using a series of tobit models  
(2) 𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝚤𝑠𝑘�𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑅𝚤𝑠𝑘�𝑗2  + 𝜃𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 
where the livestock holding of household i, in parish j and sub-county k are presumed to be 
correlated with: (1) 𝛼: an intercept; (2) Risk: as estimated earlier using equation (2) and which 
enters with both linear and quadratic terms; (3) Violence: any LRA activity within the parish; (4) 
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X: a vector of controls for household characteristics (demographic profile27, proportion of literate 
adults, and the gender, age, literacy, marital status and education of the head of the household), 
whether or not the household also produces crops, household assets28, community 
characteristics29, and parish level agro-ecological measures30; and (5) 𝛾𝑘: sub-county fixed 
effects. The sub-county is the geographical level immediately above the parish and adds 198 
additional fixed effects that control for a variety of unobserved sub-county invariant factors.  
Importantly, IDP camps tended to be concentrated in the Acholi districts. While IDP camp status 
is not observed within the Census data, the sub-county fixed effects reduce the potential impact 
of this potentially important omitted variable. Additionally, the fixed effects also address any 
regional differences in livestock holding patterns and preferences (such as between Karamoja 
and the rest of Northern Uganda). Atypically large holdings of livestock are also omitted31. The 
error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘, is assumed to be mean zero and normally distributed. 
The model does not permit the estimated effect of risk, β, to be interpreted as having a causal 
effect on livestock holdings. As noted earlier, this is because the risk estimates from the Census 
data are estimated using data from current attacks and therefore the timing surveys relative to 
attacks is uncertain. Despite this, the literature review on the effects of conflict risk along with 
                                                          
27 Household demographics are disaggregated by gender and by the total number of individuals aged 0-5, 6-16, 17-
50 and 51 and older in each household. 
28 The binary asset variables measure ownership of land, house, motor vehicle, motorcycle, bicycle, and mobile 
phone. 
29 Binary variables include those for a human disease epidemic, the presence of micro-finance institutions and for 
the presence of all-weather road, and for the presence of seasonal roads in the enumeration areas. 
30 The agro-ecological controls include measures for the percent of the parish area with shrub or tree leaf, 
herbaceous, coniferous plantation, woodland, bushland, grassland, or wetland cover. These also include the percent 
of land in humid, sub-humid, semi-humid or transition agro-ecological zones.  
31 A conservative measure of outliers is used; an outlier is any observation that is more than 6 standard deviations 
away from the mean of individuals who have positive holdings. If the sample were normally distributed, there 
should not be a single household that is 6 standard deviations from the mean (even in a sample with over 500,000 
observations), much less than the mean of positive holdings. 
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the literature on the placement of attacks in Northern Uganda suggests that these results may be 
stronger than mere correlation. In particular, since the LRA tended to attack whichever village 
they encountered, shifts in household livestock holdings should not have impacted risk levels 
(especially at the parish level).  
The results for the primary livestock in Northern Uganda are presented in table 10. As can be 
seen, livestock holdings are relatively prevalent with roughly one in two households owning 
goats and poultry. Ownership of sheep or cattle is less prevalent (10 and 20 percent ownership, 
respectively) while pigs are the least widely owned type of livestock. In each of the tobit 
estimations, there is a strong quadratic relationship between risk and the amount of livestock 
owned suggesting that the intensity of responses to risk decreases as risk increases.  
Interestingly, livestock that need to be grazed showed the largest implied32 declines due to 
conflict risk. Moreover, poultry, which can be exclusively raised within a compound or village 
showed the lowest relative decline. These results strongly match the non-quantitative literature 
on how household livestock portfolios respond to conflict risk. The large implied increases in pig 
holdings are also consistent with the particular context in Northern Uganda as both the LRA and 
the Karamajong, a neighboring ethnic group which frequently raided livestock, are not interested 
in pigs. The overall effect, however, may be limited due to the relatively low amount of 
households reporting any pig holdings. 
                                                          
32 The average effect of risk is created by multiplying the coefficients for the risk terms, 𝛽𝑗, with the averages for 
linear and squared risk within the sample. The implied effect is the average effect of risk divided by the average 
non-zero holdings. That is, the implied effect of livestock j = 
𝛽𝑗∗𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑗>0  This 
is a more conservative estimate than when the mean holdings of livestock j are used. Since certain livestock, such as 
pigs, are kept by a relatively small amount of households, the mean holdings are substantially smaller than the mean 
positive holdings. The implied effect is the average effect divided by the average positive holdings. 
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Overall, the results suggest that the conflict risk is correlated with a strong decrease in the wealth 
held in livestock. While the census does not contain information on the prices of livestock nor on 
household income/consumption, this information is available in the NUS data. Using the median 
2004 prices33, at the mean risk levels, the changes in livestock decreased the average value of 
livestock by roughly 260,746 shillings ($150), which represents roughly 65% of the average 
value of livestock holdings and 25.5% of the mean annual consumption. Within the livestock 
portfolio, there is a shift from large grazing animals, such as cattle, towards smaller livestock 
which can be maintained with villages or compounds. In particular, the relative importance of 
pigs in the livestock portfolio increases greatly. 
These estimates may somewhat overestimate direct household responses to the risk of violence 
for two reasons. First, the Census data does not contain information on prior attacks on 
households or communities. Insofar as previous attacks are correlated with the current placement 
of violence, the estimated parameter may reflect both factors. This potential concern, however, is 
mitigated by the fact that most communities and, especially, households never directly 
experience. Consequently, this concern only affects a fraction of the sample. Second, as previous 
mentioned, the government forced households in certain areas to relocate to IDP camps. 
Presumably, the forced relocations were located in areas which were likely to be attacked. In 
order to avoid panic sales, households in these areas might anticipate the relocation and decrease 
their livestock herds and shift towards livestock that fit better in an IDP camp context. Again, 
this potential effect is largely mitigated as these forced relocations were primarily in the Acholi 
districts and should be reflected in the sub-country fixed effects.  
                                                          
33 Since the price data are imprecise and contain clear outliers, the price data were purged of prices which were more 
than six standard deviations above the non-zero prices mean for that particular livestock. The median value of this 
adjusted price distribution is then used. 
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Since these potential effects of these confounding factors are largely mitigated, the magnitude of 
the results strongly suggests that households decreased livestock holdings. The data are not 
sufficiently detailed to examine what happens to the proceeds from the livestock sales. Since 
Rockmore (2011) finds that increased conflict-risk leads to lower consumption levels, these 
proceeds do not appear to be consumed. While it cannot be verified, households presumably use 
the proceeds to either self-insure against destruction from attacks or to assist in voluntary 
migration following such attacks.  
While livestock are important, it is not the primarily source of income for most households as 
many own little or no livestock. Consequently, the choice of crops provides another way to 
mitigate conflict risk within agriculture. For households with livestock, the size or the 
composition of livestock portfolios might also influence cropping decisions due to the need for 
draught power, manure or means to sell crop output. In contrast to the information on livestock, 
the total production of crops is not in the Census data. Therefore, cropping patterns are estimated 
using a series of probit models.34 These models largely match model (3) except that the control 
variable for the household producing crops is switched with a variable for the household owning 
any livestock. 
Table 11 shows the effects of the estimation. As compared to the previous examination of 
livestock, this estimation will “underestimate” the effects of risk. Since the probit examines the 
probability that a household grows a particular crop, it does not capture shifts in the intensive 
margins of production which leave crop choice unchanged. Despite this, there appear to be 
strong effects of risk on the two most prevalent crops, cassava and beans. The decrease in 
                                                          
34 The probits are not estimated using a system of equations due to the size of the data. With over 670,000 
households, the system would have over 4 million observations and over 200 independent variables. 
Computationally, this would require considerable time and computing power for limited gains in standard errors. 
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cassava cropping likely reflects several factors. For instance, cassava cropping typically relies on 
draught oxen (FAO 2005). Not only have these generally decreased in Northern Uganda due to 
looting, but the earlier analysis suggests further decreases in the available oxen due to conflict-
risk. Additionally, despite its ability to well in marginal and stressed environment, its yields 
crucially depend on weeding with delays leading to yield reductions of over 90 percent (FAO 
2005). Insecurity may reduce the ability of households to weed their cassava plots. Insecurity has 
also hindered the ability of households to sell their production and to receive crucial farm 
extension services since it is vulnerable to pests. 
Similarly, conflict has likely also made bean production less attractive. Bean production is very 
labor intensive due to the need to clear the bushes and tall grasses endemic to Northern Uganda 
as well as labor intensive to harvest and to winnow (Fit Uganda Ltd. 2007). Additionally, the 
conflict may have limited the availability high yielding grains. 
Since the production data in unavailable for crops, the results are difficult to interpret. In general, 
there appears to be a strong response in cropping patterns due to conflict. These do not appear to 
match the low-risk, low-return strategy suggested by the literature. Rather, the changes appear to 
be driven by the particular characteristics of crops, as opposed to their inherent riskiness. For the 
two crops with the greatest decreases, I hypothesize that this more reflective of the considerable 
manpower and oxen needed to farm these. More detailed data, including on household 
composition, however, are needed to verify this. Similarly, groundnuts, the crop with the third 
largest decline, are an important cash crop whose value to households substantially declines as 
markets become inaccessible due to insecurity. 
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In contrast to the primary sources of income and the labor force status, the livestock and crop 
portfolios appear to strongly respond to conflict risk. The evidence from the analysis of livestock 
strongly match prior expectations as overall holdings decreased and as the composition of 
livestock shifted from large grazing animals to smaller animals that can be kept within villages. 
Additionally, pigs were the only category of livestock whose holdings increased in response to 
conflict risk thereby underlining the importance of the varying risk associated with specific 
livestock types. In contrast, while the crop choice also responded greatly to conflict risk, the 
pattern did not match prior expectations of a shift towards to low-risk low-return crops. Rather, 
households appear to choose crops based on their characteristics, particularly the requirement 
labor and oxen for production. 
Intensive Margin: Returns and Risk 
One factor that could explain these shifts in portfolios would be if returns to assets depended on 
the levels of conflict risk. These changes may reflect general equilibrium effects, such as 
changing prices, or other factors such as the intensity of use. Changes in returns would also 
explain the lower consumption per capita observed in the second chapter as risk levels increased. 
The earlier review of literature suggests that this could occur during conflicts for a variety of 
reasons. Yields of crops could decrease due to premature harvesting or decreased fertilizer use, 
while livestock may be culled prematurely. Additionally, prices for assets may change 
dramatically as evidence by Verpooten’s (2009) finding that the price of livestock declined by 50 
percent during the genocide in Rwanda. More broadly, shifting employment patterns might also 
impact the returns to assets such as labor or human capital. 
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A modified quadratic function is used to investigate the relationship between assets, conflict risk 
and consumption per capita in the NUS sample.  
(3) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝚤𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑚� =   𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 𝑎�𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑗=1𝑁𝑖=1 𝑎�𝑖𝑙𝑎�𝑗𝑙 + 𝑅𝚤𝑠𝑘�𝑚�𝛾𝑚 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑎�𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 +
∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑎�𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑎�𝑗� +  𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑋�𝑙𝑚 + 𝜀𝑙𝑚 
where the data is centered at the data mean so that this specification represents an exact second-
order approximation at the sample mean. So 𝑎𝚤� = 𝑎𝑖 − (∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 )/𝑁. Consumption is the log of 
per capita household consumption for household l in district m. 𝛼 is the intercept term. a is a 
vector of productive assets. Assets are measured along several dimensions: livestock (number of 
oxen and cattle, of sheep and goats, of chicken, and of pigs), land (acres of land owned), and 
human capital (proportion of literate household member aged 10 or older).  
The coefficient on the 2nd term, 𝛽𝑖, represents the correlation between assets and consumption at 
the sample mean and can be interpreted as the mean returns to asset i at the sample mean. The 
3rd term contains the square and cross term which allow both for non-linear returns to asset i  but 
also for its returns to depend both on its level and that of asset j. 
The interaction terms between the estimated conflict risk (linear and squared terms) and the 
assets allow the returns to assets to change in response to the level of estimated risk. Moreover, 
by estimating the effect of risk through assets, 𝜋 and 𝜃, as well as by itself, 𝛾, it is possible to 
separate some of the channels in which risk affects consumption. In particular, by controlling for 
many of the assets, 𝛾, may be interpreted as reflecting many of the broader general equilibrium 
effects (although some of these may also be reflected in the prices of assets which results in 
changes in wealth levels). Specifically, 𝛾, represents the marginal effect of estimated risk (from 
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mean risk levels) while 𝜋 captures the joint effect of marginal changes in estimated risk and in 
asset levels as these change from their sample means.  
The vector of control variables, X, reflects other factors that might influence consumption levels. 
Two different specifications are used. The first uses the same list of control variables as the 
second chapter.35 The second specification supplements this list with several additional variables 
that might influence the returns to particular assets. The base specification contains controls for 
prior abductions, the demographic composition of the household, the gender of the head of 
household, whether the household had migrated due to insecurity (in 2004 or since 1992), the 
education of the head of the household, residence in an IDP camp, the presence of a major source 
of employment within 10 kilometers of the center of the community, the number of disabled 
within the household, and binary variables for the ownership of, respectively, a boat, motor 
vehicle, motorcycle, bicycle, and generator. Additionally district fixed effects are included and 
errors are clustered at the community level. 
The second specification adds variables for the number of household members in school, and 
binary variables for the presence within the community of markets selling agricultural inputs, 
agricultural produce, or non-agricultural produce. This specification also includes the number of 
irrigated fields owned by the household and binary variables for the presence within 5 kilometers 
of the center of the community of a World Food Programme office or other NGO food 
distribution center, of NGOs assisting displaced people and former abductees or combatants or 
internally displaced people/camp. These factors may affect the returns of many of the assets 
examined. 
                                                          
35 The list is not exactly the same as the Rockmore (2011) as he aggregates livestock into tropical livestock units 
(TLU) and uses this measure as a control variable. Livestock are included individually in the vector of assets and 
therefore do not enter as TLU. 
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Several broad patterns emerge from the estimation of equation (4).36 Table 12 presents the 
marginal returns for assets at the sample mean when there is no risk (𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑖
|risk=0). Most assets 
have positive returns at the sample mean, implying that increases in household holdings above 
the mean levels would increase consumption. The returns to education are particularly high. 
These findings are consistent both with underinvestment by households due to credit constraints 
(per capita consumption in the sample is $0.30 per day) and with households avoiding assets that 
can be looted (with the exception of human capital). 
The effects of risk are explored in table 13. Interestingly, effect of risk (at the mean level) 
completely disappears. It is only significantly different from 0 in two of the specifications and its 
magnitude is so small that it has no practical significance. In combination with the earlier results 
on portfolios, this suggests that almost all of the results reported in the second chapter are 
behavioral responses to risk; the general equilibrium effects are practically non-existent. That is, 
the losses associated with conflict risk – which represent the majority of all household level 
conflict losses – are driven by household portfolios allocations. The economic insignificant 
magnitude of the risk coefficient demonstrates that other unmeasured pathways, including 
general equilibrium effects, do not account for any of the significant losses associated with 
conflict. 
As noted earlier, the shift in portfolios may be a response to risk induced change in returns to 
assets. As shown in the lower half of table 13, this is not case as the returns to assets at the 
sample mean ( 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑖𝜕Risk
) are generally not significant. The only exceptions are sheep/goats and 
literacy which are weakly significant in some of the specifications. Notably, these exceptions do 
                                                          
36 The full results are presented in Appendix 3. 
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not occur when the conceptually superior (subjective) measure is used. Consequently, responses 
in asset levels do not appear to be due to changes in rates of return induced by conflict risk. 
The earlier analysis of cropping portfolios was not able to examine production levels. The 
returns to land, however, should incorporate changes to production levels and yields as described 
by the literature. The insignificance of the coefficient for the interaction between conflict risk 
and land, however, appears at odds with the conflict-risk leading to lowered yields. One possible 
explanation is that conflict prevents households from using all their land. In that case, land 
ownership might not fully capture the above mentioned effects.   
Overall, the analysis suggests that shifts to asset levels are one of the primarily paths by which 
conflict-risk decreases consumption. This is reinforced by both the general insignificance of the 
estimated 𝜋 coefficients and the small magnitude of the effect of risk at the sample mean (despite 
significant 𝛾 coefficients).  
VII. Discussion 
Although conflict risk clearly affects household decisions, our empirical understanding has been 
limited; current analyses have focused on specific responses and therefore do not allow for a 
comprehensive view of responses and potential tradeoffs. Moreover, the inability to separate the 
effects of the insecurity from that of violence has made it impossible to quantify the different 
pathways from conflict to lower post-conflict outcomes. Using unique data, including potentially 
the largest dataset on conflict (~690,000), this paper has investigated different potential pathways 
in which households might adjust their livelihoods choices, livestock and crop portfolios, and/or 
experiences, and the returns to assets. 
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Insecurity has a very strong effect on the livelihoods of rural households in Northern Uganda. 
Reflecting the limited options for income diversification in rural Northern Uganda, households 
do not change livelihoods even in response to vary large change in the insecurity. That is, 
farmers remain farmers. Similarly, while there are changes to labor market behavior, these 
changes appear to be more limited. This likely reflects the general lack of alternate employment 
opportunities. While there was no effect on female labor, men shifted from unpaid family work 
to wage employment. Insofar as wage employment is typically associated with higher income 
and less variation in income, this finding runs counter to previous research linking conflict with 
lower consumption levels. 
While responses to insecurity did not appear on the extensive margins, the results suggest 
important changes on the intensive margins. Within the dominant source of rural livelihoods, 
agriculture, there are substantial shifts in the composition of portfolios. These shifts only 
partially support the widely held belief that household shift away from profitable but risky (in 
terms of exposure to violence) activities towards less risk, low return activities. Within livestock 
portfolios, there is strong shift away from large, grazing livestock, despite the positive marginal 
returns, to smaller livestock which can be kept within compounds. Moreover, the overall value of 
livestock herds, which are typically targeted during conflicts, declined by roughly two thirds.  
In contrast to the clear shift towards low-risk low-return activities in livestock portfolios, this is 
not as evident in crop portfolios. Insecurity clearly affected the choice of which crops to 
cultivate, however, these appeared to labor and draught intensive crops. This suggests a 
potentially important interaction between the risk reduction in the composition of livestock herds 
and the choice of crops even in areas where livestock are not the primary source of income. More 
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detailed data would permit this to be verified. More broadly, the results suggest insecurity may 
affect dietary diversity and overall nutrition by changing the composition of crops. Since local 
food markets may cease functioning during conflicts, this may have potentially important effects 
especially on the long run human capital of adolescents.   
The large decreases in the size and value of livestock herds should result in large proceeds for 
households. Since the value of livestock portfolio declines by roughly one of fourth of annual 
mean consumption, this is an important unanswered question that cannot be examined with the 
data used here. While multiple possibilities exist, it is possible that household conserve the 
income to insure themselves against potential attacks and to have capital in case of forced 
migration due to insecurity or the government. At the same time, the saving levels may be higher 
than desired as the insecurity likely reduces the opportunities for households to productively 
invest; many peace-time opportunities may not be available while others only payoff over 
prolonged periods of time making them very risky during periods of conflict. Consequently, 
insecurity may lead households to decrease investment in a productive activity, livestock, 
without providing opportunities to reinvest the funds.  
Returning to Rockmore’s (2011) analysis of the relative contribution of insecurity and exposure 
of conflict to household losses, I find that the economic effect of insecurity disappears once 
portfolio choice is included in the estimation. Combined with the lack of effect of risk measures 
on productive assets (with the exception of human capital), this suggests that the majority of the 
changes in livelihoods occur at the intensive as opposed to extensive margins and that any 
general equilibrium effects are muted.  
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Table 1: Description of data from NUS and ACLED 
  Mean Min Max 
Estimated objective risk 0.29 0.00 0.97 
Estimated objective risk, squared 0.21 0.00 0.94 
Estimated objective risk*female head of household 0.09 0.00 0.97 
Estimated objective risk 1999 0.25 0.00 0.71 
Estimated objective risk 2004 using same model as the 1999 0.28 0.00 0.95 
Estimated subjective risk 0.26 0.00 0.97 
Estimated subjective risk, squared 0.14 0.00 0.94 
Expenditure, ln(per capita annualized household 
expenditure) 0.08 0.00 0.97 
Log of per capita consumption (shillings) 12.10 8.66 15.61 
Total number of oxen or cattle 1.40 0.00 200.00 
Total number of sheep or goat 2.56 0.00 100.00 
Total number of poultry 3.47 0.00 75.00 
Total number of pigs 0.22 0.00 15.00 
Binary variable for ownership of a hoe (0=no, 1=yes) 0.93 0.00 1.00 
Binary variable for ownership of a plough (0=no, 1=yes) 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Female head of household 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Number of household members in school 1.59 0.00 12.00 
Number of disabled individuals in household 0.28 0.00 5.00 
Proportion of household members literate aged 10 or older 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Presence of market which sells agricultural inputs with LC1 
(0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Presence of market which sells agricultural produce with 
LC1 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Presence of market which sells non-agriculture production 
with LC1 (0=no, 1=yes) 0.24 0.00 1.00 
No schooling (0=no, 1=yes), head of household 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Some schooling but did not finish primary (0=no, 1=yes), 
head of household 0.53 0.00 1.00 
Finished primary (0=no, 1=yes), head of household 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Some secondary schooling  (0=no, 1=yes), head of 
household 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Finished secondary (0=no, 1=yes), head of household 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Specialized degree or diploma (0=no, 1=yes), head of 
household 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Finished tertiary (0=no, 1=yes), head of household 0.00 0.00 1.00 
No answer for schooling (0=no, 1=yes) , head of household 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Presence of WFP or other food distribution within 5km of 0.11 0.00 1.00 
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LC1 center 
Presence of NGO assisting former combatants within 5km 
of LC1 center 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Total land in the largest plots (acres) 3.70 0.00 88.00 
Total amount of irrigated land (acres) 0.03 0.00 16.00 
Number of individual aged 14-60 from household who are 
away 0.08 0.00 5.00 
Presence of urban center or other major source of 
employment within 10 km (0=no, 1=yes) 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Community, LRA attack in 2004  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Community, cattle rustling in 2004  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Community, LRA attack since 1992  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Household attacked since 1992 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed, Agriculture (2004) 0.67 0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture (2004) 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Wage Employment  (2004) 0.12 0.00 1.00 
     of which Temporary (2004) 0.08 0.00 1.00 
     of which Permanent (2004) 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Remittances (2004) 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Other Sources (2004) 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed, Agriculture (1999) 0.73 0.00 1.00 
Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture (1999) 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Wage Employment  (1999) 0.07 0.00 1.00 
     of which Temporary (1999) 0.03 0.00 1.00 
     of which Permanent (1999) 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Remittances (1999) 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Other Sources (1999) 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Work 0.98 0.00 1.00 
     of which Employer    0.00 0.00 1.00 
     of which Self-Employed 0.87 0.00 1.00 
     of which Employee 0.11 0.00 1.00 
     of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Unemployed 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Student 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Any abduction since 1992  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Any abduction in 2004  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Female head of household 2.61 0.00 12.00 
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Total number in household younger than 14 2.28 0.00 9.00 
Total number in household between 14-60 0.20 0.00 3.00 
Total number in household older than 60 0.06 0.00 3.00 
Total number in household older than 60 0.02 0.00 4.00 
Head of household migrated due to insecurity, 2004 (0=no, 
1=yes)\ 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Head of household migrate due to insecurity, ever (0=no, 
1=yes) 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Distance to nearest attack 1997, ACLED 0.83 0.02 2.43 
Distance to nearest attack 1998, ACLED 0.45 0.00 1.36 
Distance to nearest attack 1999, ACLED 0.86 0.01 2.22 
Distance to nearest attack 2000, ACLED 0.92 0.00 2.49 
Distance to nearest attack 2001, ACLED 0.69 0.01 2.11 
Distance to nearest attack 2002, ACLED 0.37 0.00 1.60 
Distance to nearest attack 2003, ACLED 0.21 0.00 0.95 
Distance to nearest attack 2004, NUS 0.34 0.00 1.09 
Distance to nearest attack 1999, NUS 0.28 0.00 1.25 
Distance to nearest attack 1992. NUS 0.31 0.00 1.37 
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Table 2: Description of data from the 2002 Ugandan Census 
  Mean Min Max 
Was there any rebel activity in the parish in the past 12 months? 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Estimated Risk (Logit) 0.39 0.00 0.75 
Estimated Risk*Estimated Risk (Logit) 0.19 0.00 0.57 
Any livestock in the household (0=no, 1=yes) 0.65 0.00 1.00 
Any crops in the household (0=no, 1=yes) 0.82 0.00 1.00 
Goats, owned (total) 2.37 0.00 133.00 
Sheep, owned (total) 0.94 0.00 196.00 
Pigs, owned (total) 0.11 0.00 29.00 
Cattle, owned (total) 1.64 0.00 190.00 
Chicken, owned (total) 3.27 0.00 104.00 
Cassava, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Sweetpeas, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Groundnuts, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Sorghum, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Maize, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Beans, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Millet, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Sesame, grown in last season (Jan-Jun 2002) 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Male household members, aged 0-5 0.61 0.00 10.00 
Male household members, aged 6-16 0.88 0.00 15.00 
Male household members, aged 17-50 1.00 0.00 48.00 
Male household members, aged 51 or older 0.19 0.00 10.00 
Female household members, aged 0-5 0.61 0.00 10.00 
Female household members, aged 6-16 0.84 0.00 18.00 
Female household members, aged 17-50 1.12 0.00 19.00 
Female household members, aged 51 or older 0.18 0.00 11.00 
Proportion of household members aged 10 or older who are literate 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Head of the household male, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.78 0.00 1.00 
Head of the household married,  (0=no, 1=yes) 0.84 0.00 1.00 
Head of the household, no education 0.33 0.00 1.00 
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Head of the household, some education 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed P7 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed J3 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed S6 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed a certificate 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed diploma training 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Head of the Household, completed a degree 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Is the head of the household literate? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.60 0.00 1.00 
Age of the head of the household 41.16 10.00 95.00 
Own a house, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.95 0.00 1.00 
Own land, , (0=no, 1=yes) 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Own at least one motorvehicle, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Own at least one motorcycle, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Own at least one bicycle, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.40 0.00 1.00 
One at least one mobile phone, (0=no, 1=yes) 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any cattle rustling in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any incidence of rebel activity in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any drought in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.76 0.00 1.00 
Is there a market place for crops in the LC1? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Is there a market place for animals/poultry in the LC1? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any major disease affecting crops in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.90 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any major disease affecting livestock in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.95 0.00 1.00 
Did the LC1 experience any human epidemic in the past 12 months? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.86 0.00 1.00 
Do you have any formal micro-credit institutions in the LC1> (0=no, 1=yes) 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Is there an all weather road in or bordering the LC1? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Is there an a seasonal road in or bordering the LC1? (0=no, 1=yes) 0.56 0.00 1.00 
Distance of the parish to an urban center 21.30 0.40 68.90 
Fraction of the parish which is populated 0.99 0.24 1.00 
Fraction of the parish covered by water 0.01 0.00 0.76 
Fraction of the parish covered by trees/shrub 0.00 0.00 0.27 
Fraction of the parish covered by herbaceous 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish in the humid agro-ecological zone 0.01 0.00 1.00 
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Fraction of the parish in the sub-humid agro-ecological zone 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish in the semi-humid agro-ecological zone 0.84 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish in the transition agro-ecological zone 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish covered by coniferous plantation 0.00 0.00 0.30 
Fraction of the parish covered by woodland 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish covered by bushland 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish covered by grassland 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Fraction of the parish with wetland cover 0.00 0.00 0.36 
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Table 3: Logit Estimating Objective and Subjective Risk of Community Attacks 
  Obj Subj   
Distance to nearest attack 1992. NUS 0.41 -0.8   
  [3.14] [2.04]   
Distance to nearest attack 1999, NUS 0.49 2.56   
  [5.42] [2.92]   
Distance to nearest attack 2004, NUS -6.16** -1.54   
  [2.92] [2.61]   
Distance to nearest attack 1997, ACLED 1.98 8.00***   
  [2.02] [1.81]   
Distance to nearest attack 1998, ACLED -0.56 -1.92   
  [2.11] [1.80]   
Distance to nearest attack 1999, ACLED -0.16 -8.14***   
  [1.99] [2.19]   
Distance to nearest attack 2000, ACLED -1.97 0.73   
  [1.56] [1.65]   
Distance to nearest attack 2001, ACLED -0.5 1.19   
  [2.51] [2.06]   
Distance to nearest attack 2002, ACLED -2.54 -5.04***   
  [2.60] [1.81]   
Distance to nearest attack 2003, ACLED -15.52*** -1.56   
  [4.18] [1.84]   
Constant 3.22*** 0.43   
  [1.16] [0.50]   
Observations 353 353   
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.35   
Percent of LRA attacks in 2004 correctly classified 89.2% 80.2%   
Robust standard errors in brackets, community weights used   
*, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively   
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Table 4: Logit Estimating Objective and Subjective Risk of Community Attacks 
for 2004, 1999 
  Obj 1999 Obj 2004   
Distance to nearest attack t-1, ACLED -3.27*** -20.40*** 
   [0.64] [4.04] 
 Distance to nearest attack t-2, ACLED -1.29*** -6.52*** 
 
 
[0.39] [2.11] 
 Constant 0.96** 2.95*** 
   [0.39] [0.62] 
 Observations 353 353 
 Pseudo R2 0.22 0.53 
 Percent of LRA attacks in 2004 correctly classified 78.7% 87.8% 
 Robust standard errors in brackets, community weights used 
 *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively 
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Table 5: Logit Estimating Objective Risk for the Census data 
  Attack     
Distance to nearest activity -0.18***     
  [0.02]     
Constant 1.12***     
  [0.13]     
Observations 1174     
Pseudo R2 0.14     
Percent of LRA attacks in 2004 correctly classified 69.0%     
Robust standard errors in brackets, community weights used 
 *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively 
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Table 6: Placement of LRA Attacks and Estimated Risk in 1999 and 2004 
                  
  % Communities Attacked   Estimated Obj. Risk   
Region 1999 2004 Change   1999 2004 Change   
Acholi 84.4% 98.6% 14.2%   60.1% 80.4% 20.3%   
Karamoja 5.3% 10.5% 5.3%   6.0% 11.0% 5.0%   
Lango 37.8% 48.8% 11.0%   46.0% 51.5% 5.5%   
Teso 7.7% 14.2% 6.5%   14.5% 11.1% -3.4%   
West Nile 9.9% 2.8% -7.0%   11.1% 8.9% -2.2%   
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Table 7: Changes in Sources of Income Between Households in non-IDP Communities with 
the Greatest Increase and Decrease in Estimated Risk Between 1999 and 2004 
Group Type: Quintile   
Difference 
  
  1st 5th   
Change in risk levels between 1999 and 2004 -0.27 0.33 0.60***   
Average risk levels in 1999 0.36 0.35 0.00   
Sample size 512 486     
          
  
% reporting each 
source in 1999 
Difference 
  
Sources 1st 5th   
Self-Employed, Agriculture 0.83 0.81 -0.02   
Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture 0.10 0.05 -0.05**   
Wage Employment 0.05 0.12 0.07***   
     of which Temporary 0.03 0.03 0.00   
     of which Permanent 0.02 0.10 0.08***   
Remittances 0.01 0.01 0.00   
Other Sources 0.00 0.00 0.00   
          
  
Difference between 
1999 and 2004 in % 
reporting each source 
Difference 
  
Sources 1st 5th   
Self-Employed, Agriculture -0.06 -0.07 -0.01   
Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture 0.01 0.02 0.01   
Wage Employment 0.02 0.02 0.00   
     of which Temporary 0.02 0.04 0.02   
     of which Permanent 0.01 -0.01 -0.02*   
Remittances 0.03 0.02 0.00   
Other Sources 0.00 0.00 0.00   
*,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively   
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Table 8: Labor Force Status for Non-Disabled Adults (14-61) by Risk Group 
Full Sample         
  Quintile 
Difference 
  
  1st 5th   
Work 0.66 0.65 -0.02   
     of which Employer    0.00 0.00 0.00   
     of which Self-Employed 0.36 0.36 0.00   
     of which Employee 0.04 0.08 0.04***   
     of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.26 0.20 -0.06***   
Unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.01*   
Student 0.26 0.25 -0.01   
Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.05 0.08 0.03   
Other 0.02 0.01 -0.01   
Sample Size 1,681 1,617     
          
Non-IDP Population         
  Quintile 
Difference 
  
  1st 5th   
Work 0.66 0.67 0.00   
     of which Employer    0.00 0.00 0.00   
     of which Self-Employed 0.36 0.36 0.00   
     of which Employee 0.04 0.08 0.04***   
     of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.26 0.22 -0.04*   
Unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Student 0.27 0.24 -0.03   
Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.04 0.07 0.03*   
Other 0.02 0.02 -0.01   
Sample Size 1,345 1,349     
*,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 9: Labor Force Status for Non-Disabled Adults (18-61) by Risk Group and Gender 
Full Sample               
  Female 
Difference 
  Male 
Difference   1st 5th   1st 5th 
Work 0.85 0.86 0.01   0.90 0.90 -0.01 
     of which Employer    0.004 0.00 -0.004*   0.002 0.01 0.01 
     of which Self-Employed 0.35 0.39 0.04   0.71 0.67 -0.04 
     of which Employee 0.05 0.07 0.02   0.07 0.16 0.09*** 
     of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.45 0.39 -0.05   0.12 0.05 -0.07** 
Unemployed 0.001 0.001 0.0002   0.005 0.01 0.01* 
Student 0.04 0.02 -0.02   0.05 0.07 0.02 
Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.09 0.12 0.03   0.01 0.02 0.01 
Other 0.02 0.004 -0.01*   0.02 0.004 -0.02 
Sample Size 621 630     510 505   
                
Non-IDP Population               
  Female 
Difference 
  Male 
Difference   1st 5th   1st 5th 
Work 0.86 0.87 0.004   0.91 0.90 -0.01 
     of which Employer    0.005 0.002 -0.003   0.00 0.01 0.004 
     of which Self-Employed 0.36 0.39 0.03   0.72 0.65 -0.07 
     of which Employee 0.05 0.06 0.01   0.07 0.19 0.12*** 
     of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.45 0.41 -0.04   0.12 0.06 -0.06** 
Unemployed 0.001 0.00 -0.001   0.001 0.01 0.01 
Student 0.04 0.01 -0.03**   0.06 0.06 0.01 
Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.08 0.11 0.03   0.01 0.02 0.01 
Other 0.02 0.01 0.00   0.03 0.01 -0.02 
Sample Size 502 506     411 391   
*,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 10: The Relationship Between Livestock Holdings and the Risk of Violence 
            
  Goats Sheep Pigs Cattle Poultry 
Coefficient on Estimated Risk-Linear Term -5.14*** -12.27*** 3.55*** -10.66*** -2.54*** 
  (0.42) (1.13) (0.53) (0.90) (0.36) 
Coefficient on Estimated Risk-Quadratic Term 5.79*** 13.0*** -3.27*** 15.05*** 2.53*** 
  (0.42) (1.51) (0.64) (1.17) (0.45) 
R2 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.04 
Sample Size 690,615 690,658 690,764 690,514 690,714 
Effect of Risk Evaluated at Sample Mean -0.87 -2.24 0.74 -1.22 -0.49 
Percent of Households with Positive Holdings 40.8% 10.9% 4.5% 20.0% 50.2% 
Average Holdings for Households with Positive Holdings 5.8 8.6 2.4 8.2 6.5 
Mean Effect as Percent of Average Positive Holdings -14.9% -26.1% 30.2% -14.9% -7.6% 
*,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
Standard Errors in Parentheses           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106 
 
Table 11: The Relationship Between Crop Choice and the Risk of Violence 
                  
  Cassava Sweetpea Groundnuts Sorghum Maize Beans Millet Sesame 
Coef. on the Estimated Risk-Linear Term 0.72*** 0.41*** 0.08 0.23*** -0.14*** 1.00*** -0.85*** -1.62*** 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Coef. on the Estimated Risk-Quadratic Term -0.97*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.27*** 0.05 -1.39*** 0.94*** 1.62*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.30 0.16 0.28 0.18 0.20 
Sample Size 673,870 689,737 689,737 689,737 690,836 689,737 689,737 672,694 
  
        Marginal Effect at Mean 
        Estimated Risk-Linear Term 0.22*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.25*** -0.16*** -0.33*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Estimated Risk-Quadratic Term -0.29*** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.01 -0.35*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
  
        Overall Effect on Probability to Grow Crop -7.4% -1.6% -4.6% -0.7% -2.4% -9.7% 1.6% 0.1% 
Percent of Sample Growing Crop 32.6% 17.9% 8.5% 17.3% 22.1% 30.1% 15.2% 16.9% 
*,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
Standard Errors in Parentheses                 
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Table 12: Marginal Returns to Assets at Mean Levels 
  Objective Risk Subjective Risk   
  Specification Specification   
  1 2 1 2   
Cattle/Oxen 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***   
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Sheep/Goats 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01   
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)   
Poultry 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Pigs 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03   
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)   
Total land owned (acres) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***   
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Proportion Literate, aged 10+ 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.19***   
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 13: Average and Marginal Effects of Risk at Mean Levels 
  Objective Risk Subjective Risk   
 
Specification Specification   
Effect of Risk  1 2 1 2   
Average Effect (with no assets) -0.00** -0.26 -0.00** 0.00   
  (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)   
 
          
Marginal Effect (with no assets) 0.16 0.19 -0.83*** -0.78***   
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.33)   
Marginal Effect of Risk on Asset   
 
      
Cattle/Oxen 0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.05   
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)   
Sheep/Goats 0.15* 0.13 -0.01 -0.02   
  (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)   
Poultry 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01   
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   
Pigs -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.09   
  (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)   
Total land owned (acres) 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05   
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)   
Proportion Literate, aged 10+ -0.86* -0.78* -0.35 -0.36   
  (0.46) (0.45) (0.51) (0.50)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix 1: Changes in Sources of Income Between Households in non-IDP Communities 
with the Greatest Increase and Decrease in Estimated Risk Between 1999 and 2004 
Group Type: Quartile   
Difference    1st 4th 
 Change in risk -0.24 0.28 0.52*** 
 Average risk in 1999 0.33 0.32 -0.01 
 Sample size 852 926   
         
 
  
% reporting each source 
in 1999 
Difference  Sources 1st 4th 
 Self-Employed, Agriculture 0.84 0.81 -0.03 
 Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture 0.09 0.07 -0.03 
 Wage Employment 0.05 0.11 0.06*** 
      of which Temporary 0.03 0.03 0.00 
      of which Permanent 0.02 0.08 0.06*** 
 Remittances 0.02 0.01 0.00 
 Other Sources 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         
 
  
Difference between 
1999 and 2004 in % 
reporting each source 
Difference  Sources 1st 4th 
 Self-Employed, Agriculture -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 
 Self-Employed, Non-Agriculture 0.00 0.02 0.02 
 Wage Employment 0.02 0.03 0.01 
      of which Temporary 0.02 0.04 0.03** 
      of which Permanent 0.01 -0.01 -0.01* 
 Remittances 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 Other Sources 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 *,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
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Appendix 2: Labor Force Status for Non-Disabled Adults (14-61) by Risk 
Group 
Full Sample 
    
 
Quartile 
Difference  
 
1st 4th 
 Work 0.66 0.63 -0.03 
    of which Employer 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    of which Self-Employed 0.36 0.36 0.00 
    of which Employee 0.04 0.08 0.04*** 
    of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.26 0.20 -0.06*** 
 Unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 
 Student 0.26 0.26 0.00 
 Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.06 0.08 0.02 
 Other 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 Sample Size 2,070 2,025 
  
     Non-IDP Population 
    
 
Quartile 
Difference  
 
1st 4th 
 Work 0.66 0.67 0.01 
    of which Employer 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    of which Self-Employed 0.36 0.36 0.00 
    of which Employee 0.04 0.08 0.04*** 
    of which Family Worker (unpaid) 0.26 0.23 -0.03* 
 Unemployed 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Student 0.26 0.24 -0.02 
 Domestic Duties/Homemaker 0.06 0.07 0.01 
 Other 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
 Sample Size 1,686 1,683 
  *,**,*** Significant at the 1, 5, 10% level, respectively 
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Appendix 3: Returns to Assets and the Effect of Risk on These Returns 
    Objective Risk Subjective Risk 
    Specification Specification 
𝛽𝑖    1 2 1 2 
 
Cattle/Oxen 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Sheep/Goats 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Poultry 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Pigs 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
  Total land owned (acres) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Proportion Literate, aged 10+ 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 
 𝛽𝑖𝑗   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
Cattle*Cattle -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Sheep*Sheep 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Poultry*Poultry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Pigs*Pigs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Land*Land -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00* 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Literate*Literate 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.06 
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
  Cattle*Sheep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Cattle*Pigs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Cattle*Poultry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Sheep*Pigs -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Sheep*Poultry 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Pigs*Poultry 0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 
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    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Cattle*Land 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Land*Pigs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Land*Poultry -0.00** -0.00** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Land*Sheep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Cattle*Literate 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Literacy*Pigs 0.02 0.03 0.08** 0.08** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
  Literacy*Poultry 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Literate*sheep 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Literate*Land 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝜋𝑖    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Cattle*Risk 0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
  Sheep*Risk 0.15* 0.12 -0.01 -0.02 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
  Poultry*Risk 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Pigs*Risk -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 0.09 
    (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
  Land*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
  Literate*Risk -0.86* -0.78* -0.35 -0.36 
𝜃𝑖𝑗    (0.46) (0.45) (0.51) (0.50) 
  Land*Land*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Literate*Literate*Risk -1.02 -0.98 0.28 0.19 
    (1.18) (1.19) (1.33) (1.33) 
  Cattle*Cattle*Risk -0.02** -0.02** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Sheep*Sheep*Risk -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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  Poultry*Poultry*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Pigs*Pigs*Risk 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Cattle*Sheep*Risk 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Cattle*Pigs*Risk 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 
    (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
  Cattle*Poultry*Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Sheep*Pigs*Risk 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Sheep*Poultry*Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Pigs*Poultry*Risk 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
  Cattle*Land*Risk 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Land*Pigs*Risk 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
  Land*Poultry*Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Land*Sheep*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Cattle*Literate*Risk -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 
    (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
  Literate*Pigs*Risk 0.06 0.16 -0.66 -0.69 
    (0.38) (0.38) (0.46) (0.45) 
  Literate*Poultry*Risk 0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
  Literate*Sheep*Risk -0.04 -0.01 -0.13 -0.14 
    (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) 
  Literate*Land*Risk 0.19* 0.21** -0.20 -0.25* 
    (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) 
 
Cattle*Risk*Risk -0.18 -0.16 0.11 0.08 
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
  Sheep*Risk*Risk -0.20* -0.17 0.02 0.05 
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
  Poultry*Risk*Risk 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
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    (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Pigs*Risk*Risk 0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.05 
    (0.32) (0.32) (0.40) (0.40) 
  Land*Risk*Risk 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
  Literate*Risk*Risk 0.56 0.47 0.17 0.21 
    (0.55) (0.54) (0.63) (0.60) 
  Land*Land*Risk*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Literate*Literate*Risk*Risk 1.74 1.76 0.22 0.44 
    (1.35) (1.35) (1.62) (1.63) 
  Cattle*Cattle*Risk*Risk 0.03** 0.02** -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Sheep*Sheep*Risk*Risk 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Poultry*Poultry*Risk*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Pigs*Pigs*Risk*Risk -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Cattle*Sheep*Risk*Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Cattle*Pigs**Risk*Risk -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.02 
    (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.17) 
  Cattle*Poultry*Risk*Risk 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Sheep*Pigs*Risk*Risk -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Sheep*Poultry*Risk*Risk 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Pigs*Poultry*Risk*Risk -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Cattle*Land*Risk*Risk -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
  Land*Pigs*Risk*Risk -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
    (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
  Land*Poultry*Risk*Risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Land*Sheep*Risk*Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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  Cattle*Literate*Risk*Risk 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.05 
    (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) 
  Literate*Pigs*Risk*Risk 0.00 -0.11 1.05* 1.04* 
    (0.41) (0.41) (0.55) (0.55) 
  Literate*Poultry*Risk*Risk -0.13 -0.13 0.07 0.05 
    (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
  Literate*Sheep*Risk*Risk 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.15 
    (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
  Literate*Land*Risk*Risk -0.26** -0.30*** 0.19 0.23 
 𝛾𝑚   (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
  Risk 0.16 0.19 -0.83** -0.78** 
    (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.32) 
  Risk*Risk -0.40 -0.41 0.99** 0.93** 
    (0.28) (0.28) (0.39) (0.38) 
  Observations 3467 3437 3467 3437 
  R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  District-level fixed effects 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSECURITY IN A PASTORAL SETTING: CONSEQUENCES AND DYNAMICS 
Co-authored by Christopher B. Barrett 
 
I. Introduction 
Negative impacts from conflict and other forms of physical insecurity have been reported along a 
number of dimensions including consumption (Ibáñez and Moya, 2010; Rockmore 2011), 
education (Akresh and de Walque 2011; Shemyakina 2011) and nutrition/health (Akresh et al. 
2011, forthcoming; Minoiu and Shemyakina forthcoming). While some of these impacts arise 
from direct exposure to conflict, it is becoming increasingly clear that much of these negative 
impacts result from costly precautionary responses by households to mitigate conflict risk 
(Justino 2009; Rockmore 2011). Costly responses to insecurity (i.e., the risk of violence) have 
been reported in labor markets (Fernández et al. 2011; Menon and Rodgers 2011) and the choice 
of crops and livestock (Finnström 2003; Bundervoet 2007; Rockmore 2012; Vlassenroot 2008). 
Rockmore (2011) estimated that insecurity causes at least half of the aggregate consumption 
costs from conflict in northern Uganda as even though the personal costs of suffering violence 
exceed those of conflict risk, far more people suffer from risk than directly experience violence. 
The importance of household responses to insecurity suggests an important, but to date 
overlooked, link with the broader literatures on the role of subjective expectations in guiding 
behavior and determining economic outcomes (Manski 2004) and on costly responses to risk 
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Carter 1997; Dercon 2008). Differences in subjective 
expectations may explain why observationally similar households respond very differently when 
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confronted with uncertainty. Despite this importance, our empirical knowledge about the effects 
of insecurity remains extremely limited. The main limitation has been the absence of household-
level measures of subjective perceptions of insecurity, which has prevented researchers from 
directly identifying responses to perceived insecurity risk. Rather, empirical results have been 
interpreted based on qualitative priors of household responses to insecurity. For instance, 
numerous authors find increases in the production of low-risk low-return crops during conflicts 
which they attribute to insecurity (inter alia Finnström 2003; Bundervoet 2007; McKay and 
Loveridge 2005; Vlassenroot 2008). While these choices are consistent with households 
minimizing potential exposure to violence, the actual perceived insecurity is never directly 
measured. Even when measures of conflict risk are constructed (Rockmore 2011; 2012), these do 
not directly measure individual-level subjective risk but rather are community-specific estimates 
that rely on the spatio-temporal variation in the realization of violence and assume homogeneity 
of exposure and perception within communities.  
Using a unique ten-period quarterly panel of household subjective perceptions of insecurity, this 
paper focuses on three important and previously unstudied issues regarding conflict risk. First, 
we study the relative contribution of individual-level subjective expectations of insecurity on 
income. In doing so, we make multiple important innovations including separating the effects of 
current and prior expectations of insecurity on income. Since individuals make decisions based 
on their subjective expectations and since shifts in income generating activities and portfolios 
may be both time consuming and costly to change, current income levels may reflect both 
current beliefs as well as responses to perceptions during previous periods. Moreover, the effects 
of the risk of violence have been studied in isolation from other risks even though violence is just 
one of many (potentially correlated) risks to which households might respond. Consequently, 
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using similar data on households’ subjective perceptions of a variety of other common risks, 
including those concerning health, weather and prices, we examine the robustness and relative 
income effects of insecurity risk. Furthermore, prior studies on the micro-economic costs of 
conflict have typically relied on cross-sectional data and therefore could only control for 
observed characteristics or use aggregate geographical fixed effects. The panel nature of these 
data allows us to control for unobserved time invariant individual characteristics that are likely 
correlated with outcomes and potentially also correlated with risk exposure or perceptions.  
Second, the micro-conflict literature has not addressed the potential effects of seasonality on 
household responses to conflict. Since there is often strong seasonality in both income and 
insecurity, the effects of insecurity are likely to vary across time and, moreover, there could be 
some conflation of common seasonal patterns with a causal effect of conflict (or conflict risk) on 
income. The quarterly structure of data used roughly corresponds to the bimodal distribution of 
rainfall in the survey region, which influences herding patterns of livestock, the main asset that 
underlies most livelihoods in the region. But conflict also varies seasonally and in response to 
agro-meteorological conditions. We therefore allow for the effects of insecurity to vary based on 
the season in which it occurs. 
Third, having established the importance of subjective perceptions of insecurity, we examine 
their evolution over time. In particular, we focus on the role of prior beliefs in determining 
current subjective perceptions. If subjective beliefs of conflict risk are both costly and persistent, 
economic recovery from episodes may be slow.  
We find that the effect of the perceptions of insecurity can be masked both by using aggregate 
income and by constraining its effects to be constant across time. At first glance, there does not 
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appear to be a significant association between subjective perceptions of insecurity and aggregate 
income or with it components. However, when the effects of insecurity are allowed to vary 
across seasons, strong effects emerge in both aggregate income and in specific income 
components. Interestingly, insecurity is not uniformly associated with lower income. Looking at 
the evolution of perceptions across time, we find that while prior beliefs are significantly 
correlated with current perceptions of insecurity, their effect is relatively small in magnitude and 
decreases over time. Rather, households largely determine their beliefs anew each quarter, 
suggesting that perceptions may respond quickly post-violence and thus that any adverse effects 
of insecurity need not persist very long. In contrast to prior beliefs, agro-meteorological 
conditions play an important role with pasture quality – as reflected by remotely-sensed 
normalized differenced vegetation index (NDVI) measures – playing the largest role in 
explaining subjective expectations of insecurity. In addition to broadening the focus of the 
conflict literature away from just weather, this finding suggests that agro-meteorological models 
and remote sensing data may be useful in developing early warnings indicators for perceptions of 
insecurity in these regions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The context and data are presented in section 
II. Section III examines the effects of subjective expectations of insecurity on income and its 
components, as well the season-specific effects of these subjective perceptions. Section IV 
examines the evolution of perceptions across time while section V concludes. 
II. Context and Data 
The data are drawn from the southern Ethiopia sub-sample of the Pastoral Risk Management 
(PARIMA) project, which focused on 11 communities located within a single broad livestock 
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production and marketing region that spans the Kenyan and Ethiopia border (Barrett et al. 2008; 
Doss et al. 2008; McPeak et al. 2012). As described below, due to concerns about endogenous 
migration, we limit our analysis to the five communities in Ethiopia. The broader PARIMA 
region covers arid and semi-arid lands where extensive livestock grazing – pastoralism – remains 
the dominant livelihood. As a result, not only is household wealth largely concentrated in 
livestock but livestock also forms an integral part of local economies. Although some households 
have become sedentarized, many others herd livestock across large areas, seasonally or even 
more frequently, in search of water and pasture. Household members and livestock are often 
spread across base and satellite camps in order to provide pasture and water for the livestock. 
The analysis uses quarterly data collected from households from March 2000 through June 2002. 
While households were randomly selected within communities, the communities were not 
randomly selected but rather were chosen to represent the relevant ethnic and geographic 
variation within the broader PARIMA region. Consequently, the analysis in the paper is only 
representative for the particular sample communities.  
The survey communities were populated mainly by members of the Borana people, with the 
exception of Finchawa, which is just north of the Borena zone and populated by a mixture of 
Guji and Gabra Miigo peoples, both of which are historically and culturally related to the Borana 
(McPeak et al. 2012). The Borana communities relied primarily on pastoralism with little 
economic diversification. This is reflects in part the region’s bimodal distribution of rainfall – a 
long rains season typically runs from March through June and a less reliable short rains season 
commonly begins in October and ends in December – and the arid-to-semi-arid climate, which 
limits the potential for crop cultivation, especially outside of lowland seasonal stream basins. 
This bimodal distribution of rainfall also results in long-range migration of herds in search of 
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dry-season grazing pasture. Finchawa, the non-Borana community, is at somewhat higher 
altitude, enjoys better rainfall, and as a result has more extensive cultivation and less extensive 
migration of livestock in its mixed crop-livestock system. 
In addition to the natural attrition in samples from death or migration, the pastoral setting adds 
additional difficulties. Due to temporary migration, there are periods when a household could not 
be found and is therefore absent from the sample. Since household migration is potentially 
determined by perceptions of future risks, there is strong potential for endogenous sample 
attrition or interruption. In the Kenyan sample, only 93 of the 182 households (51%) were 
interviewed in all 10 periods.37 This was not exclusively due to attrition as 159 households 
(87%) were interviewed at least 8 times. In contrast, 148 of 150 Ethiopian households were 
interviewed in all 10 periods (99%). Consequently, to avoid issues related to attrition bias and 
the potential of temporary migration due to perceptions, the analysis we report is limited to the 
Ethiopian households present in each period. Of the 148 households, 144 are used in the final 
analysis as 4 of the households did not provide information on the age of the head of the 
household, one of the key control variables as this reflects life cycle effects. 
The PARIMA survey questionnaire collected both retrospective information about shocks in the 
previous three months as well as prospective information on perceived subjective risks over the 
coming three months. The quarterly structure of the sampling was chosen to roughly correspond 
to the above-mentioned bimodal distribution of rainfall. The information on perceptions was 
collected from the self-identified head of the household. In certain cases, such as when the head 
of the household was temporarily away herding animals at a distant location, the acting head of 
                                                          
37 Looking at a more disaggregated level, none of the Kenyan communities had more than 70 percent of the 
households present in every period. 
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household was interviewed. Since it is not possible to identify this in the data, the perceptions are 
interpreted as those of the household, as opposed to head of household.  
The quarterly household surveys recorded each respondent’s forward-looking subjective 
perceptions for a variety of different prospective sources of risk. More specifically, heads of the 
sample households were asked which shocks they believed could affect their household in the 
coming three months, selecting from a list of 11 shocks commonly cited by people – developed 
in open-ended pre-testing in the area – or from an open-ended “other” option. The listed risks 
were lack of pasture for animals, insufficient water for animals, animal sickness or death, animal 
loss due to theft or raiding, physical insecurity and violent conflict, human sickness, no buyers 
for animals you wish to sell, low prices for animals you wish to sell, food shortages, high prices 
for things you buy, and crop failure. Since households were asked which shocks might affect 
their household, their answers presumably combine both their expectations regarding the 
probability of the shock and their beliefs regarding their ability to address various outcomes 
(Smith et al. 2001, Doss et al. 2008). 
Although the elicited perceptions are prospective, they may also reflect some evolution of 
perceptions since the previous quarterly elicitation of subjective perceptions. That is, while 
perceptions are measured every three months, households continuously update their perceptions 
(and their resultant behaviors) throughout the period. Since we observe perceptions only at the 
beginning and the end of the quarter, changes in perceptions that took place during the period 
may be reflected in the perception declared at the end of the period. Consequently, it is important 
to recognize that household income in a quarter may be influenced by both the perceptions 
declared at the beginning of that quarter as well as by that part of the prospective perceptions that 
it declares at the end of the quarter, which surely reflect changes in perceptions that occurred 
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during the quarter and that may have affected behavior or outcome realizations during the 
quarter. Insofar as income generating activities cannot change instantaneously, we would expect 
that the prior perceptions should have relatively more effect. The difficulty of discrete 
observations of continuously-updated perceptions underscores an intrinsic identification problem 
inherent to this sort of empirical investigation. Prospective subjective concerns are almost surely 
influenced by current and recent conditions and behaviors. We therefore emphasize our inability 
to make any causal statements about the relationship between subjective expectations and 
income or behaviors; we can only describe suggestive statistical associations. 
Corresponding information on the realization of prospective shocks is also recorded at the 
community level the subsequent quarter. Similar to the individual data, there are missing 
observations for the communities. While this was partially related to problems with enumerators 
not returning surveys or to difficulties in finding key informants, there were also problems with 
insecurity in Ethiopia.38 Only 40 of the 50 potential quarterly community observations regarding 
raids are available. This problem is further addressed when it arises in the analysis.  
The key dependent variable on which we focus is quarterly per capita income. Household 
income for the quarter is created by combining the income from trade and business, wages and 
salary, livestock sales and products, remittances (including food aid) and harvested crops from 
the quarter. Livestock sales and production, milk production, crop production, and food aid are 
valued using community quarter price averages. Milk production was estimated using household 
specific base and satellite camp average daily production. Quarterly average household income 
for the pooled sample is displayed in the first column of Table 1.39 The sample is extremely poor 
                                                          
38 Based on personal correspondence with the lead researchers involved in collecting the PARIMA data. 
39 The sample is only 1296 since the income data was not collected for the first period of the sample. 
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with per capita daily income of approximately US$0.10 per day. Livestock sales and production 
represent close to 80 percent of total income. Despite media reports regarding food aid, 
remittances (which include food aid) represent only approximately 10 percent of overall income. 
In the pooled quarterly data, households perceived risks from a wide variety of shocks, with 10 
of the 12 risks mentioned by at least half the sample and two shocks mentioned by 80 percent of 
the sample (Table 2). In particular, the households are relatively concerned with prices for 
purchased items and with food security. While insecurity and cattle theft/raiding are not among 
the most mentioned risks, they remain potentially quite important as they are both mentioned by 
roughly half of the households.  
Violence and insecurity have been reported in this area since at least the colonial period with 
much of the violence surrounding livestock raiding, which served a variety of purposes: 
traditional (e.g., to secure bridewealth or demonstrate bravery), coping mechanism (e.g., to 
restock herds after droughts or disease outbreaks), or to avenge prior raids or perceived slights 
(Smith et al. 2001, McPeak et al. 2012). More recently, raiding in pastoralist settings has evolved 
due to the increased prevalence of automatic weapons and become increasingly commercial 
(Fleisher 2000).  For instance, in the years preceding the data collection, there were very large 
incidents of cattle raiding with certain communities losing more than 70 percent of total livestock 
within the year (Smith et al. 2001).  
McPeak et al. (2012) report that violence in the area varied greatly across time but that incidents 
of violence and insecurity occurred roughly every 4-6 months during the 2000 to 2006 period. 
Despite the presence of violence and the widespread concerns regarding conflict and raiding, 
Yirbecho et al. (2004) report that more than half of the overall PARIMA sample report never 
 128 
 
experiencing conflict during the previous decade. Thus, for most households in the region, the 
effects, if any, of insecurity on their incomes and behaviors would be attributable to the risks 
they faced rather than to any direct injuries to people or property they suffered. Hence, the 
importance of exploring the relationship between subjective perceptions of insecurity risk and 
household incomes and behaviors. 
Prior studies have suggested several patterns with raids and perceptions of insecurity. Violence 
appears more concentrated in (ethnic) border areas, particularly those between with hostile 
neighbors. In those areas, quite apart from the greater risk of violence, communities’ ability to 
adjust herding patterns is partially limited since access to pastures and water is often governed by 
clan, sub-clan or family affiliations (Smith et al. 2000, 2001). In particular, the eastern and 
western borders of the survey region are particularly dangerous as they capture the ethnic 
frontiers between the Borena and the Somalis on the east and the Dassanach to the west. Poorer 
households appear more concerned by insecurity and cattle raids, perhaps due to their relatively 
higher concentration of wealth in livestock (Smith et al. 2001). The overall concentration of 
wealth in livestock also results in a strong correlation between perceptions of insecurity and 
livestock theft (0.61 in the PARIMA sample). 
The flow and ebb of violence described by McPeak et al. (2012) is apparent as perceptions of 
violence and insecurity vary greatly during this period (Figure 1). The strong notable increase in 
perceptions during 2000 corresponds with the end of a major drought from late 1999 to 2000 
which also significantly affected vegetation. The fluid nature of these subjective perceptions, 
particular after mid-2000, suggests significant intertemporal updating of subjects’ prior beliefs, 
which we corroborate a bit more rigorously below. In addition to the temporal variation apparent 
in Figure 1, there is also considerably spatial variation within the sample (Table 3). Fear of 
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insecurity varies among communities, from relatively low levels in Finchawa, the northernmost 
and most economically diversified sample community, to nearly every respondent in Qorate, a 
heavily pastoral community near the Somali ethnic frontier. The inter-community pattern appears 
highly correlated with communities’ pastoral nature, with more pastoral communities more 
fearful of insecurity and livestock theft. 
We also control for the agro-meteorological conditions. A variety of weather related factors, 
such as rainfall (Miguel et al. 2004), temperature (Burke et al. 2009), El Nino/Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) (Hsiang et al. 2011) and climate change (Gledistch 2012), have been linked 
to the incidence of conflict. The empirical literature, however, has primarily focused on rainfall 
since it is a key input to economic activity in rain-fed agricultural economies (as well as an 
available and plausibly exogenous instrumental variable). In the Horn of Africa, however, there 
are an estimated 20 million pastoralists whose livelihoods rely on livestock and pastures. While 
rainfall is an important input to pasture quality, it does not solely determine pasture conditions, 
which are jointly affected by stocking rates, soil conditions, etc. Consequently, pastoralist 
income may be determined less by rainfall than by pasture levels. For instance, in Northern 
Kenya, herd losses are better explained by measures of pasture quality, such as the normalized 
difference vegetation index (NDVI), than by rainfall (Chantarat et al. forthcoming).  
The data for the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) and for rainfall are both drawn 
from the PARIMA data.40 Both the rainfall and NDVI data are derived from satellite data and 
represent the value for the pixel at the center of each location. The rainfall variable reflects the 
                                                          
40 As is further described in the associated codebook (Barrett et al. 2008), the NDVI data are drawn from the USGS 
ADDS-FEWS NDVIg (2000-2004) and USGS ADDS-FEWS NDVIrg (2000-2007) data series for NDVI 
(http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/.USGS/.ADDS/.NDVI/) and the rainfall data from NOAA NCEP CPC 
FEWS Gridded Africa DAILY RFE 
 (http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/SOURCES/.NOAA/.NCEP/.CPC/.FEWS/.Africa/.DAILY/.RFEv2/) .  
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total rainfall over the quarter, expressed in standard deviations from the quarter-specific average 
total rainfall for the quarter during the 2000 to 2004 period. NDVI measures the degree to which 
a pixel contains live green vegetation. The variable is used as a proxy for the available pasture 
for livestock. It measures the maximum NDVI from the quarter, in standard deviations, relative 
to the average maximum NDVI for the quarter during the 2000 to 2007 period. Current 
subjective perceptions are then matched with agro-meteorological conditions over the previous 
quarter. Table 4 shows the variation in rainfall and NDVI during the sample period, averaging 
the standard deviations across communities. Reflecting the bimodal distribution of rainfall, the 
2nd and 4th quarters have the highest levels of rainfall. The end of the major 1999-2000 drought 
appears clearly in the data. 
III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Income 
Perceptions regarding insecurity may affect income through a variety of channels including 
household-level migration, the composition and size of livestock portfolios, the division of 
livestock and family members between the base camp and satellite camps, or even market prices 
for animals and animal products and other general equilibrium effects. Although many of these 
responses are observable in the data, others are not, such as changes in animal husbandry. Rather 
than focusing on trying to identify a particular pathway, household income provides a summary 
measure the aggregate net effect of risk on well-being, whether through changed behavior, 
changes in prices, or other pathways. 
Income offers several advantages over consumption in these data. Insofar as households are able 
to smooth consumption through savings or inter- or intra-household transfers, consumption may 
understate the effects of risk. Moreover, in contrast to most surveys, in this setting income may 
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be easier to measure than consumption. Households were often divided geographically across 
multiple camps but the survey only interviewed those at the base camp. Average livestock 
production rates, however, are more easily obtained and are potentially less sensitive to recall 
bias than retrospective consumption measures. The managers of this survey expressly indicate 
greater confidence in the income aggregates than the consumption ones (Barrett et al. 2008). 
We estimate the following model: 
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡−𝑠1𝑠=0𝐾𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑠=1 + 𝜏𝑙𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
∑ 𝛿𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛
4
𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘2002𝑘=2000 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝜀 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 measures the total income of household i in community j during the quarter 
ending at time t. To better understand losses associated with insecurity, we also estimate 
equation (1) using each of the six income components (trade and business earnings, livestock 
sales, livestock products, crops harvested, remittances, and wages and salary) as the dependent 
variable in place of total household income. Income is a function of several factors. 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡−𝑠is a 
vector of the risk perceptions declared at both time t-1 for the past quarter and at time t for the 
coming quarter over K different risks. The perception measures are dichotomous (1=yes, 0=no), 
reflecting whether the household expressed concern about that specific risk.41 We first consider 
the effect of perceptions of insecurity and theft in isolation from other perceptions (K=2) before 
introducing all the other elicited risk perceptions (K=12).  
The household fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖, account for unobservable time invariant characteristics that 
might determine income, such as skill or social connections. Since the heads of household do not 
                                                          
41 In addition to this information, there is also information on the ordinal rankings of expressed risks. Since the 
concerns varies over both periods and respondents, it is difficult to incorporate the model without either imposing 
additional structure on the model or including dummy variables for the range of possibilities (e.g., ranked 2nd 
among 9 declared risks, ranked 3rd among 3 risks, etc.) 
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change during this period, this also includes the gender and education of the head of the 
household. The time varying household characteristics, 𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1, include the age and age squared 
of the head of the household to reflect potential changes in earnings due to lifecycle effects, and 
the number of household members (headcount), at time t-1, the beginning of the quarter in which 
the income is earned. We also include measures of aggregate livestock holdings (in tropical 
livestock units, TLU42) at the beginning of the period, in both linear and squared terms so as to 
allow for a non-linear effect of livestock holdings. These measures capture both much of the 
wealth of households as well as their relative exposure to insecurity and cattle theft.  
The 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 vector includes binary variables reflecting exogenous events the household 
suffered during the quarter in which the income was earned: any deaths of household members, 
any deaths of a working age individual (16-64), or any theft of livestock from the household 
(1=yes, 0=no). We do not include community shocks because missing information on several of 
these variables would reduce the final sample by roughly 40 percent. If shocks are correlated 
with risks, when shocks are omitted, the coefficients for perceptions may capture both effects. 
Since we are able to include variables measuring insecurity, such as livestock thefts, this is 
primarily a concern for the other risk perceptions, which are only included as controls anyway.  
The vector 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡 measures rainfall and pasture quality (NDVI) during the period in which 
the income is earned. Since the exact relationship between agro-meteorological conditions and 
income is unknown, we allow for a quadratic relation by including both linear and squared terms. 
These also control for certain weather-related community-level shocks. We also include quarter 
(seasonal) and year fixed effects. 
                                                          
42 Tropical livestock units are means to aggregate livestock by their mean live weights. We use the standard 
weighting system of TLU= 1 cattle = 0.7 camels = 10 goats = 11 sheep. 
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The top half of Table 5 presents the results when only the current and lagged perceptions for 
insecurity and theft are included (K=2) while the bottom panel includes all the available risk 
perceptions (K=12).43 The first column measures the effect of lagged perceptions on total income 
while the subsequent columns disaggregate this effect by examining the effects on each of the 
income components individually. The errors are clustered at the household level. 
At first glance, subjective perceptions of the risk of both insecurity and theft do not affect 
(aggregate) income. Even when income is disaggregated into its components, perceptions of 
insecurity are never correlated with any of the income components. In contrast, fears of livestock 
theft are associated with significant increases of income from livestock products, equivalent to 
13% of quarterly income. This may arise from an increase in the amount of slaughtered animals 
to prevent theft. Alternately, if the perceptions change herding patterns, it might allow greater 
time to milk animals. Additionally, when all the available risk perceptions are included, 
perceptions of livestock theft are also correlated with a slight decrease in incomes (1.4%) from 
remittances.  
Comparing the top and bottom halves of Table 5, the inclusion of the subjective expectations of a 
broader range of risks has only a limited impact on the point estimates of the effects of insecurity 
and their significance levels. This suggests that, in this particular context, examining the effects 
of insecurity and of perceptions of cattle theft in isolation from other potential risks does not 
greatly distort the findings.  
The results from Table 5 suggest that insecurity and fears of cattle theft have little if any effect of 
income. While the latter is associated with income changes, these are primarily positive and do 
                                                          
43 The full results are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
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not appear to affect aggregate income, presumably due to an ability of household to substitute 
income from different income sources. Of course, households whose income is relatively more 
concentrated remittances may be particularly vulnerable. In general, however, these results 
seemingly contrast with the literature which suggests and find effects of insecurity – particularly 
in conflicts as opposed to pastoral communities in Ethiopia – as well as the general qualitative 
evidence on insecurity in the studied area (Dercon 2004; Justino 2009;  Rockmore 2011; 2012).  
In part, this may arise from the model specification. In equation (1), the effects of risk 
perceptions, 𝛽𝑘, are allowed to vary across years. Its effects, however, are constrained to be 
constant within a given year. That is,  𝛽𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽𝑘𝑑𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛 within any given year.  There 
are, however, a variety of reasons to believe that the effects of risk perceptions may vary intra-
annually particularly as income generating opportunities likely vary greatly across seasons. In 
particular, the strong bimodal distribution of rainfall noted earlier regulates the economic 
opportunities, the associated returns, and the available diversification opportunities (Bailey et al., 
1999; Little et al., 2001). Even within rainy seasons, there are strong differences in the amount of 
rainfall and its certainty between the long and short rains. In addition to the clear implications for 
cropping, climate (including rainfall) helps to determine livestock productivity. The impact of 
climate on the productivity increases in lower less stable rainfall zones, precisely the areas which 
rely the most on livestock (Bailey et al., 1999). Moreover, prices for animal sales and animal 
products may be affected if supply and demand are related to seasons.  
We explore this possibility by relaxing the constraint in equation (1) that the effects of 
perceptions are constant across time.  
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(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡−𝑠 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛1𝑠=0𝐾𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑠=1 +
𝜏𝑙𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛4𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘2002𝑘=2000 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝜀 
Equation (2) is identical to equation (1) with the exception of the interaction between the current 
and lagged perceptions, 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡−𝑠, with the fixed effects for the quarter. The coefficient vector, 
𝛽𝑘, of the interaction terms represents the marginal effect of perceptions within the risk quarter, 
thereby allowing for seasonality in the impact of such risk on earnings.   
Table 6 presents the results for insecurity, the primary subjective perception of interest, when all 
the data for risk perceptions are used (K=12). The errors are clustered by household. For ease of 
comparison, the results from each of the regressions are presented horizontally. That is, the first 
row of results is drawn from a single estimation of equation (2) using total income as the 
dependent variable. Consequently, the vertical columns show the marginal effect of insecurity in 
each quarter across regressions. The top half of the table presents the results for current 
perceptions of insecurity while the bottom for the lagged perceptions. As shown in equation (2), 
both sets of interactions are included in each regression so that the first rows for current and 
lagged insecurity are from the same estimation. 
As specified in equation (2), the quarters are from time t and the income is from the quarter 
ending at time t. Therefore, in the 4th column, the current perception is from the beginning of the 
4th quarter, the lagged perception is from the beginning of the 3rd quarter and the income is 
earned between during the 3rd quarter. 
Two things emerge from table 6. First, there exists a certain amount of heterogeneity in the 
effects of perceptions that was previously masked. Depending on the quarter, current perceptions 
of insecurity are weakly correlated with income from livestock sales and remittances, equivalent 
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to 22 and 10 percent of average quarterly income respectively when significant. While there is 
(limited) potential for reverse causality between perceptions at end of the quarter and income 
earned during the quarter, this is not possible for the perceptions at the beginning of the quarter 
(the lagged perception). Here again, there is evidence of seasonality in the effects of perceptions 
as lagged insecurity is correlated with aggregate income and income from remittances. Not only 
do the significance levels increase, but the size of the magnitudes as well with insecurity at the 
beginning of the 3rd quarter leading to a more than 50 percent change in average quarterly 
income over the quarter.  
The second point which emerges is that perceptions of insecurity are not always significantly 
correlated with lower income. Whereas the literature has primarily linked insecurity with lower 
income, the results here are mixed. Current and lagged perceptions of insecurity are both linked 
with increases and decreases of income depending on the quarter of the perception and the 
income component. Most notably, the coefficient of lagged perceptions of insecurity on income 
during the 3rd quarter is not only positive but also significant at the 1.7 percent level. 
The positive coefficients on insecurity might arise for several reasons. One possibility is that 
households increase consumption (and hence income) during periods of insecurity in order to 
mitigate potential losses. Another possibility is that this increased income compensates for 
decreased income in the prior period. In particular, the coefficient for current perceptions of 
insecurity in column (3) is barely insignificant (significant at the 10.7 percent level). In that case, 
the (current) perceived insecurity would lead to substantial decreased income in the 2nd quarter (-
431 birr) which would be partially compensated (+341 birr) in the subsequent 3rd quarter (as it 
becomes a lagged perception).  
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In part, the identification of the heterogeneous effects of perceptions across quarters is 
complicated by the dichotomous nature of the measure of insecurity. The inability to capture 
changes in the magnitude of risk perceptions reduces the variation in the data, making it more 
difficult to identify the effects of insecurity (and other perceptions) particularly with the 
individual level fixed effects and the relatively short panel (8 periods). Despite this difficulty, 
there is still evidence of seasonality. Although the coefficients for the interactions terms are 
frequently statistically different in pairwise statistical tests, they are typically not significantly 
different in joint statistical tests of the interaction terms between insecurity and quarter. 
IV. The Dynamics of Subjective Perceptions of Insecurity Risk 
The previous analyses suggest that subjective perceptions of insecurity affect, often negatively, 
income and its various components. Consequently, it is important to better understand the 
persistence of subjective insecurity risk across time because if households update such 
perceptions quickly, then the economic costs of insecurity can be limited when violence 
subsides, while if insecurity risk perceptions persist, economic recovery post-violence might be 
quite slow.  
We examine the dynamics of insecurity perceptions by estimating the following conditional 
fixed effects logit model: 
(3) 𝑅𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−𝑙𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜏𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛4𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘2002𝑘=2000 +
∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀 
where 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the risk perception of household i in community j at time t for a particular risk, in 
this case Insecurity. We allow lagged effects of up to L periods. Since theory does not suggest 
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the correct number of lagged perceptions (L) to include, we use goodness of fit (GOF) criteria 
(AIC, BIC and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests) to select among models with up to four lagged 
perceptions. In each case, the GOF measures suggest the use of four lags. While we only present 
the results with four lagged periods, the omitted models with shorter lags are qualitatively 
similar. 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 is a vector composed of linear and quadratic rainfall and NDVI measures 
for the quarter in which the income is earned. We also include quarter, year and household (𝛾𝑖) 
fixed effects. The error term, 𝜀, is assumed to be iid normal.  
The vector 𝛽𝑙 contains the primary coefficients of interest, reflecting the effect of l
th lags of risk 
perceptions on current perceptions. If the βs are jointly insignificant, then current risk 
perceptions are independent of prior perceptions. 𝜏𝑗 represents the estimated marginal effect of 
prior agro-meteorological realizations on current risk perceptions. 𝛿 represents the estimated 
impact of seasonality, net of rainfall and NDVI from the prior quarter, on current perceptions.  
The first column of Table 7 presents the results without the inclusion of shocks. The lagged 
values of perceptions of insecurity in the column are all individually significant and have a 
negative (but greater than -0.1) marginal effect, which implies that the effects of prior 
perceptions dissipate rapidly and oscillate over time. Although these marginal effects are highly 
significant statistically, their magnitudes and thus true economic significance are quite small. In 
this context, insecurity risk perceptions are largely newly determined each quarter, controlling 
for seasonality and agro-meteorological conditions. This rapid updating of subjective beliefs 
about the risk of violence is a hopeful indication that improvements in security can yield quick 
economic dividends. 
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Agro-meteorological conditions appear to play an important role in determining conflict risk 
perceptions, as above average levels of pasture (as reflected in NDVI) are significantly 
associated with insecurity. In particular, evaluated at the sample mean, a one standard deviation 
is very significantly associated with a 25 percent higher likelihood of being insecure. Insofar as 
NDVI is correlated across quarter, this large increase is partially offset by the negative 
coefficient on lagged NDVI. The finding that insecurity increases with pasture availability is 
consistent with several different explanations. For instance, better forage for animals might 
provide greater rewards for looting. Similarly, the better forage might facilitate raids by 
improving livestock health thereby making it easier to escape with them. In contrast to pasture 
quality, rainfall does not appear to influence perceptions of insecurity. This result is perhaps a 
little surprising as decreases in rainfall may lead to greater amounts of livestock and of different 
clans congregating competing for the same water holes.  
While current perceptions respond to prior beliefs, this may mask the effects of the realization of 
these risks (i.e., violence). Moreover, in addition to information imparted by a shock, individuals 
frequently overweight information from recent shocks (Doss et al. 2008). Although the survey 
does not measure insecurity or violence directly, it does contain information at both the 
household and community levels for stolen livestock and raids respectively.  
Since a number of community observations are missing and since some of these absences may 
by endogenous to perceptions, we first introduce the household measure for the number of stolen 
livestock over the previous quarter (column 2). As can be seen, this has no substantive impact on 
either the statistical significance or the magnitude of the estimated marginal effects of any of the 
lagged risk perception variables. This may partially reflect the relative few instances of cattle 
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theft in the data; thefts were reported in less than one half of one percent of the quarter-
household observations.  
Community shocks are included in the third column. The estimation contains only one lag of 
perceptions as the estimation fails to converge with additional lags. Despite this change in the 
structure of the model, the results are similar although the marginal effects greatly increase. The 
increase in the marginal effect of the lagged perception likely reflects both the effect of the one 
quarter lag and that of previous lags. Insofar as community level shocks are not statistically 
significant, the potential endogeneity of community attrition and the goodness of fit criteria, we 
place more weight on columns 1 and 2. Moreover, irrespective of the mode, the same results 
emerge: while prior beliefs matters, the effects of pasture quality are much important, and 
rainfall has no impact. 
V. Discussion 
Despite the central role played by risk in spreading the negative effects of conflict and violence, 
subjective perceptions of risk have not previously been directly measured in the economics 
literature. Using a unique panel of ten quarters of subjective risk data and incomes from southern 
Ethiopia, this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we examine the effect of 
subjective perceptions of insecurity risk on income and find that its effect is masked when it is 
constrained to be identical across quarters and income components. This suggests that cross-
sectional analyses of the effects of insecurity may miss important effects since they typically 
only observe one period. Moreover, depending on the season, they may erroneously find that 
perceptions of insecurity are or are not associated with income. 
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Further research is needed to determine whether these seasonal effects of insecurity risk 
perceptions reflect livelihood decisions, such as herd migration, which are costly to reverse, or 
whether households simply smooth income across periods. Further, whereas the effect of the risk 
of conflict has previously been examined only in isolation from other risks, we explicitly control 
for the perceptions of a variety of other common risks. In general, the addition of other 
subjective perceptions did not greatly influence the results. This suggests that analyses of 
insecurity performed without accounting for other risks may suffer from little or no bias to these 
omitted variables. 
Second, we examine how subjective risk perceptions of insecurity evolve across time and, 
particularly, the role of prior beliefs in determining current perceptions. While prior risk 
perceptions have a statistically significant effect on current beliefs, the magnitude of 
autocorrelation is relatively small and declines over time. This suggests that household largely 
determine their beliefs about the risk of violence anew each period within this setting. 
Consequently, insofar as subjective expectations determine outcomes, households and 
communities may recover relatively rapidly after episodes of violence. 
Moreover, the literature on conflict has frequently focused on the role of rainfall in economy 
growth and the incidence of conflict (Miguel et al. 2004). Recent studies have tried to expand 
this focus to other factors such as temperature (Burke et al. 2009). We add to the literature by 
examining the relative effects of pasture (NDVI) as well as rainfall. While NDVI has been 
studied previously, for instance as an alternative to rainfall in earlier drafts44 of Miguel et. al. 
(2004) which established the importance of rainfall, we are not aware of studies which study the 
                                                          
44 In the BREAD working paper (#040) version of their paper, footnote 19 notes that previous versions of the paper 
used NDVI as an alternate measure of weather variation.   
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comparative effects, especially in the context of subjective risk perceptions. We find that 
measures of pasture availability (NDVI) are relatively more important than rainfall in 
determining current perceptions of insecurity risk. Insofar as risk perceptions are related to 
realizations or shocks, this suggests that rainfall might not be as important as the availability of 
pasture in primarily pastoralist settings, such as much of the Horn of Africa. These results 
suggest that agro-meteorological forecasts can perhaps be used to pre-emptively prepare policy 
interventions to combat the effects of insecurity. While data are often sparse in these regions, the 
importance of the NDVI suggests that remote sensing data can play an important role. 
Unlike civil wars, which are anomalous events, reports of violence and insecurity have been 
commonplace in the pastoral communities which dominate arid and semi-arid lands (McPeak et 
al. 2012). This suggests a need to broaden the focus of the conflict literature from relatively rare 
civil wars to areas where insecurity has been and continues to be a regular feature of everyday 
life. More broadly, the nuanced effect of insecurity suggests a need for continued study to better 
understand its impacts and to guide policy. 
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Table 1: Average Quarterly Household Income and Sources 
      
 Total Income (Birr) 664 % of total   
    Trade and Business 37 5.6%   
    Livestock Sales 157 23.7%   
    Livestock Products 372 56.0%   
    Crop Harvested 26 3.9%   
    Remittances 65 9.8%   
    Wage and Salary 7 1.0%   
Average household size 8.45     
Income per capita ($)* 0.10     
Observations 1296     
* Average exchange rate of 8.4 Birr/US Dollar during 
survey period   
 
 
 
Table 2: Percent of Households Afraid of Risks in Coming 
Quarter 
      
Risk Ethiopia   
Not enough food for people 88.4%   
High prices for things you buy 82.8%   
Low prices for animals you wish to sell 71.0%   
Not enough pasture for animals 70.4%   
Human sickness 69.0%   
Insecurity/violence/fights 64.3%   
Animal sickness/death 62.6%   
Not enough water for animals 61.3%   
No buyers for animals you wish to sell 59.2%   
Crops Fail 59.0%   
Animal loss due to theft/raiding 47.2%   
Other 6.8%   
Pooled Sample=1440     
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Table 3: Fear of Insecurity and Theft Disaggregated by 
Location 
      
Community Insecurity Theft 
Dida Hara 47.6% 24.5% 
Dillo 88.0% 62.7% 
Finchawa 5.5% 7.9% 
Qorate 98.3% 97.3% 
Wachille 82.7% 45.0% 
Pooled Sample=1440     
 
 
                                           Table 4: Variation in Agro-Meteorological  
                                           Conditions from Quarter Means (in Std Dev.)  
 
                                           Period NDVI Rainfall  
                                           2000: Q1  -0.15           -0.88   
                                           2000: Q2*  -0.23           -0.47   
                                           2000: Q3   0.27            2.44   
                                           2000: Q4**   0.27            0.11   
                                           2001: Q1   0.42            0.33   
                                           2001: Q2*           -0.14           -0.32   
                                           2001: Q3             -0.43           -0.68   
                                           2001: Q4**         -0.35           -0.42   
                                           2002: Q1              0.26            0.38   
                                           2002: Q2*            0.01           -0.03   
                                           * Indicates long rains   
                                           ** indicates short rains 
  
 145 
 
Table 5: Estimated Effects of Insecurity and Theft Risk Perceptions on Income and its 
Components (Birr) 
                
Just Including Insecurity and Theft (K=2) 
          
    Components of Income 
      Livestock Livestock       
  Income Trade Sales Products Crop Remittances Wages 
Insecurity, t -60.28 -76.47 33.01 -40.64 -6.51 28.81 1.53 
  (145.13) (71.66) (39.79) (86.25) (17.58) (28.86) (5.62) 
                  t-1 -73.01 -93.38 13.38 63.07 -29.58 -30.03 3.53 
  (120.75) (87.83) (38.71) (52.01) (20.85) (24.80) (6.86) 
Theft,          t 20.85 -18.51 -20.11 90.87** -4.09 -22.79 -4.52 
  (70.68) (23.15) (30.02) (43.61) (15.75) (16.17) (3.96) 
                  t-1 -2.56 -54.12 -4.10 47.83 0.55 9.80 -2.51 
  (65.67) (43.11) (26.07) (33.39) (7.27) (19.61) (5.24) 
Total Obs 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
Total HHs 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.10 -0.01 
                
Controlling for all Perceived Risks (K=12) 
          
    Components of Income 
      Livestock Livestock       
  Income Trade Sales Products Crop Remittances Wages 
Insecurity, t -23.34 -33.94 27.51 -55.43 11.23 26.43 0.87 
  (121.14) (40.09) (40.25) (95.26) (18.71) (27.57) (6.07) 
                  t-1 -47.79 -80.68 1.74 58.89 -16.09 -17.26 5.61 
  (106.36) (72.14) (39.77) (60.35) (16.11) (22.14) (6.69) 
Theft,          t 24.93 13.42 -48.58 87.14* -10.74 -6.90 -9.42** 
  (70.57) (19.91) (33.36) (44.79) (18.32) (19.91) (4.70) 
                  t-1 -27.58 -36.62 -17.15 7.66 -8.22 28.28 -1.53 
  (68.32) (24.54) (33.43) (42.19) (10.65) (19.43) (5.63) 
Total Obs 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
Total HHs 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.00 
*,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
The regressions also control for agro-meteorological conditions, household characteristics, 
livestock holdings, and household and time fixed effects.  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the household level 
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Table 6: Estimated Quarter-Specific Marginal Effects of Insecurity (Birr) 
              
Insecurity, t Marginal Effect of Insecurity in Quarter Obs Adj. R2 
 
1 2 3 4   
 Total Income (Birr) 52.76 -33.90 -431.32 -42.33 1152 0.17 
  (145.58) (144.43) (265.61) (195.52)   
     Trade and Business -42.45 -4.94 -148.34 12.80 1152 0.14 
  (42.58) (25.26) (156.77) (87.02)   
     Livestock Sales 86.94 74.18 -143.95* -42.98 1152 0.11 
  (73.45) (56.42) (85.34) (94.99)   
     Livestock Products 9.41 -159.71 -135.20 -118.78 1152 0.18 
  (119.43) (132.44) (122.91) (93.92)   
     Crop Harvested -4.99 -5.92 -1.52 31.98 1152 0.25 
  (10.41) (30.32) (70.26) (17.43)   
     Remittances 7.03 55.96 -0.35 67.79* 1152 0.13 
  (27.70) (44.96) (130.64) (39.81)   
     Wage and Salary -3.19 6.54 -1.97 6.85 1152 0.04 
  (13.69) (9.15) (9.37) (6.78)     
              
Insecurity, t-1 Marginal Effect of Insecurity in Quarter Obs adj R2 
  1 2 3 4     
Total Income (Birr) -89.75 4.92 160.18 341.43** 1152 0.17 
  (125.60) (160.18) (309.92) (141.93)   
     Trade and Business -24.89 -81.94 -212.65 -48.19 1152 0.14 
  (58.38) (77.99) (167.63) (46.82)   
     Livestock Sales 21.24 20.33 -55.52 67.81 1152 0.11 
  (69.25) (59.75) (116.75) (79.87)   
     Livestock Products -4.89 98.88 201.34 235.27 1152 0.18 
  (93.87) (63.32) (130.42) (161.20)   
     Crop Harvested -20.67 -24.33 -3.47 25.00 1152 0.25 
  (29.81) (43.37) (11.79) (18.32)   
     Remittances -69.19* -13.36 -23.28 39.40 1152 0.13 
  (38.71) (48.04) (39.40) (38.10)   
     Wage and Salary 8.65 5.35 8.36 5.65 1152 0.04 
  (12.88) (6.65) (9.13) (9.76)   
 *,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
The regressions also control for agro-meteorological conditions, household characteristics, 
livestock holdings, and household and time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the household level 
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Table 7: Marginal Effect of Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic on Perceptions 
            
  (1) (2) (3)     
Perception,       t-1 -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.20***     
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)     
                         t-2 -0.06*** -0.05*** -     
  (0.01) (0.01)       
                         t-3 -0.04*** -0.04*** -     
  (0.01) (0.01)       
                         t-4 -0.07*** -0.06*** -     
  (0.02) (0.01)       
NDVI (at mean), t 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.63***     
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.23)     
NDVI (at mean), t-1 -0.11* -0.11* 0.17     
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.20)     
Rainfall  (at mean), t -0.00 0.00 -0.00     
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.18)     
Rainfall  (at mean), t-1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02     
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)     
Quarter 1 (1=yes) 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.49***     
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)     
Quarter 2 (1=yes) 0.10** 0.09** 0.61**     
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.24)     
Quarter 3 (1=yes) 0.28** 0.27** 0.91***     
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)     
Quarter 4 (1=yes) 0.02 0.02 0.75***     
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.19)     
Livestock stolen - -0.06 0.01     
    (0.05) (0.21)     
Raid in community - - -0.16     
      (0.14)     
Total Obs 444 444 535     
Total HHs 74 74 78     
AIC 216.23 216.94 307.92     
BIC 281.76 286.57 376.43     
            
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000:
Q1
2000:
Q2
2000:
Q3
2000:
Q4
2001:
Q1
2001:
Q2
2001:
Q3
2001:
Q4
2002:
Q1
2002:
Q2
Pe
rc
en
t o
f H
ou
se
ho
ld
s W
ho
 R
ep
or
t B
ei
ng
 A
fr
ia
d 
fo
r C
om
in
g 
Q
ua
rt
er
 
Quarters 
Figure 1: Perceptions of Insecurity and Theft 
Across Time 
Insecurity
Theft
 149 
 
Appendix Table 1: Variables and Data 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Total Income (Birr) 662.9 996.9 -1619.7 13437.5 
    Trade and Business 37.0 390.9 0.0 9000.0 
    Livestock Sales 6.4 46.4 0.0 1000.0 
    Livestock Products 158.9 356.6 0.0 3200.0 
    Crop Harvested 370.5 705.6 0.0 9200.0 
    Remittances 25.0 135.3 0.0 2718.1 
    Wage and Salary 65.1 193.3 -3000.0 2393.4 
Household size 8.7 4.5 2.0 22.0 
Any livestock stolen 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
NDVI 0.0 0.4 -0.6 1.4 
(NDVI)2 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.9 
Rainfall 0.2 0.9 -1.0 3.4 
(Rainfall)2 0.9 2.4 0.0 11.7 
Any raid in community 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Not enough pasture for animals 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Not enough water for animals 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Animal sickness/death 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Animal loss due to theft/raiding 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Insecurity/violence/fights 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Human sickness 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
No buyers for animals you wish to sell 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Low prices for animals you wish to sell 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Not enough food for people 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 
High prices for things you buy 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Crops Fail 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Other 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Death in the HH 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Adult death in HH 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Age Head of HH 49.8 16.4 23.0 100.0 
(Age of Head)2 2748.0 1867.0 529.0 10000.0 
Herd size (TLU) 13.8 26.4 0.0 438.1 
(Herd size)2 886.0 7123.6 0.0 191960.1 
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Appendix 1 Table 2: Impact of Perceptions on Income, Full Results (K=2) 
                
    Components of Income 
      Livestock Livestock       
  Income Trade Sales Products Crop Remittances Wages 
Insecurity, t -60.28 -76.47 33.01 -40.64 -6.51 28.81 1.53 
  [145.13] [71.66] [39.79] [86.25] [17.58] [28.86] [5.62] 
Insecurity, t-1 -73.01 -93.38 13.38 63.07 -29.58 -30.03 3.53 
  [120.75] [87.83] [38.71] [52.01] [20.85] [24.80] [6.86] 
Theft, t 20.85 -18.51 -20.11 90.87** -4.09 -22.79 -4.52 
  [70.68] [23.15] [30.02] [43.61] [15.75] [16.17] [3.96] 
Theft, t-1 -2.56 -54.12 -4.1 47.83 0.55 9.8 -2.51 
  [65.67] [43.11] [26.07] [33.39] [7.27] [19.61] [5.24] 
Rainfall 66.72 -70.27 127.53*** 87.4 -7.56 -74.64*** 4.26 
  [104.01] [56.78] [43.99] [56.08] [22.37] [25.70] [5.49] 
(Rainfall)2 33.13 23.93 -27.07* 9.63 -3.64 31.79*** -1.52 
  [40.83] [18.73] [15.93] [25.12] [5.94] [10.83] [2.31] 
NDVI -1,160.57*** -16.83 -251.73*** -931.34*** -56.27* 92.20*** 3.39 
  [189.79] [30.30] [76.51] [160.56] [29.03] [33.59] [8.20] 
(NDVI)2 600.84*** -0.91 86.09 498.48*** 77.85*** -56.91** -3.75 
  [140.55] [17.17] [61.06] [118.02] [21.87] [28.79] [7.42] 
Quarter 1 (1=yes) 108.65* 21.42 -6.64 125.21** -33.64*** -0.85 3.14 
  [59.90] [39.66] [38.03] [49.96] [11.43] [22.49] [4.34] 
Quarter 3 (1=yes) -397.23*** -4.2 -58.92 -395.89*** 23.63 32.44 5.72 
  [111.51] [50.71] [49.98] [89.24] [16.80] [29.13] [10.45] 
Quarter 4 (1=yes) -79.9 20.75 41.62 -107.64 -45.37*** 9.11 1.63 
  [96.97] [49.91] [52.49] [83.83] [14.71] [23.44] [5.81] 
Year=2001 (1=yes) -291.99*** -27.08 37.96 -246.18*** -20.81* -43.31*** 7.44 
  [71.47] [26.95] [35.60] [50.81] [11.05] [11.85] [4.58] 
Herd size (TLU), t-1 17.67*** 1.74 4.85** 10.12*** 1.52** -0.72 0.16* 
  [5.46] [1.83] [1.90] [3.82] [0.75] [1.06] [0.09] 
(Herd size)2, t-1 -0.06 -34.71 6.51 59.74 0.12 0.02 -0.02 
  [125.46] [0.00] [0.47] [85.41] [24.09] [0.23] [0.00] 
Age Head of HH, t-1 -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.09 -0.11 -0.00*** 0.01*** 2.9 
  [0.01] [51.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.18] [22.88] [7.03] 
(Age of Head)2, t-1 -0.31 0.01 -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.74 -34 -0.00* 
  [1.14] [0.30] [47.90] [0.73] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] 
Livestock stolen, t -253.31 17.93 -137.49* -251.85** 51.29 66.65 0.15 
  [229.62] [44.76] [78.26] [112.44] [32.58] [74.86] [6.89] 
Death in the HH, t 367.54 -16.42 206.18 178.27 -24.23 36.37 -12.62 
  [298.81] [21.25] [133.38] [177.12] [17.51] [47.63] [10.00] 
Adult death in HH, t -293.97 51.75 -325.75** -24.97 49.5 -48.54 4.04 
  [366.91] [47.35] [149.07] [237.95] [60.22] [48.26] [11.09] 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
Number of master 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.1 -0.01 
*,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
Standard errors in brackets, errors are clustered at the household level 
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Appendix 1 Table 2: Impact of Perceptions on Income, Full Results (Continued with K=12) 
                
    Components of Income 
      Livestock Livestock       
  Income Trade Sales Products Crop Remittances Wages 
Insecurity, t -23.34 -33.94 27.51 -55.43 11.23 26.43 0.87 
  [121.14] [40.09] [40.25] [95.26] [18.71] [27.57] [6.07] 
Insecurity, t-1 -47.79 -80.68 1.74 58.89 -16.09 -17.26 5.61 
  [106.36] [72.14] [39.77] [60.35] [16.11] [22.14] [6.69] 
Theft, t 24.93 13.42 -48.58 87.14* -10.74 -6.9 -9.42** 
  [70.57] [19.91] [33.36] [44.79] [18.32] [19.91] [4.70] 
Theft, t-1 -27.58 -36.62 -17.15 7.66 -8.22 28.28 -1.53 
  [68.32] [24.54] [33.43] [42.19] [10.65] [19.43] [5.63] 
Rainfall 118.44 -70.86 113.19** 114.44* 7.84 -48.28* 2.11 
  [108.66] [56.68] [43.52] [61.95] [14.33] [27.91] [5.79] 
(Rainfall)2 10.82 22.05 -23.07 0.88 -10.34*** 22.47* -1.17 
  [42.68] [17.11] [16.12] [28.19] [3.71] [12.48] [2.42] 
NDVI -1,179.95*** -12.88 -249.08*** -936.44*** -40.03 53.62 4.86 
  [207.21] [37.09] [82.70] [165.99] [25.25] [37.04] [11.00] 
(NDVI)2 568.19*** -36.53 89.28 517.81*** 47.16** -44.17 -5.36 
  [150.24] [45.90] [63.01] [127.65] [20.62] [32.74] [9.74] 
Quarter 1 (1=yes) 128.13* 19.81 -7.53 141.94*** -20.51* -10.91 5.33 
  [67.93] [40.63] [45.84] [46.64] [12.38] [24.61] [5.09] 
Quarter 3 (1=yes) -386.19*** -15.27 -87.9 -353.21*** 38.25** 24.82 7.12 
  [118.39] [47.92] [53.70] [85.06] [15.21] [30.10] [11.33] 
Quarter 4 (1=yes) -74.23 4.29 25.7 -72.68 -26.57** -8.18 3.21 
  [114.12] [36.05] [60.54] [81.31] [11.30] [20.58] [6.35] 
Year=2001 (1=yes) -294.58*** -35 32.83 -231.31*** -10.33 -57.53*** 6.76 
  [79.40] [31.32] [38.32] [53.46] [7.22] [13.88] [4.74] 
Herd size (TLU), t-1 18.30*** 1.68 5.14*** 10.47*** 1.51** -0.57 0.08 
  [5.57] [1.84] [1.95] [3.90] [0.62] [1.24] [0.07] 
(Herd size)2, t-1 11.77 -56.49 -0.01*** -0.26 11.12 0.03 0 
  [1.18] [0.00] [0.48] [0.70] [18.58] [0.00] [0.04] 
Age Head of HH, t-1 -0.42 -0.02*** -4.4 -0.04*** -0.02 0.01*** -0.02 
  [137.14] [60.93] [55.82] [0.01] [0.17] [0.24] [6.43] 
(Age of Head)2, t-1 -0.06*** -0.13 -0.02 113.06 -0.00*** -52.97* 1.45 
  [0.01] [0.40] [0.00] [86.75] [0.00] [27.94] [0.00] 
Livestock stolen, t -166.08 29.25 -84.97 -236.76* 61.31 63.95 1.13 
  [271.65] [78.58] [108.20] [126.44] [41.82] [78.96] [6.28] 
Death in the HH, t 375.71 -12.63 160 217.12 -15.23 34.75 -8.3 
  [300.66] [39.58] [132.02] [179.56] [18.25] [51.34] [6.38] 
Adult death in HH, t -380.91 9.56 -317.27** -19.37 5.18 -55.33 -3.67 
  [375.31] [42.32] [143.77] [243.31] [55.49] [52.39] [11.32] 
Animal pasture, t 61.11 13.24 10.6 40.27 6.92 -18.28 8.37 
  [68.82] [41.56] [35.13] [40.84] [11.81] [17.25] [8.24] 
Animal pasture, t-1 -0.24 -14.58 30.03 -4.69 -12.78 1.77 0.01 
  [82.69] [27.20] [28.20] [50.42] [15.38] [11.94] [4.98] 
Water for animals, t 19.29 39.58 50.56 -92.83** 4.84 22.22 -5.08 
  [65.19] [37.61] [34.91] [44.03] [12.16] [19.24] [6.11] 
Water for animals, t-1 -95.01 11.11 -1.93 -63.94 -12 -31.75* 3.5 
  [78.89] [15.84] [34.02] [51.55] [17.01] [17.88] [5.50] 
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Animal sickness, t 25.11 -48.45 -7.65 87.9 21.83 -30.13 1.61 
  [51.61] [42.57] [38.55] [71.00] [16.97] [26.66] [5.56] 
Animal sickness, t-1 200.58** 22.29 20.59 112.77* 33.29 17.35 -5.71 
  [92.65] [22.67] [30.79] [64.53] [22.51] [19.10] [4.06] 
Human sickness, t -42.33 -22.03 1.19 -24.04 15.55 -14.68 1.67 
  [60.11] [14.21] [31.93] [46.89] [15.69] [19.06] [4.21] 
Human sickness, t-1 -34.98 19.12 1.15 -13.74 -15.39 -25.8 -0.32 
  [81.77] [23.36] [39.88] [45.13] [19.15] [19.88] [5.48] 
No buyer animals, t -45.3 -26.86 25.84 -23.82 -14.92 -15.35 9.82* 
  [60.06] [34.33] [39.62] [48.94] [14.60] [21.97] [5.23] 
No buyer animals, t-1 54.06 -25.77 21.27 45.71 22.13 -12.85 3.57 
  [65.52] [23.02] [32.91] [48.75] [16.64] [17.62] [6.58] 
Low animal price, t 11.09 14.79 -34.44 -0.63 -1.58 37.85 -4.9 
  [61.83] [18.68] [45.40] [62.74] [14.84] [24.89] [5.52] 
Low animal price, t-1 -100.72 -1.69 -61.29* -30.52 -4.18 -0.31 -2.72 
  [61.90] [15.44] [33.47] [35.35] [19.51] [14.83] [2.92] 
Food for people, t -174.75 -105.56 -8.53 56.26 -93.99*** -10.51 -12.42 
  [140.41] [80.42] [43.19] [86.64] [30.90] [20.75] [9.64] 
Food for people, t-1 -73.39 -61.63 -36.08 132.68 -65.49** -30.3 -12.58 
  [168.82] [94.40] [63.45] [98.22] [28.35] [25.25] [7.90] 
High prices, t 20.63 -16.46 17.31 -31.42 36.71 8.15 6.32 
  [84.70] [23.79] [31.52] [63.44] [27.67] [22.91] [6.73] 
High prices, t -18.44 -40.38 42.18 -22.67 14.94 -7.25 -5.27 
  [84.51] [36.59] [46.62] [55.22] [16.64] [22.69] [7.44] 
Crops fail, t 129.47** 23.22 79.85** 1.01 -19.87 44.39** 0.88 
  [54.68] [20.17] [37.12] [40.25] [15.01] [19.90] [3.25] 
Crops fail, t-1 -102.35 -4.36 96.94** -124.68*** -36.97* -36.35* 3.06 
  [71.16] [10.82] [38.06] [42.49] [19.49] [18.42] [3.59] 
Other shock, t 165.04 99.1 72.85 -38.3 27 5.37 -0.97 
  [111.18] [96.98] [45.31] [56.41] [31.51] [43.37] [4.75] 
Other shock, t-1 178.64* 51.14 56.58 -24.92 68.16** 31.32 -3.64 
  [105.05] [41.91] [45.33] [60.11] [33.19] [37.64] [3.77] 
HH size, t-1 13.3 11.44 -33.72 48.36 -7.72 -4.88 -0.18 
  [105.58] [70.31] [31.82] [53.82] [9.30] [9.46] [2.61] 
Observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
Number of master 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.00 
*,**,*** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
Standard errors in brackets, errors are clustered at the household level 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RISK OF VIOLENCE: POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
 
The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) reports that roughly one quarter of individuals live 
either in fragile and conflict-affected countries or in countries with very high levels of violence 
(World Bank 2011). Moreover, recent elections in Sub-Saharan Africa have been associated with 
violence (Kenya 2007; Zimbabwe 2008) and coups (Mali and Guinea-Bissau 2012) with some 
research that violence affects between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa (Bekoe 2010). 
Consequently, beyond the current focus of finding policies to help countries transition from post-
conflict to developing, it is urgent to understand which policies are effective during conflicts and 
widespread insecurity The importance is further underlined by new research pointing to the 
lasting effects of conflict not only on poverty but also on long run health and education levels – 
two vital and often irreversible determinants of the intergenerational transfer of poverty. Since 
recent research suggests that much of these costs are due to self-imposed costly responses to 
insecurity, this also suggests strong benefits to active policy interventions. 
Although this new research has noted the importance of insecurity and household responses, the 
risk of violence has not yet been quantitatively measured. The primarily contribution of this 
dissertation has been to formally measure and quantify its effects. The primary result which 
emerges from chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the important costs of insecurity. These high costs emerge 
equally in Uganda, which was in the midst of large and long-lasting civil war, as well as in 
Ethiopia, an area without large organized violence but rather a history of more sporadic and 
isolated violence as well as established conflict-risk mitigation strategies. While the estimated 
 157 
 
household losses from insecurity during the civil war (chapter 2) appear modest, roughly 2 to 6 
percent, these are arguably quite large since they compound over time and since the average civil 
war last roughly 7 years (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). 
While the dissertation adds to our understanding of the effects of insecurity, further research is 
needed to begin to formulate research-driven policy. In particular, fours areas stand out. First, 
while the dissertation has quantified the importance of insecurity, it focuses on income, 
consumption and asset portfolios. However, as noted earlier, many of the important 
consequences from conflict are through non-monetary factors such as education and nutrition. 
Are the costs identified by the literature primarily due to insecurity or actual exposure to 
violence? If the former, are these costs the result of the decreased income identified in the 
dissertation, general equilibrium effects through prices, switches in livelihoods or even changes 
in intra-household allocations? In particular, for nutrition, each of these may suggest different 
policy interventions. For instance, Valente (2011) finds that in utero exposure to conflict leads to 
worse health and birth outcomes. Since she does not differentiate between risk and exposure and 
then among the different pathways ranging from stress to malnutrition to shifts in income, it is 
not possible to design an effective policy response. 
Second, since conflicts persist across time, it is important better understand the importance of the 
timing of perceptions of insecurity. Chapter 5 finds that strong seasonality in the effects of 
subjective expectations of insecurity. While this is strongly influenced by the pastoral setting and 
the bimodal distribution of rainfall, it is likely present in other settings in which income streams 
are lumpy or where household make costly and potentially irreversible decisions on income 
streams at particular points in the year such as in agriculture. Further research is needed to 
understand the implications of seasonality on the effects of insecurity. In particular, multiple 
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period models which incorporate sequential investments and the timing of decisions and of 
subjective expectations of insecurity can usefully identify the importance of the timing of 
perceptions. 
Third, there is a need to models that can forecast instability and violence. As chapter 5 discusses, 
agro-meteorological conditions may be particularly important as rainfall and, especially, pasture 
quality are linked with perceptions of insecurity. While certainly not true in all contexts, remote 
sensing data may be useful in many pastoral contexts although further research is needed. While 
the researchers with links to the military have already begun to incorporate agro-ecological 
conditions into models of conflict (The Economist 2012), their focus is on the outbreak of 
violence. As discussed in the dissertation, the majority of monetary losses from conflict arise 
from costly household responses to insecurity. Since insecurity can arise without the outbreak of 
violence, research on forecasting subjective expectations of insecurity (as opposed to the 
outbreak of violence) can play an important role in targeting policies and humanitarian aid.  
Fourth, the dissertation has pointed to the important behavioral responses to insecurity. Insofar as 
conflicts often persist across long periods of time and, since the only experience with economic 
activity of some young adults is during conflict, do some of these behavioral consequences 
become ingrained? For instance, do individuals post-conflict have different propensities to save 
or to invest across risky assets based on their experience with insecurity (i.e., duration and initial 
age at exposure)? Similarly, recent research has identified important behavioral consequences 
from exposure to violence. If the insecurity does lead to behavioral changes, what is the 
relationship between the two? The effect of exposure to violence may depend on the prior 
exposure to insecurity. Similarly, while there appear to be widespread behavioral responses to 
insecurity, these could be amplified by previous exposure to violence. This would fit both within 
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the mental health literature, such as with post-traumatic stress disorder, or the economics 
literature which finds that proximity to events may distort perceptions.  
Additionally, the behavioral consequences of exposure to violence are typically identified by 
comparing individuals within the conflict, specifically those with histories of exposure to 
violence with those with no prior exposure. This identification strategy may provide only a lower 
bound estimate since the non-treated population has been affected by insecurity. This suggests 
that comparisons of the behavioral effects of different degrees of exposure might offer more 
precise measures. 
The WDR 2011 notes that no Millennium Development Goal has been achieved by a low income 
fragile or conflict-affected country (World Bank 2011). Hopefully, this dissertation makes a 
small contribution to designing policies to address this. 
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